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Abstract 
        Throughout the Republican era in China (1911-1949), American-trained Chinese 
scholars played critical roles in establishing Chinese institutions for agricultural 
education, research, and extension. This dissertation argues that it was the sense of 
“belonging to China” as a cultural and social entity—not a political one—that motivated 
Chinese scientists to study in the U.S. and to return to China, to apply their knowledge to 
the social problems of their homeland. Based on the American model, the scientific 
institutions established by these scholars nonetheless developed into a pattern uniquely 
adapted to the Chinese situation. This dissertation also explores the motivations and 
strategies used by these American-trained Chinese scholars to fulfil their desire of serving 
China by developing hybrid agricultural ideas, practices, and institutions. Due to political 
decentralization in Republican China, scholars with similar motivations and goals 
adopted diverse strategies, which was unusual for nationalistic scholars in other historical 
contexts. I demonstrate the flexibility of their ideas and practices, which proved adaptive 
to the dynamic social and natural environments in which they worked (from the 
Northeast to the Southwest, and from the early “warlord period” through the turmoil of 
war in the 1940s). Hoping to improve the lives of Chinese people and to strengthen 
China’s international status, these scientists not only survived during this turbulent era 
and established a new model for agricultural research and education, but also succeeded 
in creating and circulating agricultural knowledge for global scientific communities. 
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Introduction	
 
        “For the past three decades, a noun has been endowed highest status in China. 
No matter understanding it or not, no matter conservative or reform, no one dare to 
publicly undervalue this noun. The noun is ‘science’ [Ke Xue, 科学].”1 (Hu Shi, 
1923) 
        As one of the first Boxer students taking advanced education in America and the 
most famous philosopher, essayist, educationalist, and diplomat in twentieth-century 
China, Hu Shi’s assessment of “science” represented that of many of his contemporaries 
and deeply influenced younger Chinese researchers.2 Although “science” in early 
twentieth-century China was influenced by western countries, it was (and is) remarkably 
different from science in western countries. While European and American scientists 
were debating the autonomy of science as a pure pursuit of truth versus a tool of social 
responsibility, twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, on the contrary, had taken for 
granted that science should be applied to serve the needs of society and the people. Their 
concerns and debates centered on how best to use scientific knowledge and practice to 
save and serve China. As I will demonstrate, the ideology of KeXue Jiu Guo or KeXue 
                                                 
1 Hu Shi, “Preface of Science and Views of Life,” 1923, Collected Works of Hu Shi, Volume 3, 
Peking University Press, 1998, page 152. 
2 Hu Shi (1891-1962), one of the most influential writers, philosophers, and diplomats in 20th –
century China. He was one of the leaders of the New Culture Movement, and had served as 
president of Peking University, chief director of Academia Sinica, and Chinese ambassador to the 
United States. 
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Bao Guo (科学救国 or科学报国,3 “saving or serving the country through science”) 4 
was a central motivation of early twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals. The effort of Ke 
Xue Jiu Guo during the Republican era was part of a series of social movements begun 
during the nineteenth century, focused on “saving and surviving China (救亡图存).” As 
historians have argued, Chinese people’s consciousness of their national identity of being 
Chinese emerged in the twentieth century largely in relation to the tensions between 
China and powerful foreign countries.5 Reform intellectuals’ enthusiasm in serving China 
with science was largely inspired by their belief that western countries established 
supremacy over China because of the power derived from science and technology. As a 
result, those intellectuals with close and direct experience of powerful western countries 
sometimes were more passionate in saving and serving China through science, and most 
of the leading scholars engaged in scientific research and education in Republican China 
had foreign educational backgrounds. For example, among the 869 scientists recorded by 
the five volumes of the Zhongguo Kexuejia Cidian (Xiandai) (《中国科学家辞典（现代
）》, Dictionary of Chinese Scientists [Modern], Shandong Science and Technology 
                                                 
3 For convenience and consistence, I will use simplified Chinese characters in most cases in this 
dissertation, although the scholars were usually writing traditional Chinese, in which way 科学报
国 and 科学救国 would write as 科學報國 and 科學救國. 
4 The Chinese word “国” (or “國” in traditional Chinese) has multiple meanings as country, 
nation, and state. Here I translate it as “country,” and I will explain the reason for this translation 
later. 
5 For examples see Lucian Pye’s 1992 book The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Harvard University 
Press); John Fitzgerald’s Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist 
Revolution (Stanford University Press, 1996); Henrietta Harrison’s The Making of the Republican 
Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China 1911-1929 (Oxford University Press, 1999); 
and Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point, 1924-1925, (Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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Press, 1982-1986), 626 had studied abroad (72%), and 388 of them went to the United 
States for study (45%).6 In addition, American-trained Chinese scholars had also been 
famous university presidents, social scientists, diplomats, politicians, and so on.7 
Generally speaking, among all foreign-trained Chinese scholars in Republican China, 
those returned from America have gained highest achievement in the movements to save 
and serve China through science. Therefore, it is important for historians of modern 
China to explore and analyze how the American-trained Chinese scholars understood, 
studied, and applied science in their careers. 
        This dissertation aims to answer the question of how American-trained scholars 
served China and Chinese people with agricultural science. To be more specific, through 
case studies of Chinese scholars with American educational background, I will explore 
what motivated these scholars to devote themselves to both China and science; how these 
historical figures understood “science” and “China” in the historical context of turbulent 
and decentralized Republican China; how the American experience had influenced their 
attitudes towards their country; what strategies they had taken for advancing KeXue 
BaoGuo; and what they achieved in realizing their goals.  
        The time period I examine in this dissertation starts with 1911, the year when 
Republic of China replaced the Qing Dynasty via revolution and also the year when the 
Chinese state government formally started to send large numbers of Boxer students to 
America; and ends with 1945, the end of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-
                                                 
6 The rest mainly went to Japan and European countries such as Germany, France, and Britain. 
7 Zhang Yufa, “Returned Chinese Students from America and the Chinese Leadership (1846-
1949)”, Chinese Studies in History, vol. 35, no. 3, Spring 2002, p. 54. 
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1945). The year 1911 was widely known as the establishing year of Republic of China, 
but it was especially important for my dissertation because it was the year when the 
Boxer Indeminity Scholarship program formally started. Selected young Chinese 
intellectuals received sponsorship from this program to travel to the United States for 
higher education, and they were required to return to China after finishing American 
training. This scholarship was derived from the Boxer Indeminity. Because of the Boxer 
Rebellion in 1900, the Qing Empire was fined an indemnity of four hundred and fifty 
million taels of silver to the Eight-Nation Alliance. This indemnity claim took 39 years to 
extinguish and, with an annual interest of 4%, required over nine hundred and eighty-two 
million taels (about U.S. $726 million at that time). The United States shared 7.32% of 
this indemnity. However, the Qing government quickly argued that the Boxer Protocol 
awarded the U.S. more than it should have demanded. After a seven-year negotiation, the 
U.S. government (under President Theodore Roosevelt) agreed to use the surplus portion 
to set up a scholarship program for Chinese students to study practical knowledge such as 
engineering, agriculture, and medicine in the United States. For China, this program was 
meant to bring in advanced scientific and technical knowledge. For the U.S., it was a 
chance to export American culture and influence to China. This program started to select 
and prepare Chinese students to study in the U.S. in 1909, and Tsinghua College began as 
a preparatory school in April, 1911 with part of the first remission. After 1911, the 
number of Chinese students travelling to the United States rocketed, and the United 
States gradually replaced Japan as the most preferred destination of Chinese scholars.8  
                                                 
8 Ye, Weili, Seeking Modernity in China's Name: Chinese students in the United States, 1900-
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        About half of the scientists I investigate were Boxer students whose American 
training was directly sponsored by the Boxer Scholarship, and almost all the rest had 
some association with this program. The Boxer Program was important not only because 
of the sponsorship but also because its establishment was interwined with China’s failure 
in competing with other powerful countries. Many scholars discussed in this dissertation 
confessed that the Boxer Indeminity Scholarship seemed to them a “national humiliation 
(国耻)” and that sensibility motivated them to study hard in order to “improve” China.9 
The Boxer Program required 80% of the Chinese students to major in studies related to 
science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine. Therefore, from the very beginning of 
their American training, these Chinese scholars’ patriotism was closely connected to the 
knowledge they studied, which makes them ideal examples to explore the concept of 
“scientific nationalism” (a topic I discuss in detail below).  
        During the decades between 1911 and 1945, China was divided by regional warlords 
and political factions. Although all the relatively powerful political and military forces 
had been pursuing unification of the country, none of them was able to achieve that goal 
by 1945. The so-called central government—first the warlord government in Beijing, 
then the Nationalist government in Nanjing—could only effectively control certain 
provinces, while dozens of warlords controlled other parts of China. I would like to 
describe this status as “decentralization,” which means that the central government 
existed and was acknowledged by the periphery and foreign countries, but its control and 
                                                                                                                                                 
1927, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 10. 
9 For example, Dai Fanglan in chapter 2, Zhao Lianfang in chapter 3, and Tang Peisong in chapter 
4. 
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influence over the peripherial regions was very weak. In decentralized China, the state, 
country, and nation could hardly coincide with each other because of the actual divisions 
and the lack of a powerful central government. However, cases in this dissertation will 
demonstrate that the decentralized condition of Republican China is also different from 
what some historians of modern China have described as “disintegration” or 
“fragmentation,” because even during the most turbulent era (such as civil war among 
warlords in the early 1920s), political, military, and intellectual leaders still believed that 
China should and must be unified and centralized again. The desire and faith of 
reestablishing a powerful central state co-existed with the actual decentralized condition, 
which made this period an excellent case to explore the implications and significance of 
the ideology of KeXue Baoguo, serving China with science.10  
        The idea to serve and improve China with science was very popular among 
twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, and historians of science in modern China have 
examined American-trained scientists’ desires and efforts to serve their country with 
science.11 For example, James Reardon-Anderson points out in his 1991 book The Study 
of Change: Chemistry in China, 1840-1949 that “scientism” was widely accepted by 
                                                 
10 For the Republican era as an excellent time to examine the diverse understandings and 
implications of “China,” also see Grace Shen’s recent book Unearthing the Nation: Modern 
Geology and Nationalism in Republican China (2014, the University of Chicago Press). 
11 For instance, James Reardon-Anderson, The Study of Change: Chemistry in China, 1840-1949, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Peter Neushul and Zuoyue Wang, "Between the 
Devil and the Deep Sea: C.K. Tseng, Mariculture, and the Politics of Science in Modern China," 
Isis, Vol. 91, Issue 1 (March 2000), 59-88; Zuoyue Wang, “Saving China through Science: the 
Science Society of China, Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China,” Osiris, 
Vol. 17, (2002), pp. 291-322; Grace Shen, Unearthing the Nation: Geology and Nationalism in 
Republican China, University of Chicago Press, 2014. Also refer to articles in Science and 
Technology in Modern China, 1880s-1940s, edited by Jing Tsu and Benjamin A. Elman, Brill 
Academic Publishers; Lam edition, 2014. 
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Chinese intellectuals and scientific activities in China usually had a utilitarian purpose to 
save and strengthen the country. Under this precondition, the first-generation of western-
trained Chinese scientists were more likely to devote themselves to establishing scientific 
institutions. Second-generation scientists behaved more like their western colleagues by 
working in the existing institutions and creating and circulating scientific knowledge.12 
Zuoyue Wang’s 2002 Osiris article “Saving China through Science: the Science Society 
of China, Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China” explores how 
Chinese scientists with American educational backgrounds fulfilled their desire of 
“saving China through science” by establishing a Chinese style of civil society and 
professionalizing science in China. Wang describes this process as “scientific 
nationalism” and argues that “scientific nationalism” in Republican China was different 
from that in Germany and Japan, because the SSC scientists’ ultimate goal was to save 
their country from subjugation and humiliation rather than improving the status of China 
in international scientific communities. More recently, historians have paid attention to 
Chinese intellectuals’ purpose of “saving China through science,” but their works reveal 
that Chinese intellectuals’ understanding of this ideology and the strategies they took 
were not always same as Wang has described. For example, in her 2014 book Unearthing 
the Nation: Geology and Nationalism in Republican China, Grace Shen explores the 
career of a group of geologists accepting the responsibility of “saving the nation through 
                                                 
12 Reardon-Anderson roughly defines the first generation as scientists returned to China in late 
Qing Dynasty and early Republican period, and the second generation as those returning after the 
Nationalist Party’s coming into power in 1928. Most historians of modern Chinese science’s 
classification coincide with Reardon-Anderson’s. I will follow this definition too in this 
dissertation. 
 8 
 
science.” She argues that for Chinese geologists with western education, “nation” was the 
object of their political and cultural loyalty. These geologists believed that geology was 
of primary importance in saving China and therefore connected nationalism with their 
field works of geological investigation of territory and their efforts to strive for 
international recognition for Chinese geology.  
        A similar idea of “serving the country with science” also existed in other non-
western countries. In her 2008 book Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in 
Modern Japan, Hiromi Mizuno uses “scientific nationalism” as an analytic tool to 
explore how Japanese technocrats, social scientists (Marxists), and popular writers 
considered science as the most important factor for Japan to survive and improve 
internationally. 13 She uses “scientific nationalism” to describe the idea of “science in the 
service of nation” (which is also written as “科學報國” in Japanese Kanji, the same as it 
is in traditional Chinese characters), and illustrates that various scientific promoters had 
diverse and distinct explanation and expectation of what a “scientific Japan” should be. 
The time period Mizuno focuses on is the 1920s to 1940s, roughly the same period as 
Republican China. However, there were noticeable differences between Japan and 
Republican China. At that time, Japan was one of the powers in the world, while China 
was an underdeveloped semi-colonial country. Although Japan may also be considered as 
a post-colonial country, Republican Chinese intellecutals usually considered Japan as one 
of the foreign powers oppressing China, and in many cases equated Japan to developed 
                                                 
13 Hiromi Mizuno, Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan, Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2009. 
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western countries. When Japanese scientific nationalists had gone through the stage of 
“serving the nation through science” and were attempting to strengthen the Japanese 
Empire in international competition, the concerns of Chinese “scientific nationalists” 
were still about “saving and surviving” (Jiuwang Tucun, 救亡图存) by eliminating 
foreign powers—including Japan. More importantly, by the 1920s, Japan had formed a 
typical nation-state. Despite inevitable internal tensions, the state was powerful enough to 
control its entire territory. China, on the other hand, was in a much chaotic situation than 
Japan. As I have mentioned, the official central governments during the Republican 
period—first the Beijing government, then the Nationalist government—were only able 
to control several provinces near their respective capitals. Therefore, Chinese scientific 
practitioners were facing social and academic conditions very different from their 
contemporary Japanese colleagues, and their primary concerns were distinct based on the 
realities they knew. During the three decades of Republican China, institutional 
establishment coincided with tensions between pure and applied scientific research, 
between the foreign influence and the Chinese people, and between the central and the 
local political and social forces; these were different from the beginning stage of 
Japanese agricultural institution. Therefore, Chinese scientific nationalists faced more 
complicated historical context, and their strategies exhibit characteristics distinct from 
their western and Japanese colleagues. My emphasis in this dissertation will be the 
distinct strategies taken by patriotic Chinese scholars.14  
                                                 
14 An interesting example to illustrate the different concerns between Chinese scholars and their 
contemporary Japanese colleagues comes from Shen Zonghan. When attending the third Pacific 
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        Therefore, although historians of science were using the same phrase “scientific 
nationalism”, their definitions and explanations for it have been diverse; none of them 
have adequate explanatory power for the Chinese case during the Republican period. 
Actually, in using the phrase “scientific nationalism” to represent non-western 
intellectuals’ desire or responsibility to save or serve the country through science, we 
must keep in mind that this phrase itself has multiple and complicated meanings and the 
ideology it stands for has diverse manifestations. My examination of the American-
trained Chinese scholars engaging in agricultural science will demonstrate that exploring 
motivations and strategies of historical figures is an effective way to analyze “scientific 
nationalism,” or the ideology of “serving the country through science.” By doing so, I 
                                                                                                                                                 
Science Congress in Tokyo, Shen Zonghan met a Japanese agricultural expert, who suggested to 
him that: 
        “When you improve agriculture in China, please do not learn from what young Japanese 
scholars are doing; you should follow what Japanese agriculturalists did two decades ago. At that 
time we have few institutions and colleagues. On the one hand, we had to conduct practical 
improving research to demonstrate the value of agricultural research and improvement; on the 
other hand, we had to conduct administrative works to cooperate with the government, increase 
agricultural funding, and establish agricultural experimental stations and colleges, so that young 
scholars were able to concentrate on scientific research. Now our publications are not as profound 
as those of young scholars, but the extension works are made our responsibility—that is all 
because of different situations and needs of society at different eras.” (See Shen Zonghan’s 
Memoir, volume 1, pp. 99-100). 
        In the mind of this Japanese agriculturalist, at that time (the 1920s) agricultural improvement 
in China was similar to that in Japan two decades before, and he believed that learning from 
earlier Japanese agriculturalists’ experience would help Chinese agriculturalists to establish 
agricultural institutions. Shen Zonghan had high admiration for these Japanese scholars, because 
they owned a political vision of long-term agricultural improvement while developing scientific 
research.  
        A considerable number of Chinese scholars had largely devoted themselves to establishing 
agricultural institutions from the 1910s to 1930s, and considered institution building as the 
primary strategy to resolve the most urgent problem of China. In this sense, Chinese scholars 
believing in serving the country through agricultural sciences shared similarities with the earlier 
Japanese scholars. However, at the same time, there were also scholars such as Dai Fanglan (see 
chapter 2) focusing on research of fundamental scientific problems (fungi classification) from the 
very beginning. Co-existence of diverse strategies was a remarkable and interesting character of 
nationlist scientists in Republican China. 
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will propose a new conception of how leading non-western intellectuals understood the 
relations between science and society, and how they endeavored to realize their goals in 
both basic science and social responsibility. Moreover, by stressing motivations and 
strategies, I will be able to integrate the Republican intellectuals desiring to serve China 
through science with “scientific nationalists” in other historical contexts, such as post-
1949 China, because they shared similar motivations, and their different attitudes towards 
the state was largely based on whether the strategies were most adaptive to the social and 
historical contexts and most effective to realize their ultimate goals: serving China and 
the Chinese people. 
 
“Science” as an ideology and approach to serve the country 
        During the twentieth century, no matter the Republican era or the post-1949 period, 
almost all Chinese intellectuals considered science as something with strong utilitarian 
potential. And in modern Chinese language, the term “science” is usually connected to 
“technology”—when Chinese people, both scientific practitioners and non-scientific, talk 
about “science,” they usually mean “science and technology” (Ke Ji, 科技). When 
Chinese intellectuals became concerned about their country’s perceived backwardness, 
they usually believed that it was the utilitarian power of science and technology along 
with the rational and critical ideology that had made western countries much powerful 
than China. To them, modern science was a cure-all to promote the country’s academics, 
politics, economy, and social lives. This faith in science had formed a prevailing 
 12 
 
“scientism” in the Republican era.15 Although some scholars (such as Liang Qichao 梁启
超 and Zhang Junmai 张君劢) had assented that science was not all-powerful, more 
reform intellectuals were inclined to accept Hu Shi’s rebuttal that China had not even 
reached the stage to truly understand and enjoy the benefits brought by science, and 
therefore did not deserve to doubt its utility and power.16 Therefore, the main stream 
intellectuals were exploring how to utilize western scientific knowledge and use it to 
improve agriculture, industry, military, and social lives in China.  
        A briefly introduction of the general picture of Republican China will help us to 
understand historical context of the American-trained Chinese scholars. For over two 
thousand years, China has been a unified, single unitary state, and it maintained a 
centralized country with only several interludes of division. Therefore in most cases in 
the long history, the state represented the entirety of China. The Republican era, subject 
of this dissertation, happened to be one of the remarkable interludes of division in 
Chinese history. I will use “decentralization” to characterize the chaotic political 
condition of China during the first half of the twentieth century. China was considered as 
the “central empire” until the nineteenth century. However, the imperial Qing 
government had been defeated by modernized foreign countries and had not been able to 
control and strengthen the entirety of China effectively since the late 19th century. After 
the loss in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, local military 
                                                 
15 See Wang, Hui, “The Fate of ‘Mr. Science’ in China: The Concept of Science and Its 
Application in Modern Chinese Thought.” Positions, Springer, 1995, 3(1), 1-68. Also see Shellen 
Xiao Wu’s book review of Grace Shen, Unearthing the Nation: Geology and Nationalism in 
Republican China, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 48, 2014, pp. 38-41. 
16 Hu Shi, p. 154. 
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governors gradually gained dominance of their provinces from the central government, 
and they later became warlords in the Republican era. The 1911 Revolution ended the 
Qing Empire with the accession of a republican government. Yuan Shikai (袁世凯), the 
most powerful military leader, held the country for several years. During the decades 
after Yuan’s death in 1916, China fell into many parts governed by different warlords, 
which was usually called the “Warlord Era” (1916-1928). (See Figure 1, on page 35) 
Although the Nationalist Party (KMT) government became the central government 
authority in 1928 and unified China in form, it was not capable of overcoming the 
warlords and establishing a strong national identity for all Chinese people. (See Figure 2, 
on page 36) The Nationalist government had undertaken reforms—such as the New Life 
Movement and the Rural Revival Movement—to improve its political authority. 
However, policies made by the Nationalist government were largely ignored in regions 
controlled by other political forces (including other warlords and the Communist Party, 
CCP). Even within the provinces directly under the Nationalist government’s influence, 
these reforms were highly restricted to the urban areas, while most rural areas remained 
untouched. Therefore, China after 1911 must be considered as quite decentralized.17 
During the Second Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945, the Japanese occupied 
northern and eastern China. The Nationalist government and hundreds of thousands of 
                                                 
17 For the general situation of agriculture in Republican China, see Guo, Congjie, and Chen Lei, 
“Kangzhan Qian Nanjing GuoMin ZhengFu De NongYe TuiGuang ZhengCe (Nanjing KMT 
Government’s Policies for Agricultural Popularization before the Anti-Japanese War),” Li Shi 
Dang An, No. 1, 2008 (郭从杰、陈蕾, “抗战前南京国民政府的农业推广政策”, 《历史档
案》,2008年第一期); also see Zhang Shijie and Guo Hairu, “Jiang Jieshi De NongCun HeZuo 
JingJi SiXiang (Jiang Jieshi’s Ideology of Agricultural Economics),” Min Guo Dang An, No. 4, 
2004 (张士杰、郭海儒，“蒋介石的农村合作经济思想”，《民国档案》，2004年 04期). 
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Chinese people had to retreat to the southwestern inland provinces, which were still 
extremely undeveloped at that time.  Although living and working conditions declined 
horribly for most Chinese people, the decentralized political situation got simplified 
during the war. After the Sino-Japanese War, only two strong political forces—the 
Nationalist Party and the Communist Party—remained to compete for political 
domination. My dissertation will complement and revise previous historical works by 
examining the activities of American-trained Chinese scholars in this chaotic and 
decentralized context. 
        Clearly, for the period between 1911 and 1945, the Chinese state government was 
only able to dominate part of China. Meanwhile, when Chinese intellectuals were 
exposed to western cultures, they endowed Guo with new implications such as “country” 
and “nation.” Then come the questions: when talking about Ke Xue Bao Guo (科学报国, 
serving China through science), did those Chinese scholars mean to serve Guo as the 
Chinese state or the entirety of China? In addition, did they mean to devote themselves to 
the country, the nation, or the state? My answer is: in the consciousness of American-
trained Chinese scholars, Guo, the object of their service, was actually China as a country 
and nation in the sense of culture and history, rather than the Chinese state. By focusing 
their attention on the welfare and benefits of their country people, they were able to 
ensure that they were serving the country for which they felt love and belonging and 
dedicated loyalty to, rather than any specific (and continuously changing) state 
government. For these patriotic scholars, “serving” or cooperating with the state was 
merely one of the many strategies they had taken to achieve their goals. Their ultimate 
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goals were to improve the welfare of Chinese people and to strengthen China as a 
country. The profound love and loyalty for their country and country-people (not a state) 
motivated them to choose diverse strategies to realize the goals. In this sense, Chinese 
intellectuals aiming to serve the country through science functioned in some ways as 
“scientific nationalists.” But we must keep in mind that being a scientific nationalist 
during the Republican era does not necessarily mean love or loyalty toward the state, 
because there was no centralized state.  Through identifying the objects these American-
trained Chinese scholars were serving as well as their motivations and strategies, my 
dissertation examines the careers and lives of several representative scholars and 
illustrates the development of agricultural science and education in China during the first 
half of the twentieth century. 
        Chinese scholars’ ideology about the relations between science and the state was 
different from both the western intellectuals and their Japanese neighbors. In America 
and European countries, historians have argued that science was originally considered as 
value-free activity to explore truths of nature. As I previously described, European and 
American scientists were debating the autonomy of science as a pure pursuit of truth 
versus science’s social responsibility. Even today, scientists may hesitate to cooperate 
with the state, worrying about whether state intervention would deviate from the intrinsic 
non-utilitarian spirit of science. Certainly, historians of science have been interested in 
the tension between ideology and the application of scientific knowledge.18 The majority 
                                                 
18 During the past century, many volumes of historical works by western researchers have 
explored issues about science’s non-utilitarian nature and its social responsibility, relations 
between pure and applied science, or relations between the state and scientists’ autonomy. An 
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of twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, to the contrary, were motivated by the faith 
that scientific ideas and practices should be applied to serve the country and the people. 
They did not reject cooperating with the state, but saw this relationship as a tool or 
strategy. When the state was able to facilitate improving the lives of Chinese people and 
strengthening China, this would be a good strategy taken by a large number of 
agricultural science practitioners. Unfortunately, during the Republican period, the 
powerless state could hardly be relied upon in most cases. More diverse strategies were 
required. Chinese scientific nationalists made multiple and varied choices among the 
state, the local, and the foreign forces depending on the power and reliability of these 
forces to help them meet their goals. Their strategies were much more diverse than the 
contemporary Japanese scientific nationalists, who lived in a nation-state where the state 
was powerful enough to promote agriculture through science in the entire country.19 
        For Chinese intellectuals in the early twentieth century, science (or studies of the 
natural world) innately had a practical goal of serving the country, according to both 
traditional Confucian ethics and what they had learned through overseas education. For 
the former, the ultimate goal of an intellectual was to pacify and improve China and the 
Chinese people. And for the latter, modern science was widely viewed as the foundation 
                                                                                                                                                 
early example is William Cecil Dampier’s A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy 
and Religion (Cambridge University Press: 1929); and this topic remains central to recent works, 
such as James E. McClellan’s Science and Technology in World History: An Introduction (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2nd edition, 2006). The influence of political ideology on scientists has 
dominated historical analysis about certain sciences and places, such as agricultural sciences in 
Russia/the USSR. For a brief and useful introduction to major debates in the Russian agricultural 
historiography, see Nils Roll-Hansen, “Wishful Science: The Persistence of T.D. Lysenko’s 
Agrobiology in the Politics of Science,” Osiris 23, no. 1 (2008): 166-188.   
19 See Mizuno, Science for the Empire. 
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for western countries and Japan to become technologically developed and powerful, so it 
was crucial to develop science in order to save China from weakness and 
underdevelopment, and to make China competitive among the great powers. The words 
of the chief historical figures in this dissertation reveal that almost all of these American-
trained Chinese intellectuals took the utilitarian property of science for granted. Therefore 
the essential problem for them became how to realize the goal: to serve China through 
science. 
         
Strategies to Serve China with Agricultural Science 
        American-trained scholars were essential members of the reform intellectuals 
believing in saving and serving China through science. Compared with the earlier 
Japanese-trained scholars, who had been focusing more on social studies and were more 
inclined to engage in political and economic research, most Chinese students studying in 
the United States after 1911 majored in applied studies such as science and engineering, 
and they were more likely to engage in academia after returning to China.20 Since the 
1910s, when modern science was widely introduced to Chinese intellectuals, it was the 
Chinese students in America that established the first Chinese association of science 
(Science Society of China, 中国科学社), published the first Chinese magazine named 
“science” (KeXue, 科学), confirmed the Chinese translation of science (I will explore this 
later in this section), and endeavored to improve Chinese people’s lives with the ideology 
                                                 
20 See Zhang Yufa, “Returned Chinese Students from America and the Chinese Leadership 
(1846-1949).”  
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and methodology of science. Similar to other leading reform intellectuals, they 
considered science as one of the most advanced forms of knowledge. Studying at 
institutions in western developed countries would enable them to help China to get 
stronger and help Chinese people to live better. 
        Scholars with an American educational background are ideal examples for exploring 
Chinese intellectuals’ desire to serve China with science. Firstly, because of their 
experience in western countries, they were usually more aware and sensitive to the 
tension between China and developed western countries, and therefore more conscious 
about the national identity of being Chinese people. These scholars reacted and 
responded differently to the Chinese-foreign tension. Some reacted in a “negative” way 
by feeling strong humiliation from comparison with foreign people, while some of them 
answered in a positive way by stressing that foreign power could be utilized to improve 
China. An interesting comparison came from the missionary University of Nanking. Shen 
Zonghan and Dai Fanglan (both educated in the U.S.) were two leading plant pathologists 
at the University of Nanking around 1930. Dai Fanglan felt humiliated by the fact that 
Chinese scientists were so much less well-educated than their western colleagues that 
usually they could only assist foreign scientists in exploring natural resources in China. 
He devoted himself to establishing the science of mycology in China, and finally made 
China one of the three leading centers of fungi research in the world. Shen Zonghan, on 
the other hand, invited foreign scientists such as H. H. Love to visit China and to help 
with training Chinese agriculturalists. Largely because of Shen’s efforts in building up 
networks for scientific communication, by the 1940s a considerable number of Chinese 
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agricultural scientists became well-known among American scientists despite disruptions 
caused by the war. The strategies of Dai and Shen at this stage were opposite, but their 
motivations were similar: serving China by improving China’s status in international 
scientific communities.21 
        Secondly, in addition to motivations, these scholars usually knew much more about 
the power of science and technology compared with their country people (who had not 
been exposed to modern science and technology). They were all deeply impressed by 
how science and technology had shaped the lives of foreign people and believed that it 
was science and technology that made America and Japan so powerful in the world. 
According to Liu Mei Xue Sheng Nian Bao (《留美学生年报》, Annual Reports of 
Chinese Students in America), when Chinese students first arrived in the United States, 
“seeing the highly developed material civilization, none of them could help changing 
countenance and feeling stricken (见物质文明之发达，未有不变色而却步者).” In the 
eyes of these Chinese students, America was a country with “high-rise buildings as tall as 
clouds, railways leading to everywhere, famous cities and big towns as numerous as 
strings of pearls,” all of which were based on advanced science and technology.22 After 
comparing China and the United States, these students reached the conclusion that the 
two countries had similar land area and natural conditions, so China’s backwardness 
                                                 
21 I will make a more detailed examination and analysis of this point in chapter 2. 
22 Li Xisuo & Liu Jilin, Jin Dai Zhong Guo De Liu Mei Jiao Yu (American Education and 
Modern China), Tianjin: Tianjin Guji Press, 2000, pp. 103-104. (李喜所、刘集林著，《近代中
国的留美教育》，天津市：天津古籍出版社，2000). 
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should be attributed to its lack of modern science and technology.23 This is one of the 
chief reasons why they developed the ideology of serving and saving China through 
science. 
        Among diverse scientific disciplines, agricultural science was one of the most 
fundamental studies to serve and improve China and Chinese people according to 
scholars in my project. Some of them made systematic studies and expositions on the 
importance of agricultural sciences. For instance, Zou Bingwen (邹秉文) made a careful 
and detailed analysis in a letter to the China Foundation, arguing that improving 
agricultural science was the essential solution for the seven most critical social problems 
in China he had identified.24 Others simply borrowed an old Chinese proverb to express 
their motivation, such as Jin Shanbao (金善宝)’s saying that “food is the first necessity of 
people, agriculture is the foundation of the country (民以食为天，农为国之本). I should 
devote myself to this necessity and foundation.”25 The unpretentious saying of “food is 
the first necessity of people,” or “food is the heaven of people,” frequently shows up in 
the writings of these scholars, and this constitutes an essential motivation for these 
scholars in choosing agriculture science as means to improve China.  
        During the Republican era, especially during the 1930s and 1940s, we could see 
American-trained Chinese agricultural scientists and educationalists serving in diverse 
professions and organizations. In this dissertation, I mainly focus on cases from 
universities, because I think compared with those working in governments or industry, 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 See my exploration of Zou’s analysis in chapter 1. 
25 For more details about Jin Shanbao, see chapter 4. 
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the Chinese scholars working in universities could better exemplify “scientific 
nationalism” or the desire of serving China through agricultural sciences. University 
agricultural scientists and educationalists were ideal examples to demonstrate how 
Chinese intellectuals motivated by “scientific nationalism” were different from their 
western colleagues. On the one hand, the first American-trained intellectuals mainly 
focused on science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine, but only a small portion of 
them majored in social sciences, humanities, or business. When the scientists, 
agriculturalists, and engineers returned to China, they could hardly find proper positions 
to conduct serious research, because there were no exsiting institutions accommodating 
them and not enough experts to establish the institutions. More than half of the 
American-trained agriculturalists completely left agriculture after returning to China 
since they were not able to find proper positions. As a result, the first-generation 
agricultural scientists had to cooperate with educationalists to establish their own 
institutions. Thus almost all famous Republican-era agriculturalists had served in 
universities. Therefore universities could best represent institutions built up and 
developed by influencial agricultural scientists. On the other hand, university intellectuals 
could reflect the distinctive character of “scientific nationalism” of Chinese scholars. As I 
have mentioned at the very beginning, western intellectuals have been debating about the 
autonomy of science as a pure pursuit of truth versus science’s social responsibility. 
Scholars in western universities were more sensitive to this tension than those serving in 
governmental organizations, because the later were more directly sponsored by the state 
and therefore more expected to devote themselves to practical necessities of the state and 
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society. In Republican Chinese universities, however, the situations were different. 
Chinese scholars in universitites usually took for granted that intellectuals had a duty to 
serve their country and people. Therefore by examing cases of Chinese university 
scholars, we can explore how scientists and educationers with American-training 
experience and Chinese influence behaved different from their western colleagues and 
Chinese predecessors. They were establishing and developing modern methods of 
scientific studies to resolve Chinese problems. Moreover, in the 1930s and 1940s, 
Chinese university scholars had paid more attention to balancing pure and applied 
research at the same time of serving the country than they did during the early decades. 
The university scientists’ careers illustrated how Chinese science was established and 
developed during the Republican era. 
        Despite the belief in agricultural science’s potential in saving and serving China, the 
Chinese scholars in America did not think they all needed to major in agricultural 
disciplines. For example, Hu Shi started his study in the United States with the 
agriculture school at Cornell University, but transferred to philosophy and literature soon, 
because he believed that the need for ideological reform of the Chinese people was more 
urgent. During the late 1910s and 1920s, Hu Shi was one of the most influential essayists 
in China. He called on Chinese youth and intellectuals to adopt scientific ideology 
characterized by critical and rigorous thinking, and to abandon the traditional moderate 
and non-committal ideology. Hu’s efforts helped to popularize science in China. In Hu’s 
opinion, science was more a critical and rigorous way of thinking rather than dogmatic 
knowledge. His emphasis was different from the agricultural scientists in Nanjing, but his 
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efforts succeeded in appealing to young people to develop “scientific” life views and to 
devote their lives to science. I believe that this ideological shift was an essential 
prerequisite for the development of agricultural science after the 1920s. Yet it did not 
completely abandon traditional ways of thinking: as I explained above, the Chinese 
concept of Ke Xue Bao Guo (serving China through science) was shaped by the 
traditional Ge Zhi Xue (格致学). Using the tools of scientific critical thinking, Western-
trained Chinese intellectuals created something that would help them meet their goals of 
improving the welfare of China and the world (Ping Tianxia). Examples include two 
chief figures in this dissertation who were not even agricultural scientists themselves. 
Guo Bingwen (郭秉文) and Luo Jialun (罗家伦), were two famous presidents in the 
history of the National Central University (named as the Nanjing Higher Normal 
School/Southeastern University when Guo served as president). When studying in the 
United States, they majored in education and history respectively. However, they placed 
significant emphasis on establishing and developing agricultural science, education, and 
extension, and built this university into the most successful center of agricultural science 
in China between the 1920s and 1940s.26 In my opinion, and according to the results of 
                                                 
26 In Chapter One and Chapter Three, I will explore Guo Bingwen and Luo Jialun’s efforts to 
establish the agriculture school at their university and how they themselves, their colleagues, and 
their students realized the goal of saving and improving China through agricultural science. For 
other activities about their careers at the National Central University, see Xu Xiaoqing’s book 
ZhengJu Yu XueFu: Cong DongNan DaXue Dao ZhongYang DaXue, 1919-1937 (《政局与学府：
从东南大学到中央大学，1919-1937》, Politics and Universities: From the Southeastern 
University to the National Central University, 1919-1937) (China Social Science Press, 2009).  
For more details about the life of Guo Bingwen, see Mao Rong’s 2004 book Zhi Ping Zhi Shan, 
Hong Sheng Dong Nan: DongNan DaXue XiaoZhang Guo Bingwen (《至平至善，宏声东南：
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my research, modern science is not merely scientific research. It has a complex social 
existence that involves numerous factors such as materials, methodology, knowledge, 
institutions, and social contexts. The achievements of Guo Bingwen and Luo Jialun 
corroborate the importance of non-scientists in the development of agricultural sciences 
in China. Moreover, the involvement of non-scientists in scientific activities strengthened 
the connection between scientists and their social contexts. In my case studies, this 
connection is reflected in how the agricultural scientists often directed their basic 
research toward problems of practical agricultural production.  
        After returning from America, the first-generation scholars mainly gathered in 
Beijing and Nanjing, the two political and cultural centers in China at that time. They 
formed two main schools. In Beijing, leading scholars of the New Culture Movement 
considered “science” as something similar and equal to “democracy,” which would be a 
remedy to cure problems in all fields of semi-colonial China. They also believed that 
science was an essential part of a new, western culture27 that could replace the old 
traditional Chinese cultures. Chen Duxiu (陈独秀), one of the leaders of the New Culture 
Movement, appealed to Chinese youth and intellectuals to replace “Mr. Confucius” with 
“Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy.”28 Chen himself had not studied abroad, but there 
                                                                                                                                                 
东南大学校长郭秉文》, Biography of Guo Bingwen, President of the Southeastern University) 
(Shandong Education Press, 2004). 
27 Chinese intellectuals during the Republican era sometimes used “western culture,” “western 
knowledge,” or “foreign” to describe what they thought they had learned or should learn from the 
powerful modern countries including Japan. Therefore, when historical figures in this dissertation 
were talking about “western,” they may mean not only the western/westerners, but also 
something modern, developed, and different from the old Chinese tradition.  
28 The Chinese phrases they used were Sai Xian Sheng (赛先生, Mr. S) and De Xian Sheng (德先
生, Mr. D). In the 1910s there were no unified translation of the terms “science” and “democracy” 
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were a large number of intellectuals with overseas experience supporting Chen. Hu Shi, 
for example, claimed that the desperate maladies of China (the most urgent and vital 
problems preventing China from being strong and developed) must be treated with 
desperate remedies. Science and democracy might not be perfect remedies, but they 
promised to be the most effective ones to repel China’s fatal illness caused by backward 
old culture. Overcorrection was necessary for the deadly situation, while mild 
modification and re-evaluation might be applied later after China and the Chinese people 
had enjoyed the goodness of science and democracy and were able to control them.29 Hu 
Shi did not completely agree with Chen Duxiu’s interpretation of science. For example, 
he later claimed that “it is improper to personify this term and consider it as a person. 
Once personified, it would be inclined to be idolized; once idolized, it would easily result 
in idolatry. At that time my friend Chen Duxiu only knew the two terms. He did not 
realize that science is an approach, and democracy is a life pattern.”30 In spite of such 
disagreements, both Hu and Chen were highlighting the application of science (as they 
understood it) in serving and saving the country. Although these leading scholars were 
more devoted to social sciences and humanities rather than science and engineering, their 
thoughts were widely accepted by younger Chinese intellectuals and were highly praised 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Chinese language, as I have explained before. Chen Duxiu used the initials of these terms’ 
English pronunciation to avoid confusion.  
29 Hu Shi, “Preface of Science and Views of Life,” 1923, Collected Works of Hu Shi, Volume 3, 
Peking University Press, 1998, page 153. 
30 Hu Shi’s speech at his inauguration of president of the Academia Sinica in 1958. The original 
Chinese speech is “把这个抽象名词人格化，把它看作人，最容易错误的。容易人格化，也
就容易偶像化，偶像化了，便会盲目崇拜……当时我的朋友陈独秀只认得两个名词，不知
道科学是一个方法，民主是一种生活习惯.” 
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by both the Chinese Nationalist Party and Communist Party,31 so the extreme honor they 
endowed to science profoundly influenced younger-generation Chinese intellectuals in 
the twentieth century. Scholars in the New Culture School were not as accomplished in 
agricultural scientific research as those in Nanjing were. However, their ideological 
reforms doubtlessly facilitated the later development of agricultural science and scientific 
agriculture. 
        On the contrary, in South China, another group of scholars based in the Nanjing 
Higher Normal School formed a school of XueHeng (学衡, Academic Balance). The core 
figures of this school included founders of the Science Society of China such as Hu 
Xiansu32 (胡先骕, 1894-1968) and Zhu Kezhen33 (竺可桢, 1890-1974). They agreed that 
western science was an essential approach to save China, but they also insisted that 
traditional Chinese culture deserved attention and continuation. This school agreed to 
enlighten Chinese people with science, but also insisted on balancing and combining 
                                                 
31 Both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party claim themselves to be the authentic 
inheritor of the New Culture Movement who has really inherited the spirit of Mr. Science and Mr. 
Democracy, although the two parties fought for over half a century. For more information about 
the New Culture Movement, see Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and 
the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1990. 
32 Hu Xiansu was a famous botanist and educationalist during the Republican Era. He received a 
bachelor’s degree in botany from the University of California at Berkeley and a doctoral degree 
in agriculture from Harvard University. Hu Xiansu was founder of plant taxonomy and one of the 
pioneers of botany in China. In 1920, Hu established the Journal XueHeng in Nanjing to rival the 
New Culture School and to justify traditional Chinese culture. In spite of ideological 
disagreements, Hu Xiansu and Hu Shi had a good personal relationship in their lives and careers. 
33 Zhu Kezhen graduated from the College of Agriculture, University of Illinois in 1913, and 
received a doctoral degree in meteorology from Harvard University in 1918. He was one of the 
most prominent Chinese meteorologists and educationalists in the twentieth century. In addition, 
he was founder of the Institute for the History of Natural Sciences at Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. 
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Chinese and western cultures. Despite disagreements between these two schools, all of 
these reform intellectuals believed that science was the most efficient approach, and 
should be applied, to save and improve China. The New Culture School in Beijing 
seemed less noticeable in creating scientific knowledge, but the New Culture scholars’ 
contributions in ideological reform should not be underestimated. On the other hand, the 
XueHeng School in Nanjing engaged more leading agricultural scientists, and built in 
Nanjing the center of agricultural science during the Republican period. 
        I explore the lives and careers of more than forty Chinese scholars with American 
educational backgrounds, and concentrate on nine of them in this dissertation to analyze 
how these scholars made choices among diverse strategies to realize the goal of serving 
China with agricultural science. Six of the nine scholars started their career in China 
between 1915 and 1928 (the early Republican Period, or Warlord Era): Guo Bingwen (郭
秉文), Zou Bingwen (邹秉文), Dai Fanglan (戴芳澜), Shen Zonghan (沈宗瀚), Luo 
Jialun (罗家伦), and Zhao Lianfang (赵连芳).  Three of them finished their American 
education and returned to China in 1933, when the Nationalist Government had largely 
integrated and reformed educational and scientific institutions: Tang Peisong (汤佩松), 
Feng Zefang (冯泽芳), and Jin Shanbao (金善宝). Roughly these two groups coincided 
with James Reardon-Anderson’s division of the first and second generation of scientists 
respectively in his The Study of Change: Chemistry in China, 1840-1949. The six first-
generation scientists returned to China before 1928 and had to be more devoted to 
establishing scientific institutions for scientific research, education, and extension rather 
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than focusing on research and education, while the younger-generation were able to work 
in the established institutions and to develop and circulate scientific knowledge. When 
choosing external facilitation, the first generation had to rely more on warlords and 
missionary forces. After 1928, state power (the Nationalist government) began to play a 
more important role in the development of agricultural science. This is just a rough 
description; of course, there were overlaps between the two generations. The first and 
second generations of returned scholars had differences in their conditions and strategies. 
However, their patriotic motivations, as well the common goals to serve China through 
agricultural science were similar. Therefore, these scholars provide historians the keys to 
decipher how and why the agricultural scientists and promoters redefined “scientific 
nationalism.”  
        In contrast to their profound love for the country and strong desire to serve the 
country, most of these scholars’ attitude toward the state was indifferent or even negative. 
Among my nine chief cases, Luo Jialun (罗家伦) strongly supported the Nationalist Party 
(KMT) state. Shen Zonghan (沈宗瀚) and Zhao Lianfang (赵连芳) finally left 
universities and took administrative positions in the nationalist government, because they 
believed that state power could best facilitate university scientists’ goals of reforming the 
social and economic structure of rural China and of extending achievement in agriculture 
science. All the other scholars expressed more or less dissatisfaction with the state. For 
example, Zou Bingwen (邹秉文) directly expressed his discontentment that “our central 
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government had long paid little attention to the promotion [of agricultural science].”34 
Dai Fanglan (戴芳澜) asserted that all political parties would inevitably corrupt and 
degenerate once they became the ruling government of the state.35 Tang Peisong (汤佩松
) recalled in his memoir that he had little affection for the government and party that had 
secretly murdered his father when he was young, although he had a strong feeling of 
belonging to China.36 There are opposite or competing attitudes in most countries and 
eras. However, with a stable central government, patriotic scholars usually had to 
cooperate with or directly take positions in governmental organizations, because it was 
the most effective way to serve the country. As I mentioned earlier in this introduction, 
the absence of an effective central state government allowed the existence of 
extraordinarily strong local forces, which were very rare during other historical periods in 
Chinese history when power was more centralized.  Republican scholars aiming to serve 
China through science had multiple choices of political forces with whom they could ally 
themselves. As a result, the unique decentralized situation of Republican China provides 
an important opportunity for historians to explore what diverse strategies patriotic 
scientists might adopt to serve the country and nation through their knowledge.37  
                                                 
34 Zou Bingwen’s 1925 letter to the China Foundation. See chapter 1. 
35 Qiu Weifan, “Several Anecdotes of Mycologist Dai Fanglan,” Yi En Shi (Recalling Our 
Advisers), China Agricultural University Press, 2010. 裘维蕃，“忆真菌学大师戴芳澜二三事”，
《忆恩师》，中国农业大学出版社，2010。 
36 Tang Peisong, Wei Jie Zhao Xia Gu Xi Yang (Review Sunset and Look forward to the Sunrise: 
Memoir of a Physiological Scientist), Beijing: Science Press, 1988. (汤佩松，《为接朝霞顾夕
阳：一个生理学科学家的回忆录》，北京：科学出版社，1988) 
37 For “scientific nationalism” in Germany, see J.L. Heilbron, The Dilemmas of an Upright Man: 
Max Planck as Spokesman for German Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); 
and Paul Forman, “Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists: The Ideology and Its 
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Methodology and Structure of this Dissertation 
        My exploration and analysis of the American-trained Chinese scholars are based on 
archival materials and publications in both China and the United States, including the 
Second Historical Archives of China, the Tsinghua University Archives, the Peking 
University Archives, the National Science Library at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
archives of the Institute of Microbiology at CAS, the University of Minnesota Archives, 
and the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections at Cornell University. I am 
especially interested in correspondence between the Chinese scholars and their American 
colleagues and friends. It is significant for a historian to discover that these historical 
figures expressed their thoughts and facts in English writings quite distinctly from those 
in their Chinese writings. For example, in chapter 2, I will explore the reason why Shen 
Zonghan partly gave up his work at the University of Nanking and joined the newly 
established governmental institute, the National Agricultural Research Bureau. Historians 
in both China and the United States have examined this fact, but their interpretations have 
followed the words in Shen Zonghan’s memoir, arguing that Shen transferred to the 
Bureau because he thought the new Nationalist state government would be more effective 
                                                                                                                                                 
Manipulation in Germany after World War I,” Isis Vol. 64, 1973, pp. 151-80. For science in 
Japan, see James R. Bartholomew, The Formation of Science in Japan (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 1989); and Hiromi Mizuno, Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism 
in Modern Japan (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009). On the cases of P.R. 
China, see Sigrid Schmalzer, The People's Peking Man: Popular Science and Human Identity in 
Twentieth-Century China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Zuoyue Wang, “Science 
and the state in Modern China,” Isis, Vol. 98, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 558-570; and Fa-ti Fan, 
“Redrawing the Map: Science in Twentieth-Century China,” Isis, Vol. 98, No. 3, September 2007, 
pp. 524-538. 
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in improving Chinese agriculture.38 However, in his 1934 letter to Professor Harry H. 
Love, Shen’s adviser and friend at Cornell University, Shen Zonghan confessed that he 
left the University of Nanking because of intolerable personal conflicts, rather than faith 
in the state.39 I am not assuming that the American archives in English language was the 
true reflection of what these Chinese scholars really thought or what really happened, but 
these materials definitely provide more information that we can ever find in Chinese 
archives. American historical materials contribute to critical analysis of Chinese scholars 
and Chinese science. In other words, transnational historical methodology could 
contribute to studies of both transnational history and the history of one single country.  
        Motivations, goals, and strategies are the keys for me to disclose and illuminate the 
American-trained scholars’ “scientific nationalism” or “serving China through 
agricultural science.” The motivations, goals, and strategies can be found in the writings 
of these scholars, and also are revealed in how they responded to the challenges and 
tensions in Republican China. The most noticeable tensions include that between the 
foreign and the Chinese (caused by the semi-colonial society since the nineteenth 
century), as well as tension between the central and the local (which always exists in 
Chinese history but was extrodinarily critical during the Republican era). Earlier in this 
introduction, I sketched how the foreign-Chinese tension such as a feeling of “national 
humiliation” caused by powerful foreign countries stimulated and inspired the Chinese 
intellectuals in semi-colonial China, and I will exemplify this tension in each chapter. 
                                                 
38 For example, Randall E. Stross, The Stubborn Earth: American Agriculturalists on Chinese 
Soil, 1898-1937, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986. 
39 See chapter 2 for more details about Shen’s entering the National Agricultural Bureau.  
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The Chinese-foreign and central-local tensions were significant features of Republican 
China. Although the tension between central and local in China has existed for thousands 
of years, in most cases the central governments were influential enough to effectively 
control local political forces within this country. The era from the late Qing Dynasty to 
the Republic, however, was one of the several remarkable intervals when China did not 
have a powerful central government. Meanwhile, as a semi-colonial country penetrated 
by foreign forces, foreigners usually had more privilege in China than Chinese people 
did. Institutions and organizations with foreign support usually had more stable funds and 
environments for development. Local and foreign powers were sometimes decisive for 
the existence and development of agricultural scientific institutes and programs. Chinese 
scholars aiming to serve the country through science might not approve of the local and 
foreign powers—and sometimes also the state power. Actually they usually criticized 
these powers for aggravating the decentralization of China and contributing to the 
suffering of the Chinese people. However, in many cases they had to rely on these forces 
to maintain and develop their agricultural science. 
        This dissertation roughly follows a chronological outline. Chapter One explores how 
the first generation of scientific nationalists managed to awaken the interest of Chinese 
people and establish institutions of agricultural science during the 1910s and 1920s. I 
begin with establishment of the earliest agricultural science institutes in China during the 
late Qing Dynasty and the initiation of Boxer Scholarship Program, which sponsored the 
first state-funded students to pursue post-graduate education in America. Peking 
University made significant contributions to the establishment of agricultural science. It 
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had the first state-funded institute of agriculture, and moreover, it led the New Cultural 
Movement that enlightened Chinese youth and popularized science as a utilitarian way to 
save and serve China. A new model would supplant this effort, however. While in 
Nanjing, Guo Bingwen (郭秉文) and Zou Bingwen (邹秉文), drawing support from local 
gentry, warlords, and foreign foundations, established an agricultural section at the 
Nanjing Higher Normal School/Southeastern University modeling the agricultural college 
at Cornell University, which merged education, research, and extension. They succeeded 
in developing this agricultural section into the center of agricultural science in China at 
that time. Because of extremely complicated and turbulent political and personnel 
conflicts, both Guo and Zou were forced to leave this university. However, their efforts 
had set the foundation for later accomplishments of the National Central University. 
        In the turbulent warlord era, the only peaceful place for scientists to conduct long-
term agricultural research seemed to be missionary schools supported by foreign powers 
and funds. However, the advantage of missionary schools was based on the privileges of 
foreigners in China, and this implied one of the most crucial social tensions in 
Republican China:  tension between the Chinese and the foreign. Chapter two analyzes 
the history of the College of Agriculture at the University of Nanking (JinLing DaXue, 金
陵大学), the most accomplished and influential missionary university in Republican 
China. During the warlord era, this college was the undisputed top agricultural college in 
China, but it was under the control and operation of American scholars at that time. Dai 
Fanglan and Shen Zonghan exemplified how Chinese scholars resolved the Chinese-
foreign tension with different strategies but moving toward the same goal of using 
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science to improve living conditions and autonomy for China. Dai Fanglan founded the 
discipline of mycology so that China would have a recognized, independent status in this 
field within international scientific communities. Shen Zonghan cooperated with his 
American colleagues and other missionary schools in China to improve wheat breeding 
research and extension. In 1934, both Dai and Shen left the University of Nanking. Dai 
Fanglan joined the Tsinghua University because he felt more comfortable in a university 
run by Chinese people. Shen Zonghan transferred to the National Agricultural Research 
Bureau and later became the most famous Chinese agricultural activist. Because of the 
Nationalist government’s reforms as well as rising nationalism in the 1930s, University 
of Nanking gradually lost its overwhelming advantage in the competition with Chinese 
national universities. It eventually got transformed from an American missionary 
university in China into a Chinese university with foreign sponsorship, which was more 
acceptable for Chinese students and scholars. 
        In addition to reforming the missionary universities, the Nationalist government 
took more actions in reconstructing national universities. Chapter Three explores national 
universities during the Nanjing decades (1927-1937). It starts with how the Nationalist 
government reformed universities in Nanjing and Beijing and how scholars and students 
in the two cities resisted or supported these reforms in order to maintain their autonomy 
and identity. In Beijing, Tsinghua University changed from a preparatory school for the 
Boxer students into a formal national university and established an Institute of 
Agriculture in 1934 to investigate the most urgent and critical issues of improving 
agricultural production and rural people’s living standards in North China. This small 
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institute was led by Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle, two Boxer students who had taken 
doctoral degrees at Cornell. It was expanded during the War and formed an essential part 
of the Beijing Agricultural University after 1949. In Nanjing, Luo Jialun took charge of 
the National Central University since 1932. Luo expanded the Central University’s 
agricultural extension programs into ten provinces. More importantly, when young 
intellectuals in Nanjing felt panic and resentment toward the impending Japanese 
invasion, Luo Jialun pointed out to them some clear paths toward the goal of serving 
China through science: endeavoring in scientific studies to make the National Central 
University comparable to the Tokyo Imperial University in academics, and to support the 
nation making preparation for the coming war with scientific knowledge. At the time 
preparing for the war, science could be used as a weapon to defeat the enemy. Luo Jialun 
calmed down the scholars and students with his rhetoric of scientific nationalism.  
        When the War of Resistance began in 1937, the Chinese agriculturalists had to 
migrate to the unoccupied southwestern region along with most scientific and educational 
institutions. Chapter Four follows the National Central University College of Agriculture 
in Chongqing and the Tsinghua IOA near Kunming through the war (1938-1946). When 
facing natural and social circumstances completely different from what they had been 
used to in the coastal provinces, the agriculturalists shifted their research focuses to adapt 
to local conditions and fit in with the new necessities in agricultural and industrial 
production during wartime. By examining the works of Dai Fanglan, Tang Peisong, Feng 
Zefang, and Jin Shanbao, I demonstrate that these scientists succeeded in expanding their 
institutes, resolving urgent scientific problems for increasing crop production, and 
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gaining significant achievement in pure scientific research such as fungi taxonomy and in 
vitro experiments of water metabolism. They not only survived and adapted to the chaotic 
environment, but also had made remarkable contributions to both their country and the 
sciences they worked on. Moreover, they developed more advanced scientific knowledge 
in the local environments and transmitted their findings back to their foreign colleagues, 
and therefore contributed to the global circulation of scientific knowledge. 
        I conclude with the American-trained Chinese scholars’ postwar efforts to find new 
strategies to adapt to the new circumstances and to continue serve China through 
agricultural science. The civil war, the communist domination since 1949, and the 
reforms after 1978 brought tensions different from those they had faced during the 
Republican era. Only a small portion of these scholars chose the Nationalist state and 
moved to Taiwan. The majority of these scholars stayed in mainland China and kept 
serving their country and country people. Most of them suffered persecution during the 
Communist era, but those who survived the Cultural Revolution continued their scientific 
activities, especially international communication, after the 1980s. In the epilogue, I 
argue that these scholars were successful in realizing their goals of serving China through 
agricultural science because they found creative ways to resolve (or at least function 
within) the tensions they faced and to create Chinese institutions and knowledge based on 
(but distinct from) those of the West. They established a relatively complete educational 
system for agricultural sciences to train younger agriculturalists at all levels. Their 
research achievements had received international acknowledgement, which greatly 
elevated China’s international status in the scientific community. And they had 
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successfully developed methods and crop varieties to increase agricultural production. 
Undeniably, their achievements during the Republican period were shaped by the 
difficult circumstances that limited their influence. Because of restrictions from both the 
chaotic environment and the obsolete rural living pattern, the majority of Chinese 
peasants was out of the reach of these scholars and did not get benefit from these 
scholars’ activities. However, if we look to the Communist period after 1949 or even the 
post-reform period after 1978, a considerable portion of these agriculturalists’ scientific 
achievements were extended into the new economic and political structure after 1949. 
The agricultural institutes they established during the Republican Era continued training 
younger agriculturalists in Communist China. Younger Chinese scientists have gained 
world recognition in many scientific disciplines established by these American-trained 
scholars. Moreover, the networks of scientific and educational communication between 
China and the West built by these scholars are still functioning today. Evaluating these 
American-trained Chinese scholars in a larger context of the entire twentieth century 
rather than the Republican Era, we should acknowledge that their strategies were 
effective in achieving the goals of serving China through agricultural science. 
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Figure 1 Political Situation of the Warlord Era: This figure roughly illustrates the 
political situation in China in mid-1924, when the Zhili faction of warlords reached its 
summit. The Beijing government was internationally considered as the legitimate 
Chinese government (but it only controlled the provinces around Beijing, not including 
Shanxi province). The blue area was controlled by the Nationalist Party; the green areas 
represent different warlord groups. 
(The Chinese administrative districts in 1924 were slightly different from those between 
1928 and 1949. Here I use the same base map for the convenience of comparing the 
political situations.) 
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Figure 2 This figure shows the political and military situation in China before the Central 
Plains War in 1930. The Nationalist Government unified China in form in 1928. Beijing 
was renamed as Peiping; it was no longer the national capital. Most remaining warlords 
claimed to submit to the Nationalist government based in Nanjing (therefore I changed 
them into light blue), but they actually kept independence in politics and military matters. 
The Nationalist government could effectively control provinces in East and Southeast 
China (dark-blue-shadow area). Conflicts between the Nationalist and other warlords 
finally resulted in the Central Plains War. The red circles indicate main battlefields of this 
war. 
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Chapter	1:		The	First‐generation	of	American‐trained	Agricultural	
Scientists	and	Institution‐Building:	the	Early	Republican	Era	
(1912‐1928)	
 
        The decade between the middle 1910s and 1920s was characterized by turbulent 
political and social circumstances. China was usually considered as a “central state” or 
“central nation,” which was one of the literal translations of its Chinese name “中国 
(Zhongguo).” However, as I have illustrated in the introduction, during the early 
Republican period (1912-1928), we can hardly see a central state. The imperial Qing 
government had been defeated by modernized foreign countries and had not been able to 
control and strengthen China effectively since the late nineteenth century. After the loss 
in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, local military governors 
gradually gained dominance of their provinces from the central government, and they 
later became warlords in the Republican era. The 1911 Revolution ended the Qing 
Empire with the accession of a republican government. Yuan Shikai (袁世凯), the most 
powerful military leader, held the country for several years. During the decades after 
Yuan’s death in 1916, China fell into many parts governed by different warlords, which 
was usually called the “Warlord Era” (1916-1928), when dozens of political and military 
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forces in China fought against each other to compete for the highest power of the country 
(See Figure 3).   
        It is important to remember that this decade was a period when American-trained 
Chinese intellectuals started returning to China in large scale. The first-generation 
intellectuals traveled to the United States in the late 1900s and 1910s for education, and 
returned to China when Chinese scientific and high educational institutions were barely 
established. A considerable portion of them aimed to alleviate the suffering of Chinese 
people and save and strengthen China. Through their words we can see that many of 
these leading Chinese scholars aimed to improve their country through their academic 
work, and they considered education and research in the agricultural sciences as the most 
important way to realize these ultimate goals. These scholars endeavored to establish 
modern educational and scientific institutions based on their American training and the 
Chinese reality they confronted when they returned home. In this chapter, I will explore 
the earliest attempts of American-trained scholars to establish higher agricultural 
education institutions in China. I will focus on two American-trained Chinese scholars in 
Nanjing, Guo Bingwen and Zou Bingwen, to analyze the goals and strategies of Chinese 
scholars aiming to serve the country through knowledge and agricultural science.  
 
1.1 Agricultural sciences in Peking University 
        Although agricultural education through apprenticeship had flourished in China for 
thousands of years, the institutional framework of university-based agricultural education 
and research appeared in the late nineteenth century. School education for intellectuals in 
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China had traditionally excluded agriculture. The entrance into higher education was 
through success on the imperial examinations. The students who succeeded on these 
examinations had chances to serve as governmental officials. Since the fourteenth 
century, these state exams were largely based on Confucian classics, which led Chinese 
intellectuals to focus on studies far away from what western people considered to be 
“science.” As Hu Shi pointed out in his dissertation, for over two thousand years, there 
was only one case of rational study of natural world known by all Chinese intellectuals 
(the Confucian Bamu, see the Introduction), but Chinese scholars had diverse 
understandings and explanations of the Bamu, most of which deviated from Western 
scientific approaches. 40 Although there were always Chinese scholars conducting 
scientific studies and intellectual officials conducting experimental research on 
agricultural problems, their works were out of the mainstream of official education, and 
were usually scattered and discontinuous. Chinese agricultural works conducted before 
the twentieth century involved few systematic research methods similar to modern 
science.41  
                                                 
40 Hu, Shi (Hu Shih), The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, Shanghai: The 
Oriental Book Company, 1922, pp. 1-4. 
41 Joseph Needham stressed in his 1943 speech that Chinese agriculture had an experimental 
tradition, just as the western did. However, I could not agree with him at this point, because 
although there were Chinese intellectuals who adopted an experimental approach to research and 
resolve agricultural problems, this type of approach was discontinuous, largely conducted by 
individuals,, always out of the mainstream of intellectual studies, and overall had never formed a 
“tradition”.  
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        The first modern university42 in China was the “Imperial University of Peking” (京
师大学堂) established in 1898 during the Hundred Days Reform. This was also the first 
Chinese university to set up agricultural programs. It was created with a purpose to 
replace the traditional imperial examination system. Although suspended in 1900 due to 
the Boxer Rebellion and the siege of the Eight-Nation Alliance, it was restored in 1902 
and continued receiving state funding. In August and September 1905, when the Qing 
government finally eliminated the official imperial examination,43 the Imperial University 
of Peking reorganized its programs and established eight sections of Confucian classics, 
politics and laws, liberal arts, medicine, sciences, agriculture, engineering, and 
business.44 During its early years, this university modeled Japanese agricultural schools 
in its curriculums and textbooks. In the “Constitutions of the Imperial University,” Japan 
was the only foreign country mentioned as specific example and model. For example, it 
was clearly stated that “Japanese universities only set six sections of liberal arts, laws, 
                                                 
42 In twentieth-century China, “modern” has been considered as a positive description referring to 
something advanced or the characteristics of powerful western countries, and “modernity” has 
been the pursuit of reforming intellectuals aiming to improve China (see Ye Weili, Seeking 
Modernity in China’s Name: Chinese Students in the United States, 1900-1927). “Modern 
university (现代大学)” was considered as higher educational institutes characterized by rational 
studies, the unification of research and education, and academic independence. German, 
American, and Japanese models of universities had all contributed to the establishment and 
development of Chinese universities. Although Chinese historians and educationalists have not 
yet reached an agreement about what the essense of the modern “Chinese” university might be, 
there is consensus that the modern university should borrow structures and elements from western 
universities and should abandon the old organization and operation of traditional Confucian-
based Chinese schools. 
43 This decision was officially published on September 2, 1905. 
44 “Constitutions of the Imperial University,” January 13, 1904, (“奏定大学堂章程”光绪二十九
年十一月二十六日), The Compilation of Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural 
University, 1905-1949, vol. 1, (《中国农业大学史料汇编 1905-1949》上册), Beijing: Chinese 
Agricultural University Press, 2005, pp. 29-38. 
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medicine, sciences, agriculture, and engineering, but the section of laws actually covers 
the studies of business. … Now our Chinese university sets up the section of Confucian 
classics and separates business as an independent section. Therefore there are totally 
eight sections,” and that “Japan has two universities: the Kyoto Imperial University and 
the Tokyo Imperial University and is still planning to establish two more universities. … 
China has huge territory and population. We should establish universities in every 
province. Establishment of the Imperial University at Peking may encourage the 
development of higher education in future.” 45  
        The section of agriculture had four programs of agronomy, agricultural chemistry, 
forestry, and veterinary medicine, but it did not start recruiting students at once. In 1909, 
Luo Zhenyu (罗振玉, 1866-1940), a famous linguist and archeologist, was appointed as 
director of the section of agriculture at the Imperial University. Luo Zhenyu visited Japan 
to investigate agricultural colleges in May that year. After returning from Japan, Luo 
Zhenyu changed the rules of his section in March 1910 and decided to lecture in the 
Japanese language. Four of the six agricultural faculty members were Japanese and one 
of the other two Chinese scholars (Zhang Hongzhao, 章鸿钊) had received a bachelor’s 
degree in Japan.46 New students entering the reformed agricultural section in September 
                                                 
45 See The Compilation of Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural University, 1905-1949, 
vol. 1, p. 29. 
46 The Compilation of Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural University, 1905-1949, vol. 
1, p. 90. 
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1910 were separated into two programs—agronomy and agricultural chemistry—and 
needed to take lessons in the Japanese language first.47  
        After the 1911 revolution, Luo Zhenyu, profoundly loyal to the Qing government, 
escaped to Japan. The new republican government commanded Ye Keliang (叶可梁, 
1888-1972), a missionary-trained scholar who received a bachelor of agriculture from the 
Cornell University in 1908 and a master of engineering from Michigan in 1909, to 
supervise the section of agriculture in February 1912. In May 1912, the Ministry of 
Education renamed the “Imperial University of Peking (京师大学堂)” as “Peking 
University (北京大学),” and the section of agriculture became the Agricultural College 
of Peking University. In February 1914, the agricultural college became independent 
from the Peking University under an instruction from the Ministry of Education, and was 
renamed as the National Beijing Agricultural College (国立北京农业专门学校). Lu 
Xiaozhi (路孝植, 1868-??) was appointed as the first president of this national college. 48 
        Lu Xiaozhi had studied at the Japan Higher Agricultural School during the Qing 
Dynasty and had taken governmental positions for both the Qing Empire and the 
Republican government. Although he received training in Japan, Lu was more open than 
Luo Zhenyu in accepting agricultural scientists and knowledge from other foreign 
traditions. Lu set up an institution to send outstanding graduates visiting Japan for 
surveys and further studies, but the formally required foreign language was English. In 
                                                 
47 “Development of the National Peking University (after 1905),” pp. 1-3. 
48 For the early history of this agricultural college, also see Wang Xuezhen, Peking University 
Chronicle, 1898-1997, vol. 1, (《北京大学纪事 1898-1997》上册), Beijing: Peking University 
Press, 1998. 
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July 1914, the Beijing Agricultural College set up a new section of forestry, with German 
as the required foreign language.49 By 1916, there were nine full-time faculty and twenty-
four part-time lecturers working at this college.50 All the full time faculty members of 
agricultural studies were Japanese-trained, 51 but some of the part-time lecturers had 
received education from different European countries and the United States. From 1917 
to 1920, Jin Bangzheng (金邦正, 1886-1946), an American-trained educationalist, had 
served as president of this college.52 Generally speaking, the Beijing Agricultural College 
(although it changed its name several times after 1923) had been modeling Japanese 
agricultural education in its curriculum and practice until the 1940s, when it was re-
integrated into Peking University and administrated by a group of American-trained 
scientists.  
        The separation of the agricultural college from Peking University was followed by 
similar changes of organization of this first university in China. From 1914 to 1917, the 
sections of medicine and engineering were separated as well to transform into an 
independent college. When Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培, 1868-1940), the most well-known and 
influential educationalist in Republican China became president of Peking University in 
                                                 
49 “Development of the National Beijing Agricultural College, 1914.3-1922.12,” pp. 109-110.  
50 See “Beijing Agricultural College’s report to the Ministry of Education,” 1916, p. 199, and the 
“Directory of faculty and staff”, pp. 199-203.  
51 In addition to Lu Xiaozhi, the president, six of the eight full-time faculty—Wu Zongshi (吴宗
栻), Cheng Hongshu (程鸿书), Xu Xuan (许璇), Wan Shengyang (万声扬), Liang Xi (梁希), and 
Wang Zhidong (王之栋)—had  received degrees from Japanese schools or universities, while the 
rest two were English and German teachers. 
52 Jin Bangzheng was among the first batch of Boxer students receiving education in American 
universities. He had studied forestry at the Cornell University and Lehigh University from 1910 
to 1914, and was one of the founders of the Science Society of China (中国科学社). 
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January 1917, the first important decision he made was to build Peking University an 
institute concentrating on fundamental academic studies. Cai received traditional 
Confucian education in the Qing Dynasty, but he was a reformer in both politics and 
education. After visiting Germany and France during 1907-1911 and 1913-1916, Cai was 
deeply impressed by the universities in Germany following Wilhelm Von Humboldt’s 
ideology of education. When appointed as the president of Peking University by the 
Ministry of Education, he determined to apply the German model to higher education in 
China—that is to say, universities should focus on studies of liberal arts and sciences, 
while education of applied knowledge such as agriculture, engineering, business, and 
medicine should be taken by professional schools and colleges. Cai’s reforms finally 
caused the colleges of medicine, engineering, and agriculture to become completely 
independent from Peking University, and this received both positive and negative 
feedback from the public. Even at that time, there were scholars doubting the separation 
of applied studies from university. However, Cai and his supporters resisted such 
pressure and insisted on their reforms, which set the path for the development of Peking 
University even until now—focusing on pure studies of sciences and liberal arts. 
Although some later university presidents and deans tried to reintroduce and reestablish 
sections of applied studies such as agriculture, law, business, engineering, and medicine 
in the 1940s53 and after the Cultural Revolution, Peking University has been highly 
concentrating on fundamental studies of the liberal arts and sciences. The Beijing 
                                                 
53 For example, when appointed as President of Peking University in 1946, Hu Shi managed to 
recover the Beiping Agricultural College and Beiping Medical College as agricultural and 
medical schools of Peking University.  
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Agricultural College still kept a connection with the Peking University—and had been re-
integrated into Peking University and become the agricultural school of Peking 
University in the 1940s—but agricultural sciences played an unimportant role in the 
history of Peking University after 1917.  
        Despite the decline of agricultural education, Peking University still maintained 
critical importance for the later development of the ideology of serving China through 
agricultural science. It was the most influential center to introduce modern science54 to 
Chinese intellectuals. It was the place of origin and center of the New Cultural Movement 
that enlightened Chinese youth and popularized science as a utilitarian way to save and 
serve China. When students at Peking University during this movement (such as Luo 
Jialun) became educational, scientific, and political leaders in the following decades, the 
ideology of serving China through science was passed on to more and more younger 
Chinese scholars. I will explore this aftereffect in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 through Luo 
Jialun’s career at the National Central University. 
 
1.2 Agricultural Program at the Nanjing Higher Normal School 
/Southeastern University 
        Almost at the same time that agricultural sciences were excluded from Peking 
University, a group of American-trained Chinese scholars reformed another university in 
South China to include both pure and applied studies—the Nanking Higher Normal 
                                                 
54 Or a Chinese version of modern science; see the section on Hu Shi in my introduction. 
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School (南京高等师范学校, abbreviated as “Nangao, 南高”), which was established in 
1914 (later transformed into the national Southeastern University between 1921 and 1923 
and was renamed as the National Central University in 1928). Under the operation of a 
group of American-trained scholars, this university had a special emphasis on agricultural 
sciences following an American model to combine education together with research and 
extension. 
        The establishment and development of this university was closely related to reforms 
aiming to improve China since the late Qing Dynasty. In May 1902, when hearing that 
the central Qing government intended to reform old Confucian schools into new-style 
schools, Jiangsu province established a higher normal school at Nanjing to train new-
style teachers, named as Liangjiang Normal School. From 1906 to 1911, this normal 
school had set up programs of mathematics, sciences, natural history and agriculture, 
history and geography, and music and arts. The number of students at this school had 
reached six hundred in 1910. These students were from Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi 
provinces and had to pass three strict examinations to enter this normal school. Most of 
them became lecturers in primary and secondary schools of the three provinces after 
graduation, but there were also graduates sent to work in other provinces such as Sichuan, 
Shanxi, Hunan, Guizhou, Guangdong, and Zhejiang.55 After the 1911 Revolution, 
Nanjing, one of the biggest and most influential cities in south China, suffered a series of 
fierce battles between 1911 and 1913. Almost all students, faculty, and staff fled to 
                                                 
55 “Liangjiang Normal School’s newly establishing a program of arts and crafts,” The Centennial 
Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the National Central University, pp. 19-
20. 
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escape. Troops of different military forces had seized the campus of this school several 
times. Most campus buildings were burned, staff trying to protect their schools were 
killed, and all book collections and educational equipment were ruined.56 Therefore, the 
Liangjiang Normal School was forced to suspend operations after 1911. The Department 
of Education of Jiangsu province had to close this school and blocked the campus in 
January 1914.57  
        However, as the modern educational system had already started to develop in 
Southeast China, suspension of the normal school caused a big inconvenience for primary 
and secondary schools in need of teachers. Considering this necessity, in August 1914, 
the Jiangsu provincial government decided to establish a Nanjing Higher Normal School 
on the campus site of the suspended Liangjiang Normal School. Jiang Qian (江谦, 1876-
1942), Director of Education of Jiangsu province, was appointed as president and began 
to make preparation for the new higher normal school.58 Jiang Qian invited Guo Bingwen 
(also spelled as Ping-wen Kuo or Kuo Ping Wen, 郭秉文, 1880-1969), who had recently 
received a doctoral degree for education from Columbia University in 1914, to serve as 
dean of the Nanjing Higher Normal School. Later Guo Bingwen became the real founder 
of this school.  
                                                 
56 “Li Chengyi’s report on situation of the Liangjiang Normal School” (February 23, 1913) and 
“Li Chengyi’s report on the troops robbing the Normal School” (September 20, 1913), The 
Centennial Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the National Central 
University, pp. 36-37. 
57 “Han Guojun’s Instruction to block the Normal School,” January 15, 1914, The Centennial 
Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the National Central University, p. 38. 
58 “The Jiangsu  governor Han Guojun’s instruction of appointing Jiang Qian as school president 
in order to establish the Nanjing Higher Normal School,” August 30, 1914, The Centennial 
Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the National Central University, pp. 41-
42. 
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        Guo Bingwen was born in a Chinese family believing in Christianity in Shanghai in 
1880. He received primary and secondary education at a missionary school, Lowrie 
Institute (清心书院). After working at the Lowrie Institute, the Shanghai customs, and 
Shanghai postal bureau for about ten years, Guo Bingwen noticed that modern higher 
education was budding in China. He believed that secondary education would be 
inadequate for saving and strengthening China, and therefore decide to pursue higher 
education in the United States. In 1908, Guo Bingwen entered the College of Wooster in 
Ohio and received a bachelor’s degree of science in 1911. After that he moved to 
Columbia University in New York City and majored in education. Guo Bingwen 
defended his doctoral dissertation, “The Chinese System of Public Education,”59 in 1914, 
which was considered as the first academic exploration of educational institutions in 
China. The years when Guo Bingwen studied in the United States coincided with the time 
when the earliest Chines students funded by the Boxer Scholarship arrived in the United 
States. Although Guo himself was not a Boxer student, he built up connections with 
many of these students and kept in contact with them after returning to China.  
        When finalizing his dissertation, Guo Bingwen received the invitation from Jiang 
Qian to take the position of the dean of the future Nanjing Higher Normal School. At that 
time, Guo had other invitations from organizations such as the Commercial Press, the 
Chinese customs, and some financial companies which would provide better salary. 
However, Guo Bingwen believed that education was the most important and effective 
                                                 
59 Guo Bingwen’s dissertation was published by the Teachers College of Columbia University in 
1915. He rewrote it in classical Chinese language and the Chinese edition was published by the 
Commercial Press in 1916. 
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way to improve China. When his doctoral dissertation was published by the Teachers 
College of Columbia University in 1915, Guo argued in the conclusion that patriotic 
enthusiasm was as important as educational theories and skills in serving China through 
education, which required large number of patriotic educators to help China figure out 
her own way of improvement that would differ from the already enlightened western 
institutions and traditional Chinese institutions: 
        “The problem of supplying educational facilities for China’s millions is 
so gigantic in its scope and so complicated in its character that its successful 
solution calls for not only the highest professional skill, but a great deal of 
enthusiasm, patriotism, and altruism. … Of one thing there is not the slightest 
doubt, namely, China is now confident that given sufficient time she will be 
able to work out her salvation in spite of the fact that the problem is fraught 
with difficulties. For the present she needs time to regain her breath from the 
shock which she experienced in the transition from monarchy to republic. She 
needs time to consider what are the elements in western education best 
adapted to further her vital interest, and what are the elements in her own 
system which have proved most favorable through the centuries of her history 
and which should be preserved with all vigor and tenacity. …”60   
When the Chinese version of his dissertation was re-published in 1922, Guo re-
emphasized his thoughts of serving China through education: 
                                                 
60 Guo, Bingwen (Kuo Ping-Wen), The Chinese System of Public Education, New York City: 
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1915, pp. 170-171. 
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           “Education is the axis of reforms. Its changes may result in changes in 
all other fields. Education may cultivate pillars for the country and save the 
fate of a country. That is to say, education was the field of study most closely 
related to the improvement of country and people.”61  
Guo Bingwen accepted Jiang Qian’s invitation without hesitation.62  
        Although Guo did not stress agriculture or science in his ideology about serving 
China through education, his educational activities largely facilitated the efforts of 
agricultural scientific nationalists such as Zou Bingwen. The proposal of improving 
China by cultivating capable patriotic intellectuals overlapped and coincided with the 
ideology of saving and serving China through (agricultural) science. I believe that this 
idea motivated other first-generation American-trained Chinese scientists in the 1910s to 
devote themselves to improving the educational system in China, even though they were 
not majoring in education. These scholars were impressed by the fact that China fell far 
behind modern western countries. They realized that scientific knowledge about 
agriculture, industry, and other practical issues related to the livelihood of Chinese people 
and the development of China would help to improve their country and compatriots. 
However, traditional Chinese intellectuals had paid little attention to studies of 
experiment and reasoning. For example, Guo Bingwen described in his dissertation that 
                                                 
61 Guo Bingwen, The Chinese System of Public Education, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1922, p. 
147.  
62 For the life and career of Guo Bingwen, see Memorial Collection of Mr. Guo Bingwen (In 
Memoriam: Ping Wen Kuo 1880-1969), Taipei: China Academy, 1971 (《郭秉文先生纪念集》，
台北：中华学术院，1971); also see Mao Rong, Supreme Harmony and Goodness in the 
Southeast: Guo Bingwen, President of the Southeastern University, Jinan: Shandong Education 
Press, 2004 (冒荣，《至平至善鸿声东南：东南大学校长郭秉文》，济南：山东教育出版社，
2004). 
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“for many centuries Chinese education was purely literary, philosophical, and ethical in 
character. There was little that could be called concrete or practical in the modern sense 
of the word, neither was there anything requiring the knowledge of the experimental 
method or of inductive reasoning.”63 Other American-trained scholars such as Hu Shi had 
also criticized the lack of reasoning and logical methods in traditional Chinese 
intellectual systems, as I described in the Introduction. The number of intellectuals 
capable of studying and applying the scientific knowledge was extremely small at that 
time.64 During the first decade of Republican China, hundreds of American-trained 
Chinese scholars were insufficient to directly improve a country with a population of four 
hundred million. Therefore, it is quite understandable that most American-trained 
Chinese scientists chose higher education as their career after returning to China—they 
needed to cultivate younger scientists—as many and quickly as possible—in order to 
spread and extend the knowledge to improve their country. 
        From August 1914 to August 1915, Jiang Qian, the school president, focused on 
applying for financial support, persuading troops to move out of the campus of the 
normal school, and repairing buildings and educational equipment; meanwhile Guo 
Bingwen took on the task of designing institutions and employing faculty for the new 
school. The Nanjing Higher Normal School officially started to recruit students in August 
                                                 
63 Guo Bingwen, The Chinese System of Pulbic Education, New York City: Teachers College, 
Columbia University, 1915, p. 163. Guo’s comments on Chinese education seem similar to how 
Meiji Japanese intellecutuals understood Japanese traditions; however, Guo and his contemporary 
Chinese intellecturals usually included the Japanese into models of “modern.” 
64 Through the entire republican era (1911-1949) there were no more than fifty thousand Chinese 
people receiving training in foreign countries, most of whom went abroad during the 1930s and 
1940s, when there were more financial supports for foreign education and the governmental 
restrictions for travelling abroad became looser and more flexible. 
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1915. Because of poor health, Jiang Qian felt unable to deal with all affairs of this school 
and always asked for help from Guo Bingwen. Therefore Guo had enough chances to put 
his ideals of education into practice. By October 1918, when Guo Bingwen took the 
position of acting president, there were seven sections at the Nanjing Higher Normal 
School: liberal arts, sciences, education, agriculture, engineering, business, and physical 
education. Ninety-four full-time staff and faculty were working at this school: 41 staff 
(including the president), and 53 lecturers. 32 of these lecturers had foreign educational 
background, most of whom were European- or American-trained scholars. The school 
provided funding to support outstanding lecturers without foreign background to pursue 
further training in the United States. The number of students had reached 357.65 At that 
time, this normal school’s scale and educational level had exceeded all other higher 
normal schools and got very close to full universities in China.66 Graduates from this 
school had taken less courses than full university graduates, but usually had more 
practical training, and were very popular in job market. 
        In September 1919, because of Jiang Qian’s long-term sick leave, the Jiangsu 
provincial government officially appointed Guo Bingwen as president of the Nanjing 
Higher Normal School. During that fall, Guo Bingwen began to unite gentry and scholars 
in the southeastern provinces (Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, etc.) to appeal to the 
                                                 
65 “Acting president Guo Bingwen’s report on the general situation of our school,” October 1918, 
The Centennial Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the National Central 
University, pp. 52-65. 
66 At this time, there were three other national universities in China, but all of them were in the 
North: Peking University in Beijing, Beiyang University in Tianjin, and Shanxi University in 
Taiyuan. Although there were other missionary and private universities such as the University of 
Nanking at Nanjing and the private Fudan University in Shanghai, the Nanjing Higher Normal 
School was doubtlessly the best governmental-funded school in South China. 
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public and the Beijing government to transform the Nanjing Higher Normal School into a 
full university—the Southeastern University.67 In December 1920, the Ministry of 
Education in Beijing approved the proposal to establish the Southeastern University and 
authorized Guo Bingwen to take charge of transforming the Nanjing Higher Normal 
University into this new national university. The chief purpose of this university should 
be improve higher education in southeast China and, although it was registered as 
“national,” the Beijing government did not provide financial support for its development, 
but required four southeastern provinces—Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Anhui—to 
fund this university.68 The Southeastern University absorbed most programs of the 
Nanjing Higher Normal School and set four sections with twenty departments in Nanjing: 
the section of liberal arts and science, the section of agriculture, the section of 
engineering, and the section of education. Moreover, it established a new section of 
business with three departments in Shanghai, the commercial center of southeast China 
that was not too far away from Nanjing. In August 1921, the national Southeastern 
University enrolled its first batch of students and the Nanjing Higher Normal School 
stopped recruiting students. In 1923, when the last group of students graduated from the 
                                                 
67 For more details about the preparatory stage of the Southeastern University, see “Founding of 
the National Southeastern University,” “Guo Bingwen’s letter to the committee of transforming 
Nanjing Higher Normal School into the Southeastern University” (April 10, 1920), “Huang 
Yanpei and Guo Bingwen’s letter to the Ministry of Education on transforming the Southeastern 
University” (November 18, 1920), “Letter to the Ministry of Education about the plan to establish 
a national university in Nanjing” (1920), “Schedule and budget of transforming the Nanjing 
Higher Normal School into the Southeastern University” (1920), The Centennial Records of 
Nanking University—Historical Materials of the National Central University, pp. 99-106. 
68 Actually, only Jiangsu province (where the university located) provided funding. The financial 
situation caused a series of troubles for the later development of this university. 
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Nanjing Higher Normal School, the Southeastern University completely replaced this 
normal school. 
        By the beginning of the 1920s, there were only two really influential Chinese 
universities registered as “national” at the Ministry of Education in the Beijing 
government69: one was Peking University in Beijing, north China, which is discussed in 
section 1.1; the other was the Southeastern University (Nanking Higher Normal School 
before 1923) in Nanjing.70 At that time, the two universities were usually put together for 
comparison and there was a well-known saying: “the North has Peking University, while 
the South has the Nanjing Higher Normal School (北有北大，南有南高).”71 Compared 
with Peking University, which was more involved in political movements because of its 
tradition as an imperial university and location at the national capital, this university at 
Nanjing was more devoted to academic studies and paid more attention to academic 
autonomy and independence. Although Peking University was usually considered as the 
first modern Chinese university, the Southeastern University was more like a modern 
university in western countries characterized by academic independence. Such 
independent atmosphere of academics allowed the sciences to thrive quickly in this 
                                                 
69 The two other national universities, Shanxi University in Taiyuan and Beiyang University in 
Tianjin, had fewer programs and smaller scale and were much less influential than the Nanjing 
Higher Normal School. 
70 In Chinese language, “Jing” (京) means the “national capital,” “Bei” (北) means “north” and 
“Nan” (南) means “south.” Literally, “Beijing” means the “north capital” while “Nanjing” means 
the “south capital.” During the twentieth century, Beijing and Nanjing took turns to be the 
political center of China. In the early 1920s, PKU and Nangao represented not only the top level 
of higher education, but also the political forces and cultural traditions behind them in north and 
south China respectively. 
71 Zhang Qiyun, “Guo Bingwen’s principles of running universities,” Memorial Collection of Mr. 
Guo Bingwen, pp. 1-2. (张其昀，“郭师秉文的办学方针”，《郭秉文先生纪念集》，第 1页) 
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university. A history professor from Peking University (Liang Jingdun, 梁敬鐓, also 
named as 梁和钧) praised the Southeastern University in his writings that “Peking 
University is famous for its liberal arts; the Southeastern University is famous for its 
sciences.” Liang also pointed out that “all professors at the Southeastern University were 
talents of the era (东大所延教授，皆一时英秀).”72 The top-level faculty was an 
important reason for the Southeastern University’s rapid ascent in academics. By 1923, 
more than 64% of the 222 faculty had received advanced education in western countries. 
In the sections of sciences, engineering, and agriculture, this percentage was larger than 
80%.73 Considering that Chinese higher education was still in its infancy in the 1910s, the 
western educational experience was a guarantee for the capability of faculty.  
        Guo Bingwen’s success in gathering the high-level faculty was largely because of 
his experience in the United States. For example, after he was appointed as the acting 
president of Nanjing Higher Normal School, Guo invited his Columbia University junior, 
Tao Xingzhi (陶行知, 1891-1946), to take over the position of school dean. Tao Xingzhi 
was one of the most well-known educationalists in Republican China. He had studied 
under the advising of John Dewey between 1915 and 1917 and had been deeply impacted 
by the idea that education should be closely connected to practice and experience rather 
than merely teaching. From 1917 to 1923, Tao worked at the Nanjing Higher Normal 
                                                 
72 Wang Chengsheng, “A Chinese Sage: Mr. Guo Bingwen,” Memorial Collection of Mr. Guo 
Bingwen, p. 93. (王成圣，“中国哲人郭秉文先生”，《郭秉文先生纪念集》， 93页) 
73 “Directory of faculty and staffs at the Southeastern University” (January 1923), The Centennial 
Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the National Central University, pp. 149-
164. This directory does not provide information of educational background for all faculty and 
staffs, so the real percentage of faculty with foreign educational background and graduate degrees 
might be higher than my calculation.  
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School and the Southeastern University and participated in almost all important 
institution building. Largely due to Tao’s efforts, the Southeastern University had a 
strong emphasis in balancing both pure and applied studies in education, but kept 
distance from political movements—which was quite different from Peking University’s 
focusing on pure studies in academia but actively participating in politics. While the 
balance of pure and applied knowledge is characteristic of the American model being 
followed in education in Nanjing, Peking University’s preference reflected its 
background in the German-Japanese model as well as tradition as an imperial institute. 
        In addition to his early education experience, after returning to China, Guo had 
visited the United States several times for educational surveys. Guo took all these 
chances to contact famous American universities and had found many outstanding 
Chinese students at these universities. He managed to keep in touch with these students 
and invited them to join the Nanjing Higher Normal School/Southeastern University.74 
An interesting example was Guo’s cooperation with the Science Society of China (SSC). 
The SSC was the earliest and most important civil society of science in Republican 
China. It was prepared during 1914 and formally founded in January 1915 by a group of 
Chinese students at Cornell University. Its chief initiators included Ren Hongjun (任鸿隽
), Bing Zhi (秉志), Zhou Ren (周仁), Hu Mingfu (胡明复), Zhao Yuanren (赵元任), 
Yang Xingfo (杨杏佛), Guo Tanxian (过探先), Zhang Yuanshan (章元善), and Jin 
                                                 
74 Zhu Yaozu, “Mr. Guo Bingwen and the Nanjing Higher Normal School/Southeastern 
University,” Memorial Collection of Mr. Guo Bingwen, p.  
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Bangzheng (金邦正).75 By 1918, most of these founders had graduated and returned to 
China. Therefore the base of SSC would move to China as well. Guo Bingwen grasped 
this opportunity to persuade the SSC to set its first main office in China at the Nanjing 
Higher Normal School and employed many chief members of the SSC: Ren Hongjun, 
Bing Zhi, Hu Mingfu, Yang Xingfo, and Guo Tanxian. Because of such relations, many 
SSC members joined the Nanjing Higher Normal School/Southeastern University in the 
following years after finishing their education in the United States. This university 
became the most active center for Chinese scientists in the early 1920s and its sections of 
sciences, agriculture, and engineering became unparalleled among national universities.76 
As for SSC’s cooperation with the section of agriculture, the most noticeable scientist 
should be director of this section, Zou Bingwen. 
 
1.3 Zou Bingwen, Agricultural Education, and the Ideology of Serving China 
through Agricultural Sciences  
        Zou Bingwen (邹秉文, 1893-1985, also spelled as Tsou Ping-wen) was the first to 
introduce an American model of agricultural institution—a combination of education, 
research, and extension—into Chinese universities. He spent almost ten years at the 
Nanjing Higher Normal School/the Southeastern University and built up a strong 
agricultural section based on which the National Central University was about to take the 
                                                 
75 Seven of the nine were Boxer students.  
76 For the Science Society of China, see Wang Zuoyue “Saving China through Science: the 
Science Society of China, Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China”, Osiris, 
Vol. 17, (2002), pp. 291-322. 
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leading position of agricultural education among top Chinese universities during the 
1930s and 1940s. Zou was born in Guangzhou in 1893 into a family of higher officials. 
His father was taking charge of the salt tax for the Guangdong government (which was 
the most lucrative position for provincial officials), and his uncle Zou Jialai (邹嘉来, 
1853-1921) worked at the central government and had taken important positions such as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. His uncle arranged for Zou Bingwen to travel to the United 
States in 1910 for secondary and higher education. He entered Cornell University in 1912 
to study mechanical engineering and transferred to agriculture in 1913. After receiving a 
bachelor’s degree in 1915, Zou Bingwen studied plant pathology at the graduate school 
of Cornell for about one year and returned to China in 1916.77  
        Because of his family background, Zou Bingwen had considerable chances to work 
in government or financial organizations. However, similar to Guo Bingwen, Zou’s love 
for China is reflected in his choice of occupation. With a strong desire to strengthen 
China by improving agricultural science and education, Zou Bingwen hoped to serve at 
an agricultural school. For Zou, even an unpaid position was acceptable—he just wanted 
to conduct agricultural research and education. Although several agricultural schools 
from Anhui and Jiangsu intended to employ him, only one could fulfill his requirements 
for research equipment and conditions: the missionary University of Nanking (I will 
introduce this university in Chapter 2), which had biological experimental devices like 
microscopes. Zou Bingwen did not like to work for this university. During the warlord 
                                                 
77 Yun Baorun, “Agriculturalist Zou Bingwen”, Compilations of Literature and History Materials, 
vol. 88, 1983, pp. 173-220. (恽宝润，“农学家邹秉文”，《文史资料选辑》，第 88辑，文史
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era missionary schools were actually foreign schools in Chinese territory and were 
independent from Chinese educational system. It was hard to really reform Chinese 
agricultural education within a missionary school, but he had no other satisfactory choice 
at that time. In 1916, Zou Bingwen moved to Nanjing and joined the agricultural program 
at the University of Nanking, teaching botany, plant pathology, and plant breeding.78 
        During a train trip from Nanjing to Shanghai in spring 1917, Zou Bingwen 
encountered Guo Bingwen, who was then serving as dean of the Nanjing Higher Normal 
School and planning to establish a section of agriculture. Guo Bingwen was deeply 
impressed by Zou’s ideas of improving China through agricultural sciences. He invited 
Zou to join the Nanjing Higher Normal School and to serve as director of the agricultural 
section. Zou accepted this invitation and began to work for Guo Bingwen’s school in 
summer 1917. With Zou Bingwen’s assistance, Guo Bingwen was able to attract a group 
of agricultural scientists to join the section of agriculture and the department of biology at 
his school/university. Some of these scientists included Bing Zhi, Hu Xiansu (胡先骕), 
Qian Chongshu (钱崇澍), Chen Huanyong (陈焕镛), Hu Jingfu (胡经甫), Dai Fanglan (
戴芳澜), Zhang Jingyue (张景钺), all of whom had received American education.79 
        The careers of these people were characteristic of the first generation of American-
trained Chinese scientists, who built institutions and established institution for 
agricultural science according to the American model combining research, education, and 
extension. Compared with his colleagues such as Dai Fanglan, Zhang Jingyue, or Chen 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
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Zhen, Zou Bingwen’s achievement in creating scientific knowledge was less remarkable. 
However, he contributed to establishing an institution for agricultural sciences in China 
in that he was the first to systematically investigate conditions and problems of 
agricultural science in China, to propose viable strategies of building up new scientific 
institutions, and to illustrate why agricultural science was of primary importance in 
saving and serving China.  
        Zou Bingwen himself was very successful in scientific education. He was the first 
Chinese scientist teaching plant pathology in China and composing an agriculture 
textbook in the Chinese language. Since his teaching at the University of Nanking, Zou 
had noticed that the contemporary botany textbooks in Chinese were all translated from 
Japanese textbooks, while the Japanese books were usually based on some earlier 
European publications (often German). Zou Bingwen felt that the knowledge introduced 
in these textbooks was out-of-date and not quite relevant to the environment in China, 
because natural and social conditions of both Japan and Germany were different from 
those in China. Missionary schools such as the University of Nanking were teaching with 
original textbooks in the English language, but those books were beyond the reading 
ability of most Chinese students in non-missionary schools. Zou Bingwen saw the need 
for a distinctive Chinese version of botany. Therefore, from 1918 to 1922, he wrote the 
first Chinese botany textbook for higher education, the Advanced Botany (《高等植物学
》), with fifteen chapters and Chinese-English glossaries. This book was published by the 
Shanghai Commercial Press in 1923 and became the most influential botany textbook in 
Chinese universities during the 1920s and 1930s. 
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        For agricultural programs in higher education, Zou Bingwen believed that scientific 
research and extension work had equal importance with teaching. During the ten years he 
worked at the Nanjing Higher Normal School/Southeastern University, Zou reformed and 
expanded the section of agriculture. By 1926, this section had set six departments of 
agronomy, husbandry, gardening, sericulture, biology, and pathology with 26 professors. 
Zou believed that enough agricultural experimental fields were critical for students to 
practice the knowledge they had learned, for professors to conduct scientific research, 
and for the school to improve agricultural extension. When Zou Bingwen first joined the 
Nanjing Higher Normal School, the section of agriculture had only one experimental 
farm of 40 mu (0.027 km2) at Nanjing. By 1923 when the school transformed into the 
Southeastern University, Zou’s section had nine experimental farms of over 4000 mu in 
Nanjing and Jiangsu, studying wheat, rice, sericulture, gardening, and cotton.80 He and 
his colleagues and students also made surveys in Henan, Hubei, and Hebei provinces, 
which were very difficult, because it was very challenging for them to keep travelling to 
those regions, and they usually had to rely on assistance from local people. Luckily they 
were able to find some educated people at the local sites to keep recording the data and 
sending them samples via mail for over four years.81 These efforts largely enabled high 
level, standardized scientific research and extension at Zou’s agricultural school. They 
also suggested that the agricultural experiment station model from America had to change 
                                                 
80 The huge achievement implied huge expense. I noticed that the annual expense of Zou’s 
agricultural section was four times of its annual budget. But I have not found evidence explaining 
why Guo Bingwen, the university president, agreed to support such expensive improvements. 
81 GuoLi ZhongYang DaXue NongXueYuan ZuoWu YanJiu BaoGao (Crop Research Reports of 
Agricultural School at the National Central University), Volume 1, Nanjing: the Nantional 
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to fit into Chinese conditions (such as poorly-educated farming people and natural 
environments different from those of the United States).82  
        Zou’s efforts in agricultural education and extension yielded remarkable 
accomplishments in the following decades. The experimental stations he established near 
Nanjing functioned until the Sino-Japanese War started in 1937. A lot of young students 
studying under Zou Bingwen during this period became famous agriculturalists during 
the following decades, including Jin Shanbao and Feng Zefang (I will explore them in 
chapter 4). In addition to establishing such an achieving model at the Southeastern 
University, he was the first scholar systematically surveying and illustrating what the 
agricultural education situation in China was and how to improve it. 
1.3.1 Agricultural Education in China: General situation of agricultural 
education in China in the early 1920s  
         In the same year of the publication of Advanced Botany, Zou Bingwen published 
his best known work, Agricultural Education in China. This book was mainly composed 
in 1922 and published by the Commercial Press at Shanghai in 1923. This book was a 
summary of educational ideas based on Zou’s experiences at the Southeastern University 
and University of Nanking as well as surveys on agricultural situation in other provinces. 
It was also Zou’s assessment of the newly-established educational institution. It referred 
to examples from the United States, Japan, Germany, and Denmark and systematically 
analyzed the disadvantages and problems of Chinese agricultural education—from 
                                                 
82 For details about the American model of experimental agricultural stations, see Charles 
Rosenberg, No Other Gods: On Science and American Social Thought, Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
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primary professional schools to higher education. Aimed at these problems, Zou 
expounded his views of how to reform and improve agricultural education and 
emphasized the importance of integrating education, research, and extension in 
agricultural education. It was an excellent example showing how American-trained 
Chinese agricultural scientists had been influenced by an American model of agricultural 
institutions and how they endeavored to apply and adapt this foreign model to local 
conditions in China.  
        The book has eight chapters: “Discussions on Improving Agricultural Colleges in 
Our Country,” “Current Situations of Primary Agricultural Schools in Our Country and 
Ways to improve,” “Questions on the Main Purpose of Secondary Agricultural Schools in 
Our Country,” “Current Situation and Future Plans of Agricultural Education in Our 
Country,” “Outline Plans of Developing Agricultural Education all over the Country and 
Ways to Raise Funds,” “New Educational Institution and Agricultural Education in the 
New Institution,” “Agricultural Education in Each Province under the New Institution,” 
and “Agricultural Education in Jiangsu Province under the New Institution.” Zou 
Bingwen included detailed and specific data and examples accumulated through his 
earlier works and surveys in this book. At the very beginning of the first chapter, Zou 
pointed out the importance of agricultural education for China:  
        “Now the entire country has a population of four hundred million, eighty-
five percent of which are working in farming. Half of the country’s annual 
revenue comes from farming taxation. In 1916, the revenue was 198,653,119 
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Yuan,83 while farming taxation counted for 97,553,513 Yuan. … The total 
export in 1916 was over 480,000,000 Yuan, while agricultural export of that 
year was over 352,000,000 Yuan, which counted for 73% of the total export. 
The most promising enterprises in our industry were cotton textile and silk 
textile, whose fates were largely dependent on the development of cotton and 
silkworm agriculture. Therefore, for the sake of the welfare of most people, the 
revenue of our country, the expansion of export trade, and the future of our 
industry, it is necessary to improve agriculture. In all countries of the world, the 
methods to improve agriculture are establishing agricultural experimental farms 
and agricultural schools.”84 
        In the first three chapters, Zou Bingwen illustrated and analyzed the problems of 
China’s agricultural education. By the early 1920s, there were mainly three types of 
agricultural schools in China: agricultural college (农业专门学校), secondary 
agricultural schools (甲种农校), and primary agricultural schools (乙种农校). According 
to the official educational institution system set by the Ministry of Education in 1912 and 
1913, their educational levels roughly corresponded to higher, secondary, and senior 
primary schools.85 After putting this into practice for almost a decade, educators in China 
                                                 
83 Yuan (元): silver dollar issued in at the beginning of the republican era, which was one of the 
most popular currencies during the warlord era. It was used until 1935 when the KMT 
government issued the “legal dollar” (法币) to unify and replace all the currencies issued by 
earlier warlords.  
84 Zou Bingwen, Agricultural Education in China, p. 1. 
85 According to the 1912-1913 educational institution constructed by the Ministry of Education at 
the Nanjing Provisional Government and the Beijing government, primary education included 
seven grades. Grades one through four were considered as junior primary school, which was 
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had accumulated huge dissatisfaction with this 1912-1913 educational system. Their 
appeals between 1919 and 1922 had brought about the 1922 new educational institution 
system issued by the president of the Beijing government, which affected the 
development of the Chinese educational system until the early 21th century. Zou’s 
analysis on agricultural schools exemplified educators’ discontent with the old 
educational system.  
        According to the 1912-1913 educational system, agricultural colleges were the 
highest agricultural educational institutes and their main purpose should be to cultivate 
agricultural experts. However, Zou Bingwen pointed out that graduates from these 
colleges were seldom qualified to be experts in either education or practical production.86 
He summarized three chief reasons. Firstly, courses taught in these colleges were too 
general. All students were required to take at least nineteen professional courses but had 
no time to study any of them intensively. Students graduating from such institutions 
“might be adequate to the extension of general agricultural knowledge, but definitely 
unable to serve as expert agriculturalists.”87 Secondly, time for experiment and fieldwork 
was too limited. Agricultural students could hardly fully understand what they had learnt 
from textbooks without experiment and fieldwork, and therefore could hardly practice 
book-knowledge effectively in their later careers. Thirdly, faculty were required to teach 
too heavy a course load and were not able to focus on their specialty and research—
                                                                                                                                                 
compulsory education according to the laws—in reality, through the entire republican era, less 
than 20% people had taken this compulsory education. Grades five through seven were senior 
primary school.  
86 Zou Bingwen, Agricultural Education in China,  p. 2. 
87 Zou Bingwen, Agricultural Education in China, p. 3. 
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because of rules of the ministry of education, all full-time faculty at agricultural colleges 
had to teach at least eighteen class-hours every week and they usually needed to teach 
seven to eight courses, most of which were not their research subjects. Under such rules, 
faculty usually had to give up their research, while students would not benefit from the 
faculty’s skimping on teaching. Zou Bingwe accusingly characterized such rules as 
“slaughtering scientists (残杀专家).” Based on these problems, Zou provided three 
suggestions for agricultural college: to implement selective courses rather than requiring 
all students taking all agriculture-related courses, to set more compulsory courses for 
experiment and fieldwork, and to relax the faculty from too heavy a teaching burden and 
to have them pay more attention to their specialty and research. Zou believed that these 
would be effective ways to improve agricultural colleges in China: “currently even the 
best agricultural universities in Europe and America are following these patterns. I cannot 
accept the saying that these methods are not helpful in cultivating specialized 
professionals.”88 
        Zou Bingwen understood agricultural specialized professionals as the personnel 
capable for agricultural scientific research, higher education, and administration. 
Meanwhile, he believed that another purpose of agricultural education was to train farm 
workers directly conducting agricultural production. In the second chapter of his book, 
Zou Bingwen emphasized that agricultural professional training at this level must adapt 
to the actual conditions of a country. In the United States or European countries such as 
Denmark, farm workers were usually trained at the secondary educational level. In China, 
                                                 
88 Zou Bingwen, Agricultural Education in China, p. 9.  
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it was the primary agricultural schools—or schools at the lower level—that fulfilled this 
task, because most of the farm workers were from ordinary peasant families. In China, 
the actual condition was that even rich farming families could only afford to support their 
sons to finish junior primary education. How could we expect farm workers to take 
secondary level education! Based on a survey conducted by the Nanjing Higher Normal 
School in 1919 (see Tables 1 and 2), Zou Bingwen stressed two critical problems for 
primary agricultural schools: the number of students was too small and was decreasing 
every year, and only 55% of the graduates were taking agriculture as their career. 
According to this survey, there were fewer than three thousand educated farm workers 
across the entire country, while the number of peasant families was over forty million. 
Zou proposed three principal reasons for these problems: 1) the educational level was too 
high for children of peasants to reach; 2) courses were too many and too general for 
resolving practical local problems; and 3) tuitions and fees were too much for poor 
peasants to afford. Therefore, Zou Bingwen suggested reducing the size and expenses, 
lowering the educational standards to junior elementary schools, and designing curricula 
that better fit the local conditions in order to improve primary agricultural schools in 
China. 
        Chapter three was about the problems of secondary agricultural schools. Zou 
Bingwen believed that this type of school did not have clear and practical purposes, and, 
that if his proposals for agricultural colleges and primary agricultural schools could be 
put into practice, there was no necessity to keep the secondary agricultural schools 
running in China. He advised opening provincial-funded agricultural middle school and 
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more short-term agricultural training schools or summer schools—as they were running 
at the Nanjing Higher Normal School—to replace the existing secondary agricultural 
schools. Zou believed that the training schools would be more economical and beneficial 
in cultivating agricultural practitioners.  
        The fourth chapter was an important transition in this book: Zou Bingwen first 
introduced the general situation of agricultural education in China based on extensive 
surveys. He listed the number and distribution of agricultural schools (Table 3) and 
number of students and funds for each type of school. This was the first survey of this 
type ever conducted, and it is worth repeating some of its findings here. Zou Bingwen 
considered the four agricultural schools at universities separately from the agricultural 
colleges. The total number of students at these “agricultural universities” was no more 
than three hundred, and the total annual funds were about 365, 000 Yuan. The eight 
agricultural colleges had a total number of students of no more than 1500 and the total 
annual funds were about 350,000 Yuan. It was beyond Zou’s ability to fully investigate 
the detailed situation of primary and secondary agricultural schools, so he took surveys 
on 30 representative secondary schools and 65 primary schools and estimated general 
numbers for these two types of schools. The 79 secondary agricultural schools all over 
the country might have a total student number of 10,192 and the average fund for each 
school was about 15,360 Yuan (totally 1,213,440 Yuan for all the 79 schools); while the 
total student number of the 329 primary agricultural schools was about 16,779 and the 
total funds were 1,432,635 Yuan, each school with 51 students and and average of 1,315 
Yuan. As for the chief problems, Zou briefly reviewed the problems he had illustrated in 
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the first three chapters, such as “The higher agricultural educational institutes and 
agricultural experimental farms have not fulfilled their duty of resolving problems of 
Chinese agriculture;” “primary agricultural schools should lower their educational level;” 
and secondary agricultural schools must clarify their chief purposes and needed to be 
reformed.89 Then he proposed methods to improve these schools, which he illustrated in 
detail in the following chapters. 
         Zou Bingwen proposed his ideal model of agricultural colleges and universities in 
China in the following three chapters:  “Outline Plans of Developing Agricultural 
Education all over the Country and Ways to Raise Funds;” “New Educational Institutions 
and Agricultural Education in the New Institution;” and “Agricultural Education in Each 
Province under the New Institution.” He stressed that “higher agricultural education 
should include at least three main tasks: research, education, and extension” and depicted 
a scheme of the agricultural university as in Figure 5. This hierachical scheme of the 
Chinese agricultural university had doubtlessly been influenced by the model of 
agricultural schools at American universities, and Zou Bingwen made this very clear in 
his seventh chapter: 
        “American agricultural universities have included three chief parts as their 
responsibility: research, education, and extension. Training students was only part 
of their work. Here I would like to generally translate the principal purpose of the 
agricultural school of Cornell University at New York State, the U.S. This 
purpose was published in 1906 and printed in the first page of the introduction of 
                                                 
89 Zou Bingwen, Agricultural Education in China, pp. 35-36. 
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this school. ‘Principal Purposes of the New York state Cornell University 
Agricultural School’: 1) to develop agricultural approaches in their state, 2) to 
enhance agricultural resources of their state (the university need to research on 
improving strains of plants and animals, methods of storing and selling, and 
techniques of producing agricultural byproducts), and 3) to enhance agricultural 
knowledge of their state residents. To achieve these purposes, this university sets 
proper curriculum to cultivate personnel best fitting to the agricultural condition 
of its state, applies a series of approaches of agricultural extension to spread 
agricultural knowledge to ordinary peasants, and keeps researching on the 
practical agricultural problems of New York state to figure out resolutions.” 90 
Zou Bingwen believed that this model should be a direction for the development of the 
new educational institution in China, and each Chinese province should establish 
agricultural schools similar to his scheme—although he was quite aware that the expense 
of money and qualified agricultural personnel for his scheme was beyond the ability of 
almost all provinces. According to his expectation, each agricultural university should 
have an annual budget of at least 500,000 Yuan, five times that of the richest existing 
agricultural college and university agricultural schools. Considering the chaotic political 
conditions and the poor economic situation of China, it was a Utopian dream to put his 
scheme into practice. As a compromise, Zou proposed that the ministry of education 
should first establish at least five agricultural universities based on the existing 
                                                 
90 Zou Bingwen, Agricultural Education in China, pp. 54-55. 
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agricultural colleges.91 As for funding, he suggested to allocate part of the Customs 
revenue from agriculture and the Boxer Indemnity to agricultural education. He also 
suggested that provinces near the agricultural universities should take on the duty to 
provide financial support to supplement the national allocation, because agricultural 
universities would definitely benefit these provinces.92 This was the strategy Zou 
Bingwen and Guo Bingwen had tried out at the Southeast University. These suggestions 
showed how the reformist scholars attempted to negotiate with and adapt to the turbulent 
context in order to save and improve their country with the ideas and knowledge they had 
learned. However, in chaotic China at this time, even such a compromise could not work. 
The trouble at the Southeast University was a good example, which I will explore in the 
next section of this chapter. 
        Almost at the same time when Zou Bingwen was composing his Agricultural 
Education in China, other Chinese scientists and agriculturalists were seeking ways to 
improve agricultural education as well. For example, in 1922, Hu Heru93 (胡鹤如, also 
named Hu Zi’ang 胡子昂, 1897-1991), a student at the Beijing Agricultural College, 
started a journal New Agriculture (《新农业》) to disseminate and extend modern 
agricultural knowledge to the public—especially peasants. The New Agriculture included 
                                                 
91 Zou Bingwen, Agricultural Education in China, p. 49. 
92 Zou Bingwen, Agricultural Education in China, pp. 44-45 & pp. 49-50. 
93 Hu Zi’ang (Hu Heru, 1897-1991) was a famous political activist in twentieth-century China. He 
had promoted to reform the Beijing Agricultural College into a full university in 1922. After 
graduating from the Beijing Agricultural University, he had spent over twenty years establishing 
and improving industry in southwest China. In 1945, disappointed by the bureaucrat-capitalist 
enterprises of the Nationalist government, Hu gave up his earlier belief of saving the country by 
improving industry and turned to democratic construction in China. After 1949, he served as vice 
president of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. 
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articles exploring the situation and improvement of Chinese agricultural production and 
education, as well as popular scientific writings dealing with practical problems in 
agriculture. In 1922, Hu Heru wrote a series of articles for this journal, such as “Main 
Purpose of Publishing the New Agriculture,” “How is Agricultural Education in China? 
How should it be?” and “The Agricultural University in China’s Agricultural 
Education.”94 In these articles, Hu Heru pointed out many critical problems for the 
development of agricultural education in China and proposed his ideas about agricultural 
improvement. Hu had stressed some important issues that appeared in Zou Bingwen’s 
writings as well, such as the importance of fitting into local conditions within China and 
establishing agricultural universities. Hu’s estimate for the running fee of an agricultural 
university was very close to Zou’s (“five hundred thousand should be enough”95). In 
addition, similar to Zou Bingwen, Hu Heru was asking for allocations from the Boxer 
Indemnity and Customs income to support agricultural education.96 This should not be a 
merely coincidence or an agreement between them. At that time China was suffering 
from severe civil wars. It seemed that funding related to foreign affairs was the only 
available stable and reliable financial source that would not be interfered with by the 
                                                 
94 See The Compilation of Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural University, 1905-1949, 
vol. 1, pp. 223-231. 
95 The Compilation of Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural University, 1905-1949, vol. 
1, p. 229.  
96 The Compilation of Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural University, 1905-1949, vol. 
1, pp. 229-230. 
 76 
 
conflicts among warlords. Therefore, almost all reformist educationalists and scholars 
were thinking about these funds.97 
        However, the two authors showed significant differences as well. For example, Hu 
Heru’s articles provided less data and specific examples—largely because the author was 
still in college and not able to conduct comprehensive surveys as Zou Bingwen did. But 
more important, these articles reflected the thoughts of Chinese scholars without 
American educational background, which were different from the pattern of Zou’s 
understandings. In addition, they also reveal that the local social atmosphere might have 
shaped the authors’ ways of thinking. Hu Heru’s experience in Beijing, the political 
center and the main stage of the New Cultural Movement, made him pay more attention 
to the agricultural educator’s responsibility of enlightening Chinese people and of 
building up a new social value system. For example, just as Zou Bingwen did in his 1923 
book, Hu Heru also discussed the lack of educated agricultural practitioner at primary 
level in his article:  
        “Over 80% of Chinese people are peasants with little education and not 
aware of … (modern) agricultural methods. … While educated ‘Agriculturists’ 
                                                 
97 For example, in the early 1920s, leaders of the Science Society of China were appealing that 
“some of the income from Boxer indemnity funds should be used to establish national learned 
societies and to subsidize laboratories and museums operated by those entities; that another part 
of the same money should be used to support research institutes within China’s colleges, and 
universities; that those colleges and universities should cooperate with the ministries of 
agriculture and commerce and education in creating independent research centers; that the 
Chinese government should follow the lead of the American government and develop a National 
Academy of Science and a National Research Council.” See Peter Buck, American Science and 
Modern China, 1876-1936, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 161-162. 
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… seldom practice agriculture in the rural areas and do not have the sense of 
duty to educate the peasants and improve agriculture at all!”98 
The difference was that Hu Heru was inclined to criticize a general view among common 
Chinese people that officialdom was the natural outlet for scholars and that people not 
wishing to be officials did not need education at all. He encouraged his contemporaries 
endeavoring to change this situation by “research, extension, lecturing in practice to 
realize our ideals” in order to “awaken the peasants and improve agriculture (觉悟农民，
改进农业).”99 Scholars in Nanjing, the city far away from the center of politics and the 
New Cultural Movement, such as Zou Bingwen, usually seemed less critical of the old 
Chinese traditions and less passionate in enlightening the peasant—at least they did not 
use the same type of expressions as those scholars in Beijing had done.  
        Another example was that, both Zou Bingwen and Hu Heru agreed that the 
agricultural university should be the highest agricultural educational institute. However, 
Zou Bingwen considered the main purposes of agricultural university as research, 
education, and extension, which was similar to those of American agricultural 
universities, while Hu Heru described the aim of establishing agricultural universities as 
“Common people still have doubts about agricultural education. We must have a 
powerful highest organization to conquer the thoughts of common people. …… In order 
to arouse the awareness and attention of our country people, it is necessary to establish 
                                                 
98 The Compilation of Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural University, 1905-1949, vol. 
1, p. 225. 
99 The Compilation of Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural University, 1905-1949, vol. 
1, p. 225. 
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large-scale agricultural university. Or we will fail!” and that “Agricultural university was 
a leading organization integrating the entire agricultural education. It has the duty and 
function of directing and administrating agricultural production all over the country.”100 
Again, the enlightenment spirit of the New Cultural Movement appeared in Hu’s 
writings. Moreover, as a student at the Beijing Agricultural College, a branch of the 
Peking University and the highest agricultural educational institute at the political center, 
Hu Heru had been impacted by the remaining ideologies of the Imperial University, 
which included in its principles not only academic and educational but also social and 
political responsibilities for Chinese intellectuals.  
        Therefore, by the early 1920s, there were Chinese agricultural scholars with 
different backgrounds and different ideas advocating reform and improvement in 
agricultural education, especially higher education in universities and colleges, in China. 
Their major goals were similar, but because of their dissimilar experiences and 
environments, the specific approaches they were planning to adopt were distinct. For 
intellectuals at Beijing, where old-school Chinese intellectual traditions and political 
movements were influential and active, agricultural reformers were advocating the 
awakening and enlightening of the farming people. Meanwhile the American-trained 
agriculturalists were stressing improving agricultural science to promote agricultural 
production. The reason of their preference was probably that these agriculturalists were 
deeply impressed by the fact that American agricultural production had been largely 
elevated by adoption of advanced agricultural science and techniques. Therefore, 
                                                 
100 The Compilation of Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural University, 1905-1949, vol. 
1, p. 229. 
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compared with scholars without an American background, these American-trained 
agriculturalists were more inclined to consider agricultural science or scientific 
agriculture as the most critical approach to saving and improving China. The comparison 
between Zou Bingwen and Hu Heru’s contemporaneous propositions of serving China 
through agriculture perfectly illustrate how American training might influence Chinese 
scholars.   
 
1.3.2 Agricultural Science as the Primary Solution to Improve China 
        During the decade from the late 1910s to the 1920s, it seemed that the methods 
adopted by American-trained scientists were more promising in scientific research and 
higher education. With the Nanjing Higher Normal School/Southeast University as their 
base, agricultural educationalists such as Zou Bingwen and Guo Bingwen had gathered 
the highest-level scientists and most abundant funds to realize their plans—to conduct 
agricultural research, education, and extension in the regions around Nanjing. In this way 
the Southeast University was able to both benefit local agricultural production and 
maintain academic communication with western academic organizations. However, 
Zou’s research, education, and extension required a large amount of funding and a stable 
social environment, which was almost impossible to maintain under the chaotic social 
and political circumstances during the Warlord Era. Without a powerful central state, it 
was impossible for Zou to establish the type of agricultural institution he proposed in 
Agricultural Education in China. In 1923 and 1924, even Zou’s university, the National 
Southeastern University, did not receive its annual funds from the Jiangsu government. 
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Therefore he had to turn to private and foreign funds for help. Interestingly, although Zou 
Bingwen and Hu Heru had different opinions about agricultural science and education, 
they both considered the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship as the most possible financial 
source for improving agricultural education in China, because in the turbulent warlord 
era, foreign funds seemed much more reliable than those from Chinese governments. In 
1925, Zou Bingwen applied to the China Foundation (this foundation was reformed from 
the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship in 1924) to support cotton research and extension at the 
Southeastern University. In his application letter, Zou expressed how disappointed he 
was in the Beijing central government by saying that the central government had paid 
little attention to the promotion of agriculture.  
        “It seems to us, who have specialized in agriculture and served in higher 
agricultural institutions for a number of years, that one of the most important 
enterprises to be undertaken in present-day China is the development of 
agriculture, since this is the occupation of three hundred million farmers, or 
about eighty percent of the total population. Our Central Government has long 
paid little attention to the promotion of this occupation. Even though it has done 
a little along this line, it has hardly acquired and practiced a well-devised 
system; therefore no result can be specially mentioned.”101 
        Zou also explained why agriculture deserved more attention and support by saying 
“agriculture is the occupation of three hundred million farmers” and “all the existing 
                                                 
101 Zou Bingwen’s 1925 letter to the Board of Trustees of the China Foundation for the Promotion 
of Education and Culture, Collections of Harry H. Love, File #890, materials of Tsou P.W. 1925-
1937. 
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problems in China can be best solved by the development of her agriculture.” He 
exemplified these arguments that: 
        “Improving agriculture was the fundamental way to improve the country’s 
income and to solve all problems related with financial crisis...Soldiers have 
now become the chief factors in local disturbance and violence. Most of them 
were originally farmers. … if the living conditions of the farmers were 
improved by the development of agriculture few rural people would choose to 
be soldiers and the militarists would lose their power and could easily be done 
away with. It is in this way that China can be brought to a peaceful 
condition...There is no better way to stop militarism and to eliminate the baneful 
practices of the selfish politicians than to give the majority of the farmers 
sufficient education to enable them to participate in political and social 
activities. …the source of large sums of money for promoting public education 
in the future must be the land.”102 
        Clearly, according to Zou Bingwen, agricultural research was the fundamental 
solution for eliminating poverty, enhancing public education, enriching the people and 
the country, eliminating warlordism and finally unifying the country. These words 
represented the opinions of the leading agricultural scientists at that time, according to 
my research. In addition, considering Zou’s position in higher education, numerous 
younger scholars had developed similar ideas under Zou’s influence. 
                                                 
102 Ibid. 
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        Zou successfully received a three-year grant of $35,000 from the China Foundation 
to support crop improvement research at the Southeastern University. However, he was 
not able to finish this research. After 1926, the Chinese Nationalist Party and its alliance 
warlords launched a Northern Expedition and got closer and closer to Nanjing. Faculty 
and students at the Southeastern University were involved in the political strife. Zou 
Bingwen and his family belonged to a political faction disagreeing with the Nationalist 
government, so he was forced to leave this city and his agricultural college in 1927. 
Luckily Zou Bingwen did not have to leave agriculture. When the situation settled down, 
Kong Xiangxi (孔祥熙), one of Zou’s close friends, became a leader in the Nationalist 
Central government in charge of economics. Kong helped Zou get some critical positions 
in finance and politics. Zou Bingwen did not take official position in the Nationalist 
government, but he continued working on improving agriculture by serving as senior 
advisor for governmental departments. More important, he took advantage of his status in 
finance and sponsored a series of agricultural activities. Although he left scientific 
research and education, Zou helped the works of a large number of agricultural scientists 
during the 1930s and 1940s.  
        Zou’s later career is beyond the scope of my dissertation. However, I have to point 
out that, by the time that Agricultural Education in China was first published, Zou 
Bingwen and his colleagues at the Southeastern University did not realize that the 
essentially different social and polititcal situations, economic structures, and cultural 
traditions between China and America determined that it was almost impossible for 
Chinese scholars to fulfill the desire of improving China merely through applying the 
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American model of agricultural science and education. Due to various interruptions from 
non-academic external factors, such a thriving situation was hard to sustain in chaotic 
China at this time. I will return to Guo Bingwen and the fate of intellectuals in the very 
turbulent political atmosphere in the next section to illustrate how tough it was for 
Chinese scholars to figure out a feasible strategy to realize their desire of serving China 
through knowledge and science. 
 
1.4 Guo Bingwen, “Cultivating Capable People for the Country,” and Efforts 
at the Southeastern University  
        Guo Bingwen’s courageous and resolute efforts and strong sociality enabled him to 
gather the best faculty in China and quickly build the Southeastern University into the 
most promising university in China. But his ambitious program also caused problems. 
Guo was very capable in persuading high-level scholars to join his university, but he 
failed in, or did not pay attention to, keeping effective communication and interaction 
with his faculty. Although he endeavored to build up a free and democratic atmosphere at 
the Southeastern University, when facing disagreement from colleagues, he was inclined 
to suppress dissent with presidential authority, which usually intensified his colleagues’ 
discontent.103 
        On the other hand, the total number of well-educated scholars in China was 
extremely small in the 1910s and early 1920s and the institution of scientific research and 
                                                 
103 Xu, Xiaoqing, ZhengJu Yu Xuefu: Cong DongNan DaXue Dao ZhongYang DaXue 1919-1937 
(Politics and Universities: From the Southeastern University to the Central University, 1919-
1937), Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2009, chapter 1. 
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higher education was extremely undeveloped. Guo Bingwen spared no effort to draw 
outstanding educators and researchers to his university, which was highly effective for 
building the Southeastern University an institute conducting top-level research and 
education and communicating with western universities. However, his manner did not 
always bring positive effect on the development of Chinese science and higher education. 
Even Tao Xingzhi, one of Guo Bingwen’s early followers and supporters, expressed 
disagreement with Guo’s policy of draining other Chinese institutes of the top scholars. 
For example, in November 1920, Tao heard that Guo Bingwen planned to compete with 
the private Nankai University at Tianjin for Zhong Xinxuan (钟心煊, 1892-1961), a plant 
scientist with a masters degree of botany from Harvard University. He wrote to Guo at 
once, saying that,  
        “We are running the normal school to cultivate capable people for the 
country. Boling104 is running Nankai University to cultivate capable people for 
the country as well. Cultivating people for the same country, if we gain, 
Nankai will lose. Considering the entire country, such competition won’t help. 
Organizations should take care of friendship just like individual people. We 
should take care of our relationships with institutes in Nanjing as well as those 
with Peking University and Nankai University, and not to hurt the friendship. 
… Considering improving the faculty, it is better to cultivate for ourselves than 
to grab from others. … I understand Mr. Zou Bingwen’s enthusiasm for 
                                                 
104 Zhang Boling (张伯苓), founder and president of the private Nankai University. 
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development, but our improvement and development should not hurt other 
institutes.”105 
Although Guo Bingwen accepted Tao’s suggestion at that time and did not employ 
Zhong Xinxuan, it was inevitable that he would hurt the relationship with other Chinese 
educators during his expansion of the Nanjing Higher Normal School/Southeastern 
University. 
        The most critical troubles for Guo Bingwen were the university financial situation 
and his political position. Guo advocated the idea that academic institutes like 
universities should keep autonomy and not be political. But such an idea was totally 
impractical in China during the early Republican era. The Nanjing Higher Normal School 
was funded by the Jiangsu provincial government. When it transformed into the 
Southeastern University, the central government in Beijing endowed it with a “national” 
status, which meant a duty to recruit students from the entire country, but did not provide 
direct financial support. Instead, the Ministry of Education at Beijing government 
requested four provinces in southeast China—Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang—to 
fund the Southeastern University. Governors of these four provinces belonged to three 
cliques of warlords and they were fighting against each other in the early 1920s. 
Although Guo Bingwen and his colleagues repeatedly requested funding, the provincial 
governments always declined to provide funding with the excuse of tight budget (but they 
always had the money for warfare!). Only the Jiangsu provincial government performed 
its duty, and it actually supplied two-thirds of the running expenses of the Southeastern 
                                                 
105 Tao Xingzhi, “It is better to cultivate for ourselves than to grab from others—to Guo Bingwen,” 
The Complete Works of Tao Xingzhi, vol. 8, Sichuan Education Press, 1991, 222-223. 
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University. As a result, Guo Bingwen had to suspend his idea of academic autonomy and 
to seek private funding from social and political forces. His personal networks helped a 
lot in this situation. For example, he maintained close relationship with Qi Xieyuan (齐燮
元), the warlord governing Jiangsu from 1920 to 1924, and Qi made a personal donation 
which enabled construction of the library of the Southeastern University. During 1922-
1924, with the assistance of Paul Monroe, his advisor at Columbia University, Guo 
succeeded in applying for funding from the Rockefeller Foundation to construct the 
science building and biology building. Monroe and evaluators from the Rockefeller 
Foundation believed that the Southeastern University was the most high-quality 
university operated by Chinese people capable of conducting serious, world-level 
scientific education and research.106 
        However, the turbulent political situation did not allow steady development for the 
Southeastern University. After two fierce battles with Zhejiang province, the Jiangxi 
provincial government ran out of money and its allocation for this university decreased 
30% in 1924. Compared with 1923, the total income of the Southeastern University 
decreased more than 40% in 1924. Under this financial pressure, Guo Bingwen decided 
to close the section of engineering and department of western literature in the section of 
liberal arts and sciences. All faculty and students at these programs were dismissed and 
had to leave the Southeastern University for other places. This action significantly 
irritated the faculty and students. Although the termination of these programs was forced 
                                                 
106 The Centennial Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the University of 
Nanking, Nanjing University Press, 2002, volume 1, Section of the Nanjing Higher Normal 
School and the Southeastern University.   
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by financial shortages, many faculty members believed that Guo Bingwen was taking this 
chance to expel scholars disagreeing with him. One of them was Yang Xingfo, who 
traveled to Guangzhou in October 1924 and became the secretary of Sun Yat-sen, 
premier of the Nationalist Party at that time.107  
        In the early Republican era, political infighting and chaos was the rule. It was the 
time when Sun Yat-sen led the Nationalist Party and troops from Guangdong province to 
ally with several cliques of warlords to fight against the Zhili clique of warlords which 
was controlling the Beijing government. In October 1924, because of a coup at Beijing, 
the Anhui clique of warlords replaced the Zhili clique and controlled the Beijing central 
government. Qi Xieyuan, the warlord and president of Jiangsu province, belonged to the 
Zhili clique of warlords. In December, the new Beijing government commanded non-
Zhili-clique warlords to attack Qi Xieyuan, and Qi Xieyuan was forced to relinquish 
power. As a result, Guo Bingwen lost his most important patron. Because of Guo’s close 
relationship with Qi, the Anhui-clique warlords considered Guo as a follower of the 
Zhili-clique warlords and did not like him at all. To make things worse, the new rulers at 
Beijing government invited Sun Yat-sen to be counselor. Sun’s secretary Yang Xingfo, 
the scholar who was forced to leave the Southeastern University by Guo Bingwen several 
months before, were able to reach the top politicians at this country, and he decided to 
seek justice for his unfairly treated colleagues at the Southeastern University. Yang 
Xingfo united the scholars discontented with Guo Bingwen and accused Guo of colluding 
                                                 
107 For political situation during this period and the lives and careers of Yang Xingfo, see Bai, 
Shouyi, Wang Huilin, Guo Dajun, and Lu Zhenxiang, eds. ZhongGuo TongShi DiEr Ban: Di 
ShiEr Juan, JinDai (The General History of China, Second Edition: Volume Twelve, Modern 
Period 1919-1949), Shanghai Renmin Press, 2013, No. 21 
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with Zhili-clique warlords to the Ministry of Education. Yang also recommended one of 
his closest friends, Hu Dunfu (胡敦复, 1886-1978, a mathematician and educationalist), 
to succeed Guo in the position of university president. Hu had not been involved into 
political affairs before. He had served as dean of Tsinghua College and taken charge of 
selecting Boxer students, was the founder and president of a private university at 
Shanghai, and was a chief leader of the Science Society of China. Yang believed that Hu 
would be acceptable for many people to succeed Guo in running the Southeastern 
University.  
        On January 6, 1925, the Ministry of Education signed an instruction to dismiss Guo 
Bingwen and appointed Hu Dunfu to take the position of president of the Southeastern 
University. This news surprised and upset part of the faculty and students at the 
Southeastern University. Despite Hu’s non-political background and the political 
indifference of most scholars and students at the Southeastern University, some radical 
scholars considered Hu Dunfu and Yang Xingfo as representative of the Nationalist 
Party, which they heartily disliked. They broadcast public announcements, wrote to Guo 
Bingwen, and telegraphed the Ministry of Education (in the name of all faculty and 
students), trying to keep Guo as the university president. Radical students even forced Hu 
Dunfu to sign a declaration saying that he would never be president of the Southeastern 
University. There were well-known people outside the university who supported Guo, 
and they questioned the Ministry of Education’s instruction as an abuse of political power 
over academic and educational autonomy. However, soon some other faculty stood out 
and accused Guo of being too involved in politics and hurting educational democracy 
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within the university. Conflicts between the two groups of faculty arose and worsened 
quickly. In February 1925, Guo decided to leave the Southeastern University 
permanently and set out for the United States and Europe. However, the strife triggered 
by his dismissal continued for nearly one year. Faculty and students with different ideas 
quarreled, debated, and conflicted violently with governmental officials sent by the 
Anhui-clique-warlord government. Situations worsened beyond most people’s—
including Yang Xingfo and Guo Bingwen’s—expectation and the university was almost 
paralyzed. It was not until October 1925, when Sun Chuanfang (孙传芳), another Zhili-
clique warlord, seized Nanjing that the Southeastern University got back to normal. Jiang 
Zhuzhuang (蒋竹庄), an educator and Buddhist scholar, became the university president 
and ran this university until 1927, when the Nationalist government completely 
controlled Nanjing and the nearby provinces.108  
        During the strife of changing the university president, a large group of faculty left 
the Southeastern University—some left by their own initiative; some were forced to leave 
by their colleagues. For example, almost all leaders of the Science Society of China left 
and became presidents or deans of other Chinese universities such as the Yenching 
University in Beijing, Sichuan University in Chengdu, and Zhejiang University in 
Hangzhou. Most leading scientists at the department of physics moved to Tsinghua 
University, Beijing. As a result, Tsinghua replaced the Southeastern University as the 
pre-eminent center for physics in China. As for the section of agriculture, Zou Bingwen 
                                                 
108 For details of the strife of changing university presidents, see Xu Xiaoqing, ZhengJu Yu XueFu, 
section 1.4 and chapter 2. 
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stayed until summer 1927, when the Nationalist Party replaced Sun Chuanfang to govern 
the Nanjing area, but almost half of the professors under him left in 1925 and 1926 due to 
endless personnel conflicts. Chen Zhen moved to Beijing and joined the department of 
biology at the Tsinghua University, while Guo Tanxian, Qian Chongshu, and Dai 
Fanglan stayed in Nanjing, but joined the University of Nanking (Jinling University, 金
陵大学), the unquestioned top missionary university in China at that time. I will explore 
this missionary university run by American missionaries and intellectuals and the 
patriotic Chinese agriculturalists working there in the next chapter. 
 
1.5 Summary 
        The so-called Warlord Era (1916-1928) was a very turbulent period in Chinese 
history. Chaotic and continuously changing political situation inevitably disturbed 
academic and scientific research and education. This era was also the period when the 
first-generation American scholars returned to China and endeavored to apply their 
knowledge to saving and serving China. The agricultural college in Beijing was the first 
attempt of higher agricultural education in modern sense, which introduced the Japanese 
and German traditions and largely popularized the ideology of saving and serving China 
through scientific approaches. But it gradually fell behind when American-trained 
scholars gathered in Nanjing and established an institution hybridizing the American 
model (education, research, and extension, three-in-one) with Chinese conditions. 
Scholars such as Guo Bingwen and Zou Bingwen succeeded in developing the National 
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Southeastern University into a center of agricultural science in China at that time. 
Because of extremely complicated and turbulent political and personnel conflicts, both 
Guo and Zou were forced to leave this university. However, their efforts laid the 
foundation for the accomplishments of later national agricultural institutes, as I will 
explore in the later chapters.  
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Table 1. Surveys on Primary Agricultural Schools across the Country, by the Agricultural 
Section at the Nanjing Higher Normal School in 1919109 
-Numbers of faculty and students of primary agricultural schools 
 maximum minimum average 
faculty 13 3 6 
Students 108 20 54 
 
-Graduates from primary agricultural schools 
Graduate whereabouts number percentage 
Secondary or higher agricultural schools 257 15% 
Governmental agricultural departments  77 5% 
Agricultural business 917 55% 
Other careers 176 11% 
unemployed 234 14% 
total 1661 100% 
 
-Family background of students at primary agricultural schools 
 Number percentage 
Peasant families 1220 61% 
Non-peasant families 433 22% 
unclear 241 17% 
total 1994 100% 
-New students from 1916 to 1918 
Year Numbers of students 
1916 698 
1917 688 
1918 608 
 
 
 
Table 2. Numbers of Faculty and Students of Primary Agricultural Schools, by the 
Ministry of Education in 1917110 
Schools 161 
Faculty  774 
Faculty per school 5 
Students  6103 
Students per school 38 
  
                                                 
109 Zou Bingwen, pp. 11-12. 
110 Zou Bingwen, p. 13. 
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Table 3. The Number and Distribution of Agricultural Schools in China in 1923111 
 Agricultural 
Universities* 
Agricultural 
Colleges* 
Secondary 
Agricultural Schools 
Primary 
Agricultural 
Schools 
Jiangsu 3  5 20 
Zhejiang   4 15 
Anhui   7 7 
Jiangxi  1 5 3 
Hubei   1 20 
Hunan   6 7 
Sichuan  1 2 3 
Zhili  2 5 11 
Shandong  1 3 75 
Shanxi  1 12 28 
Henan  1 13 63 
Shaanxi   2 21 
Gansu   1 2 
Guangdong 1 1** 3 1 
Fujian   3 1 
Guangxi   1  
Yunnan   2 33 
Guizhou   1 3 
Fegntian   1 4 
Jilin   1  
Heilongjiang   1 12 
Total 4 8** 76 329 
 
* In this table “Agricultural Universities” (“农业大学” in Zou Bingwen’s original 
writings) refer to universities with agricultural school or departments. “Agricultural 
College” (“农业专门学校”) refers to schools or institutes specializing in agricultural 
training at college level.  
** This college might be the Guangdong Public Agricultural College (广东公立农业专
门学校), which reformed from a professional school into a full college during 1922-1924 
under the administration of Deng Zhiyi (邓植仪). It seems that Zou Bingwen did not 
count this school as a college when writing the first chapter of his Agricultural Education 
in China, (Zou, p. 5). 
  
                                                 
111 Zou Bingwen, “Present and Future of Agricultural Education in Our Country”, Agricultural 
Education in China, pp. 25-26. 
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Table 4. Agricultural Colleges in China, 1921112 
 Programs Number of 
students 
Number 
of faculty 
Number 
of staffs 
Annual 
funds
113 
National Beijing Agricultural 
College (国立北京农业专门
学校) 
Agriculture, 
forestry 
189 33 25 100,08
0 
Zhili Public Agricultural 
College (直隶公立农业专门
学校) 
agriculture 201 27 8 43,904 
Jiangxi Public Agricultural 
College (江西公立农业专门
学校) 
Agriculture, 
forestry 
128 16 9 19,245 
Shandong Public Agricultural 
College (山东公立农业专门
学校) 
Agriculture, 
forestry, 
sericulture 
188 21 24 42,518 
Henan Public Agricultural 
College (河南公立农业专门
学校) 
Agriculture, 
forestry 
100 13 13 32,734 
Shanxi Public Agricultural 
College (山西公立农业专门
学校) 
Agriculture, 
forestry, 
veterinary  
470 39 21 51,706 
Sichuan Public Agricultural 
College (四川公立农业专门
学校) 
Agriculture, 
forestry 
157 24 18 38,880 
Total  1433 173 118 329,06
7 
Comments This table only includes seven colleges. Guangdong Agricultural School has 
not been listed. In addition, the agricultural section at the Southeastern 
University should be counted as a college of higher agricultural education. 
 
                                                 
112 Hu Heru, “How is Chinese Agricultural Education? How should it be?” “Table A: Checklist of 
Agricultural Colleges in China—based on the 1921 checklist of agricultural colleges by the 
Department of Special Education in the Ministry of Education”, 1922, See The Compilation of 
Historical Archives of the Chinese Agricultural University, 1905-1949, vol. 1, pp. 227-228. (胡鹤
如，“中国的农业教育是怎么样？该怎么样？”表 A. 全国农业专门学校一览表——根据民
国十年教育部专门教育司编印全国农业专门学校一览表，1922年，见《中国农业大学史料
汇编 1905-1949》上册，第 227-228页) 
113 The unit should be silver dollar issued by the Beijing government—from 1912 to 1935, each 
province might have its own currency, and the exact currency value is not clear in Hu Heru’s 
article, so my numbers are estimates.  
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Figure 3 Maps of the political situation of China in the 1920s; painted by French 
mapmakers (Euratlas, Historical Maps, Hisatlas, Historical and Political Maps of China, 
http://www.euratlas.net/history/hisatlas/china/index.html) and Atlases at the United 
States Military Academy (http://www.usma.edu/history/SitePages/Our%20Atlases.aspx). 
There were many mistakes in these maps, but we can still see how westerners understood 
China’s political forces and how chaotic the situation was at that time. 
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Figure 4 Zou Bingwen’s 1925 letter to the China Foundation 
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Figure 5 Zou Bingwen’s scheme for agricultural schools in each province (Zou Bingwen, 
Agricultural Education in China, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1923, pp. 42-43 & 57-58.)
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Chapter 2 Agricultural	Science	in	the	Missionary	University:	The	
College	of	Agriculture	and	Forestry	at	University	of	Nanking,	
1910s‐1930s	
 
        As we have seen in the first chapter, the very chaotic and continuously changing 
political circumstances made it extremely difficult for agricultural scientists to have a 
stable working environment. Therefore the first-generation scientists could hardly 
concentrate on systematic scientific research, but usually had to change to industry, 
politics, or education. Over 80% of American-trained Chinese agriculturalists returning 
China in the 1910s left agriculture-related studies because they were not able to find a 
suitable position. During the warlord era, even top universities were inevitably involved 
in political conflicts and were not able to guarantee the scientists’ long-term research. 
The only exception was missionary universities sponsored by western funding. Because 
of China’s semi-colonial status in the first half of the twentieth century, westerners in 
China enjoyed priority in daily life and public security. Therefore missionary universities 
were less disturbed by the chaotic social environment than the Chinese universities and 
colleges. Moreover, when Chinese institutes such as the Southeastern University were 
always struggling for funding, financial support from western Christian organizations 
seemed much more reliable and continuable. Missionary universities could provide more 
guarantees for scientific research and education, and therefore could attract a 
considerable number of capable intellectuals to study and work there. 
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        However, the advantages of missionary universities were largely based on the 
privilege of powerful western foreign countries in China. This type of school had been 
established in China since the late nineteenth century, when China lost in a series of wars 
with western powers. Missionaries from European and American countries got 
permission to establish schools based on privileges that foreigners gained through 
unequal treaties. The missionary schools were operated and funded by western people, 
outside the control of Chinese officials. Their initial purpose was usually to spread 
Christianity and to cultivate Chinese personnel for missionary activities. Since the early 
1900s, when Chinese governmental powers were remarkably weakened and not able to 
support agriculture and medicine, the missionary educators, especially those in 
missionary colleges, changed their focus to practical knowledge such as agriculture and 
medicine, which could improve the welfare of Chinese people (and convince them of the 
advantages of western Christianity). Therefore scholars in missionary universities 
composed a significant part of the agricultural sciences in Republican China. 
        We have to keep in mind that, even though these missionary educators were 
enthusiastic and sincere in wanting to improve the lives and welfare of Chinese people, it 
was not easy to tell whether their ultimate goal was to make China stronger and more 
competitive among the powerful countries, or to make more Chinese people convert to 
Christianity, or both. In this sense, these missionary educators were fundamentally 
different from the American-trained Chinese scientists, who had a clear motivation to 
improve the lives of Chinese people and China’s international status in the world with 
their knowledge. As a result, patriotic Chinese scholars working in missionary schools 
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were facing conditions different from scholars in national institutes, which meant that 
they had to take different strategies to fulfill the desire of serving China through 
agricultural science. Therefore I decided to devote a separate chapter here to exploring 
their careers. The patriotic Chinese scholars in missionary universities held strong love 
and loyalty for China as their mother country, which meant that these scholars shared 
similar goals as their colleagues in national institutes: serving China through science and 
knowledge. But as we will see, their strategies were different because of the missionary 
universities’ closer connection with the westerners. 
2.1 Missionary Schools in China, Rising National Identity, and Tension 
between the Foreign and the Chinese 
        After the 1911 revolution, especially after the New Culture Movement (1915-
1920s), Chinese intellectuals had got rid of many of the restraints of traditional Confucian 
culture. A common national identity in a modern sense was becoming stronger and 
stronger among Chinese intellectuals. Missionary schools, which had helped to introduce 
western knowledge and ideas to the Chinese people, however, started to receive more and 
more criticism from Chinese people due to this national identity. Historians such as Jessie 
G. Lutz have described misunderstandings between missionary educators and Chinese 
people.114 Although it has been widely acknowledged that Christian missionary educators 
had brought to China benefits such as modern schools, public health service, agricultural 
extensions, and so on, most Chinese people were more inclined to notice the unequal 
                                                 
114 See Jessie G. Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges, 1850-1950, chapter VII, and Chinese 
Politics and Christian Missions: The Anti-Christian Movements of 1920-1928.  
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relationship between China and the western countries, allowing the foreign missionary 
people to take actions in China without following Chinese laws and customs. In spite of 
the practical benefits brought in by the missionaries, the implication of imperialism and 
superiority of westerners seemed more important for Chinese people in the 1920s. In 
addition, because of efforts of scholars such as Zou Bingwen, Guo Bingwen, and Hu Shi, 
modern educational institutions modeling American and European systems were 
gradually developing in China by the early 1920s, as rivals to the missionary schools. 
Chinese national universities such as the Southeastern University were catching up and 
gradually able to conduct serious and systematic research and education at that time. 
Missionary-run universities seemed no longer incomparable and irreplaceable in Chinese 
higher education.  
        Roughly from 1922 to the early 1930s, the Restoring Educational Rights Movement 
(收回教育权运动) spread in China, and it reached an upsurge during 1924-1927.115 The 
chief goals of this movement included: to diminish the separateness and autonomy of 
missionary schools, to strengthen Chinese people’s control over missionary education, to 
limit Christian missionaries’ religious training of Chinese children and youths, and to 
enhance the cultivation of a national identity in Chinese schools. At the very beginning, 
young students and intellectuals were the main participants in this movement, but 
political forces (for example, the Beijing government, the Nationalist Party, and the 
Chinese Communist Party) joined in quickly, because participating in this movement 
                                                 
115 Ibid.  
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could elevate one faction over another, and serve the interests of Chinese nationalism. 
This was a serious challenge to the missionary colleges.116  
        In November 1925, the Beijing government issued a decree to regulate missionary 
schools founded by foreigners. However, it was very vague in how to supervise the 
missionary schools and how to punish schools for not following the regulations. The 
Nationalist Party had been making laws regulating and managing missionary schools 
since 1926, when it was still based in Guangdong province, and set more detailed rules 
about how to execute these laws. After moving to Nanjing and becoming the legitimate 
central government, it modified these laws and publicized them between 1927 and 1933 
to reorganize missionary schools in most regions under its control. 117 Some significant 
changes brought by these laws included: all private schools sponsored by foreigners must 
register with local and central Chinese governments; presidents of foreign-sponsored 
schools had to be Chinese people approved by either the local or central Chinese 
government, and foreigners could only be consultants or advisers; foreigners could not 
comprise more than one third of the administrative boards or committees of any school; 
religious courses and ceremonies could not be required in any schools (no matter public 
or private), and schools and educators were not allowed to induce students to participate 
in religious activities. Schools not fulfilling these regulations would not be recognized by 
                                                 
116 Ibid. 
117 For example: “Registration Regulations for Private Universities and Colleges” and 
“Registration Regulations for Private Primary and Secondary Schools” publicized in December 
1927, “Regulations for Private Schools” and “Regulations for Private School Boards” passed in 
January and publicized in February 1928, “Directive Rules for Private Schools” publicized in 
August 1929, and “Modifications of the Directive Rules for Private Schools” publicized in 
October 1933.  
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Chinese governments, and the diploma and educational level of their graduates would not 
be admitted by official Chinese organizations, thus barring the graduates from obtaining 
desirable employment. It is interesting that these regulations and rules did not mention 
“missionary” or “Christian” in their titles, but a great part of their important content was 
pointing to the missionary schools. Politically, this was a clever move; students “voted 
with their feet” rather than the missionary schools’ closure inciting an international 
political situation. 
        By 1927, when the Nationalist government set Nanjing as its national capital, there 
were in total thirteen missionary universities or colleges in China. At that time, the 
missionary universities and colleges were almost separate from the Chinese education 
system, despite the fact that the educators had maintained close connections with local 
Chinese people. More than half of these universities and colleges included agricultural 
and/or medical programs aiming to enhance local social services. During the entire 
warlord era, missionary universities were more like foreign schools located in China, 
rather than Chinese universities. It was after the Restoring Educational Rights Movement 
that these universities and colleges really became “Chinese” universities. By 1931, 
almost all118 missionary universities and colleges had registered at the Ministry of 
Education in Nanjing. The number of Chinese faculty and administrators increased 
significantly at these universities after the late 1920s, which opened up more jobs for 
American-trained Chinese scholars, and these universities had to intensify their 
communications and connections with China’s realities and necessities in order to stand 
                                                 
118 The St. John College at Shanghai did not complete its registration until 1947 because of 
disagreement from its American Christian sponsors. 
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firmly in this country. It is fair to say, although there were still remarkable distinctions 
between the missionary universities and national universities during the Nanjing Decade, 
it became possible to explore and compare the works of scientists at these universities 
within a similar framework because of these changes.  
        The Nationalist government’s regulations were a challenge to the missionary 
universities. But this was also an opportunity and a positive impact for the western-
trained Chinese agricultural scholars. They would build the “new” colleges, from the 
foundations of the old missionary schools. These would be unique hybrid institutions: 
“Chinese,” and for the good of the country and its people; but built with western 
foundation and input. Communication became the new emphasis. The colleges still had to 
satisfy the American sponsors during this period; some funds were still coming from 
foreigners. But the colleges used this opportunity to make Chinese institutions that 
communicated in ways the American foundations could understand. They needed 
Chinese scholars who understood the American system to fulfill the task of 
communication. Therefore, American-trained Chinese scholars got much more working 
opportunities than before from these reformed missionary universities. 
         Two of these reformed missionary universities had the best agricultural schools in 
China at that time: the University of Nanking (金陵大学, JinLing DaXue) in Nanjing, 
and Lingnan University (岭南大学, LingNan DaXue) in Guangzhou, south China. In 
order to fit in their local environments, the two universities had developed different 
emphasis and strategies, and both of them had gained remarkable achievement during the 
warlord era. Lingnan University was located in the southernmost part of mainland China. 
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Guangzhou was a commercial center, but far away from the political capitals such as 
Beijing and Nanjing. The agricultural section of Lingnan University developed in a way 
suitable to its geographical and political status. For example, it put particular emphasis on 
sericulture, because silk production was a chief industry of the region around Guangzhou. 
Its agronomy program focused on rice, citrus, and sugarcane, because these were the 
main food economic crops in south China. Although American Presbyterian Church was 
the principal sponsor, local Chinese gentry, merchants, and governments shared stakes in 
this university from the very beginning. From the late 1910s to early 1920s, 
administrative and academic leaders of Lingnan University were mainly Chinese people, 
while most other missionary universities were still operated by westerners. This situation 
was largely because that Guangdong province was stronghold of the Nationalist Party, 
one of the most “revolutionary” political forces in China at that time. When the 
Nationalist government published its policies to regulate missionary schools in 1926, 
Lingnan University was the first Christian university to receive the reform. Because of its 
location, it was selected by the revolutionary politicians as a model of reforming 
missionary schools to beomce more Chinese (中国化). But when the Nationalist Party 
won the North Expedition and moved its capital to Nanjing in 1927, the University of 
Nanking in this new national capital replaced Lingnan University to exemplify the 
evolution of the missionary university in Chinese soil.  
        In the rest of this chapter, I will explore the history of the agricultural college at 
University of Nanking before 1937 and focus on the careers of Dai Fanglan and Shen 
Zonghan, two Chinese plant pathologists working at this college from 1927 to 1934.  
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2.2 Agricultural Programs at the University of Nanking (Jinda) 
        The University of Nanking119 grew out of the Nanking University (汇文书院, 
HuiWen ShuYuan), a missionary school founded by C.H. Fouler in 1888 in Nanjing. This 
“university” had three divisions at the very beginning: liberal arts, divinity, and medicine, 
and it set up a division of secondary education in 1890. The first president was John 
Calvin Ferguson (1866-1945, his Chinese name was 福开森). In 1910, the Nanking 
University merged with the Union Christian College120 (宏育书院), changed its name 
into the private University of Nanking (私立金陵大学, JinLing DaXue, abbreviated as 
“Jinda” according to its Chinese name), and was registered at the New York state 
Education Department. Graduates from Jinda would receive degrees of the New York 
University simultaneously. The University’s registering in the United States was partly 
because the Chinese government had not constructed rules and policies about degree 
awarding in higher education and the regulation of private and missionary colleges. On 
the other hand, such registration helped Jinda to maintain its educational standards close 
to American universities and to acquire international acknowledgement (especially from 
the United States).121 
                                                 
119 The University of Nanking has also been spelled as “Jinling University” or “Ginling 
University” according to the pronunciation of its Chinese name. 
120 The Union Christian College was formed in 1900 by the merger of the Christian College (基督
书院 ) founded in 1891 and the Presbyterian College (益智书院) founded in 1894. 
121 For the early history of the University of Nanking, see “A Brief History of the University of 
Nanking,” “General Situation of the Founding Period,” “Process of the Foundation,” “General 
Situation of the Growing Period,” and “Acknowledgement of the New York University,” The 
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        After the 1911 Revolution, Nanjing and the nearby regions suffered a series of fierce 
battles. To make things worse, a severe flood happened in 1913. A lot of local residents 
became homeless. Joseph Bailie, a mathematics professor at Jinda, felt deep sympathy for 
these poor people. He appealed to the local government and gentries to unite and help 
these refugees and suggested that they start an agricultural organization and employ these 
homeless people as workers to plant trees at wastelands near Nanjing. This project would 
both help the refugees and improve local economics and environment. However, Bailie 
soon noticed the critical shortage of knowledgeable people in agriculture and forestry. To 
maintain the tree-planting project, he established a program of agriculture at Jinda in 
1914 and a forestry program in 1915. Bailie invited J. H. Reisner, a new master’s 
graduate from the agricultural school of Cornell University, to lecture about agriculture at 
these programs. Reisner majored in agronomy at Cornell with Professor Harry H. Love122 
as his advisor. At that time, Reisner was the only agriculturalist in China with a graduate 
degree. In 1916, the two programs combined into a section of agriculture and forestry. It 
was a four-year college from the very beginning.123 Considering that Peking University 
had already separated the agricultural college and that the Nanjing Higher Normal School 
had not yet established the agricultural section, at this time, Jinda was the only university 
                                                                                                                                                 
Centennial Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the University of Nanking, pp. 
3-4, 6-7, 14-15, 17.  
122 We will meet Professor Harry Love many times later in this dissertation. He had long-term 
close communications with many famous Chinese agriculturalists and educationalists, and was 
the most active American agricultural scientist and activist on behalf of Republican China. 
123 See “Foseph Bailie: Founder of the Agricultural School at Our University” and “General 
Introduction of the Agricultural School,” The Centennial Records of Nanking University—
Historical Materials of the University of Nanking, pp. 21 & 253. 
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in China with an agricultural section—although it was not registered as a Chinese 
university.  
        When Bailie left Jinda in the same year, some American directors suggested 
suspending the section of agriculture and forestry and concentrating on the education of 
liberal arts. Luckily, the Chinese directors and Reisner insisted that agriculture and 
forestry were the most important and necessary knowledge for China and therefore this 
section should be expanded rather than suspended. Finally the university board decided to 
continue this section and appointed Reisner as the director.124 Although Jinda seemed 
more like an American university during the warlord era, its section of agriculture and 
forestry had a Chinese root from the very beginning. In 1920, when Jinda was only 
registered at New York state, its agricultural section registered at the Ministry of 
Education in Beijing as a Chinese agricultural college.125  
        Because of efforts of Reisner and A. J. Bowen (university president from 1910 to 
1926), by 1923 this section had received about seven hundred thousand U.S. dollars from 
American donations, which guaranteed the financial supply for its further development 
and enabled its advantage over the Chinese agricultural colleges and universities 
struggling for funding. In 1924, Reisner contacted Professor Harry H. Love, his master’s 
advisor at Cornell University. The two cooperated and launched a cooperative crop 
breeding program between Cornell and Jinda. This crop breeding program was Cornell 
                                                 
124 “Foundation of the Section of Agriculture and Forestry,” based on J. H. Reisner’s recollections 
in 1954, The Centennial Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the University 
of Nanking, p. 23.  
125 “General Introduction of the Agricultural School”, The Centennial Records of Nanking 
University—Historical Materials of the University of Nanking, p. 253. 
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University’s first international technical cooperation program and the first long-term 
scientific cooperation between Chinese academic institutes and western institutes. 
American scientists from Cornell, such as H. H. Love and Clyde H. Myers, had 
conducted breeding experiments in China during the 1920s because of this program. 
Several of the most influential American-trained agriculturalists in the Republican era, 
such as Shen Zonghan and Zhao Lianfang, started their academic work in this program 
after receiving their doctoral degrees from the U.S. Shen Zonghan’s later comments 
disclosed that this cooperation embodied the ideology of combining education, research, 
and extension in agricultural science, which was obviously borrowed from the American 
model: “the most significant results of the Nanking-Cornell-International Education 
Board Program for Crop Improvement in China were: (1) training a group of Chinese 
plant breeders for carrying on a national program of crop improvement; (2) developing 
better varieties of wheat, barley, rice, kaoliang, millet and soybeans showing increased 
yields from 10 to 20 percent more than the native varieties; (3) stimulating the Chinese 
government to establish the National Agricultural Research Bureau of the Ministry of 
Industry in 1931 which made great improvements in agricultural production in China up 
to 1949 through scientific research and agricultural extension services.”126  
        In 1925, Reisner suggested the university board should appoint both American and 
Chinese directors for the section of agriculture and forestry—probably because of the 
social atmosphere of the Anti-Christianity Movement and the Regaining Education 
Rights Movement. It was the year of the strife of changing university president at the 
                                                 
126 Love, Harry H., and J. H. Reisner, The Cornell-Nanking Story, 1964. 
http://ecommons.cornell.edu/handle/1813/29080 
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Southeastern University (see section 1.4). Guo Tanxian (过探先, 1886-1929), the former 
vice director of the agricultural section at the Southeastern University, was pushed out in 
personnel conflicts and decided to join the University of Nanking. Guo Tanxian was a 
Boxer student. He studied agriculture at the University of Wisconsin and Cornell 
University, focusing on cotton science. After receiving a master’s degree from Cornell, 
Guo Tanxian returned to China 1915. He was one of the founders of the Science Society 
of China, the Jiangsu Provincial First Agricultural School, and agricultural school of the 
Southeastern University. After joining the University of Nanking, Guo Tanxian was then 
appointed as the Chinese director of the section of agriculture and forestry, and he was 
the actual person in charge of this section from 1927 to 1929.127 
        In March 1927, when the Nationalist Army of the North Expedition got close to 
Nanjing, violent riots occurred within and near the city. It seemed that the riots were 
caused by radical Chinese soldiers and workers aiming to exclude imperialism and 
foreigners.128 J. E. Williams, a vice president of the University of Nanking, was killed in 
the riots. Almost all western people at Jinda were scared and fled back to their home 
countries. The remaining Chinese faculty and staff chose Guo Tanxin to take charge of 
university affairs temporarily. Fortunately, Guo Tanxian was a Nationalist Party member 
and had personal connections with high officials of the Nationalist Party.129 He managed 
                                                 
127 “General Introduction of the Agricultural School,” The Centennial Records of Nanking 
University—Historical Materials of the University of Nanking, pp. 253-254. 
128 Later, Jiang Jieshi and his supporters within the Nationalist Party accused the Chinese 
Communist Party of plotting these riots, but the CCP claimed that Jiang was framing the CCP. 
This event finally caused rupture between the Nationalist Party and the CCP. 
129 This might be a reason for his leaving the Southeastern University—during the strife in 1925, 
Zou Bingwen (邹秉文), director of the agricultural section of the Southeastern University, stood 
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to protect Jinda from being closed or confiscated by radical anti-imperialist politicians.130 
Moreover, the Nationalist army’s occupation of Nanjing retriggered the temporarily 
subsided personnel conflicts at the Southeastern University. Zou Bingwen, director of the 
agricultural section of the Southeastern University, could not fully trust the new 
Nationalist government and resigned. Guo Tanxian took this opportunity and succeeded 
in drawing away many of the agricultural scientists not feeling very comfortable in the 
personnel disputes within the section of agriculture and forestry at Jinda (such as Dai 
Fanglan).  
        In July 1927, the Nationalist government’s regulations for missionary education 
came out, requiring that all missionary universities must have Chinese people to be the 
university president. Board members of the University of Nanking decided to appoint 
Chen Yuguang (陈裕光), an early Jinda graduate with a doctoral degree of chemistry 
from the Columbia University, to be the university president. Chen served at this position 
for twenty-four years, until 1952, when Jinda was merged with other universities under 
requirements of the Communist government.  
        Because almost all American leaders had left and did not come back to Nanjing until 
1929, for almost two years, the University of Nanking was actually operated by Chinese 
scholars with American training backgrounds, such as Guo Tanxian and Chen Yuguang. 
                                                                                                                                                 
closely together with President Guo Bingwen, who was closer to the old warlord and disagreed 
with the Nationalist Party. Therefore, there must have been conflicts and disagreements between 
Zou Bingwen and Guo Tanxian. Then, it is easy to understand why Guo Tanxian decided to 
transfer to Jinda. 
130 See “Records of the 23th conference of the Board of University of Nanking,” April 19 & 20, 
1927, in The Centennial Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the University 
of Nanking, pp. 41-43.  
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During this period, the Chinese faculty strongly increased the Chinese identity of this 
missionary university. Jinda was shifted from an American university in China into a 
Chinese university with American sponsorship and connections. In 1928, Jinda officially 
registered at the University Academy (the governmental organization functioning as the 
Ministry of Education at that time) at the Nanjing Nationalist government as “Private 
University of Nanking.” It was the first missionary university registering with the 
Chinese government.131 The section of agriculture and forestry changed its name to the 
Agricultural School at University of Nanking. Despite its missionary roots, it was the 
most comprehensive and promising agricultural college in China at that time.  
        The new situations during the Nanjing Decade had multiple influences on 
agricultural scientists at the University of Nanking. First of all, it became a real Chinese 
university, which significantly strengthened the university scientists’ confidence and 
ability to realize their desire of serving China. Despite the strong foreign missionary 
tradition and sponsorship, Chinese people were able to take important positions and make 
critical decisions at this university officially, and the foreign and missionary forces had to 
function with restrictions. As for the school of agriculture, more and more Chinese 
people became leading scientists and department chairs after 1927. Faculty, staff, and 
students at Jinda were able to openly and officially include serving, construcing, or 
improving China into their studies and works. Without such changes, Dai Fanglan and 
Shen Zonghan would not have a chance to smoothly fulfill their desire to serve their 
country through scientific research at this university. 
                                                 
131 Chen Yuguang, “Acceding to the University President in the Unrest,” The Centennial Records 
of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the University of Nanking, pp. 44-45. 
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        Secondly, the new situation encouraged scientists at Jinda to communicate and 
cooperate with more agricultural governmental and academic organizations. On the one 
hand, these scientists cooperated with more newly established agricultural institutes in 
China. They were able to work in diverse natural and social environments within this 
huge country, which was uncommon  for scientists in other countries and for themselves 
in the past. Through the cases of Dai Fanglan and Shen Zonghan, two chief figures in this 
chapter, we can see that during this time period, leading Chinese scholars in missionary 
universities were able to develop new scientific knowledge through experiments and 
surveys, and were more efficient in improving agricultural production in certain places. 
On the other hand, because of its missionary background and American sponsorship, this 
university maintained its connections with western academic institutes. Scientists at Jinda 
were able to communicate with their western colleagues easily and spread the new 
scientific knowledge they developed on Chinese soil to the western scientific 
communities. Therefore they were making great achievements as scientists by creating 
and circulating scientific knowledge. 
        Meanwhile, after two decades of communication and exchange in science and 
education, by the late 1920s, some American scholars and foundations started to value 
the importance and improvement of Chinese science. An interesting case was attitudes of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Rockefeller Foundation. The Institute of Pacific 
Relations was an NGO aiming to provide a forum to explore relations between the Pacific 
countries. It was based in the United States. China was considered as one of the founder 
countries because missionary organizations in China (such as the Y.M.C.A., 基督教青年
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会) played active roles in organizing the first meetings. The University of Nanking was 
not among these founder organizations, but its faculty attended the bi-annual meetings as 
representatives of Chinese scholars. In 1927, a group of American agricultural 
economists of the Institute received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to conduct a 
survey of natural and economic conditions in rural China. These American researchers 
believed that their research would provide substantial data for the studies of agricultural 
economics and would benefit Chinese agriculture. However, their project was delayed 
because of political changes caused by the Nationalist Northern Expedition. When the 
situation got settled, the new Nationalist government declined American researchers’ 
request of surveying rural Chinese, because this activity would hurt Chinese people’s 
feelings of national esteem and might be dangerous for national security. The final 
compromise was that Professor John L. Buck and Professor Sun Wenyu (孙文郁) from 
the University of Nanking were jointly commissioned to conduct this survey. Buck was a 
Cornell graduate who had been working in China for fourteen years, and had settled in 
China. Sun received a master’s degree in nutrition science from Stanford University. The 
American researchers trusted the academic ability of Buck and Sun, and the Chinese 
government trusted their loyalty. The survey project lasted from 1929 to 1936 and 
covered 168 counties in 22 provinces. Buck and Sun published a book Zhongguo TuDi 
LiYong (Utilities of Chinese Land) in 1937. The English version of this book was 
considered as one of the most classical works of Chinese agricultural economics by 
western scholars. However, this book received wide criticism from Chinese scholars 
during both the Republican era and post-1949 period. Critical Chinese scholars 
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commented that this book mechanically followed western theories but ignored 
remarkable difference between Chinese and western agriculture. In addition, there were 
also patriotic intellectuals claimed that investigating lands of agriculture was a typical 
colonial activity and that allowing foreigners to investigate Chinese rural land was a 
humiliation for Chinese people.132 The partnership of Professors Buck and Sun was not 
enough to overcome the ongoing Chinese-foreign tensions; although this strategy was 
successful in ensuring the completion of the agricultural survey and publication of the 
book. 
         From this case we can see that status of missionary university in Republican China 
was delicate and complicated. Actually, Chinese scholars in missionary universities were 
much closer to the Chinese-foreign tension than their colleagues in national universities. 
Most of these scholars I am exploring had expressed their love and loyalty for China, but 
their attitudes toward foreign scholars and foreign elements at missionary universities 
were very diverse, largely dependent on their personal experiences. Therefore the 
strategies they took seemed quite different. In this chapter, I will highlight the examples 
of Dai Fanglan and Shen Zonghan to illustrate the motivations, strategies, and 
achievements of the Jinda scientists during this period. 
 
                                                 
132 Zhang, Jing, “The Institute of Pacific Relations and Chinese Rural Survey, 1929-1937—
Chinese Rural Land Survey at the University of Nanking,” Min Guo Dang An, February 2007. 
(张静，“太平洋国际学会与 1929-1937年中国农村问题研究——以金陵大学中国土地调查
为中心”，《民国档案》，2007.02) Also see Zhang Jing, China Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1925-1945, Social Sciences Academic Press, October 2012. (张静，《中国太平洋国际会议研
究 1925-1945》，社会科学文献出版社，2012年 10月) 
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2.3 Dai Fanglan: Establishing Mycology for China 
        Dai Fanglan was born in Zhenhai, Zejiang Province on May 3rd, 1893. He was the 
third son of a scholar-gentry family. His grandfather and father had been chief officials at 
several counties in Zhejiang Province. Sponsored by their uncle Dai Zhenchuo, Dai 
Fanglan and his elder brother were able to take western-style elementary and secondary 
education in Shanghai. They graduated from high school in 1910, the year when the Qing 
Government started the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program. After a one-year 
preparation, Dai Fanglan passed the exam and was admitted to Tsinghua College at the 
age of eighteen. He studied at this college for two years to prepare for college education 
in the United States.133  
        According to the original agreement between the Qing Empire and the U.S. 
government, over 80% of the selected Boxer students had to major in applied knowledge 
such as engineering, agriculture, medicine, business and law. The Republican 
governments followed this rule. In actual practice, the Boxer students had the freedom to 
change their universities and majors. For example, Hu Shi (胡适), one of the first 
generation Boxer students, transferred from agriculture to philosophy at Cornell 
University. However, Hu Shi was an exceptional case. Most Boxer students stayed in the 
sciences and engineering. In his autobiography, Dai Fanglan explained the reason for his 
choosing agriculture as a major, in which a motivation of patriotism and scientific 
nationalism is apparent: 
                                                 
133 Cheng Guangsheng, Biography of Dai Fanglan, pp. 5-10. 
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        “…foreigners were continuously insulting our country. Youths at that 
era were all filled with righteous patriotism and wished our country to 
become stronger very soon. Most young people prefer to study practical 
knowledge rather than humanities in order to make China stronger. Therefore 
I chose agriculture as my major. I thought that the United States had 
advanced agricultural sciences. In addition, it was a democratic and advanced 
country and might be a model for our development.”134  
         Nevertheless, just like most first-generation American-trained Chinese scientists, 
while acknowledging the democracy and advancement of the United States, Dai Fanglan 
did not forget the humiliations for China brought by this country and others from the 
west. 
        In 1914 Dai Fanglan entered the College of Agriculture in University of Wisconsin-
Madison. It was the era when H. L. Russell and J. L. Ralph were building up the studies 
of microbiology and plant pathology in the United States. Dai Fanglan was the first 
Chinese student to study plant pathology in America. For two years, Dai Fanglan focused 
on mycology and agronomy at the University of Wisconsin. It was during this period that 
he joined the Science Society of China (SSC), the first Chinese scientific association 
established by his Tsinghua seniors at Cornell University in 1915. (The SSC was 
organized by a group of Chinese students at Cornell University in 1914.) The first issue 
of its monthly journal, KeXue (Science), was published in January 1915, which signified 
the formal establishment of the Science Society. Among the nine founders of the SSC, 
                                                 
134 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 10-11 
 118 
 
seven were sponsored by the Boxer scholarship and were therefore Tsinghua alumni.135 
Dai Fanglan’s Cornell colleagues encouraged him to introduce other Chinese students in 
Wisconsin into this society. Two years later, in fall 1916, Dai Fanglan transferred to the 
School of Agriculture in Cornell University, considered by some to be the best 
agricultural school in the United States.136  He took mycology and plant pathology 
courses with George Francis Atkinson, Herbert Hice Whetzel137, Harry Morton 
Fitzpatrick, Joseph Charles Arthur, and Charles David Chupp. Under the direction of 
Whetzel, Dai Fanglan got more field practice as an undergraduate student. He developed 
a strong interest in plant pathology and mycology during the two years in Cornell. 
        In 1918, Dai Fanglan entered the graduate school in Columbia University. His 
advisor was Professor Robert Almer Harper. Dai Fanglan’s studies during the Columbia 
period were on cellular biology and taxonomy of fungi. He also developed a good 
relationship with Bernard Ogilvie Dodge, an American scientist from University of 
Wisconsin. After returning to China, Dai Fanglan kept in communication with Harper 
and Dodge for many years.138 
                                                 
135 Wang Zuoyue, “Saving China through Science: the Science Society of China, Scientific 
Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China,” Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 17, Science and 
Civil Society (2002), pp. 291-322. 
136 Several Tsinghua students had already studied at Cornell before Dai Fanglan. For example, 
Bing Zhi (秉志, 1886-1965) studied there between 1909 and 1913 and later received a PhD 
degree from the department of biology; Guo Tanxian (过探先, 1886-1926) received a master’s 
degree in 1915; Zou Bingwen (邹秉文, 1893-1985) received a bachelor’s degree in 1915 and 
then studied plant pathology for one year before going back to China in 1916. 
137 Herbert H. Whetzel directed two other prominent Chinese agricultural scientists to finish their 
doctorate dissertations: Deng Shuqun in 1928 and Lin Chuanguang (林传光) in 1940.  
138 Cheng Guangsheng, p. 14 and p. 32. 
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        Dai Fanglan’s studies in Columbia proceeded smoothly. However, his father was 
unemployed in 1919, and the whole family was falling into a difficult situation. Dai 
Fanglan had to give up his study in America to go back home to earn a living for the 
family.139 Dai Fanglan’s early career in China demonstrates the political instability of the 
times. As mentioned before, the decade from the late 1910s to 1928 was a period of high 
warlordism. China was actually controlled by more than ten warlords competing with 
each other. Some of these warlords were receiving funding and support from foreign 
countries such as the United States, Japan, and USSR. Therefore, it was very hard for 
American-trained Chinese scientists and educators in China to fully concentrate on 
scientific works without interference from politics. They had to deal with such 
complicated political situations and to balance so many political forces—local and 
foreign—just to survive and maintain their lives, while their overseas experience 
sometimes made it impossible for them to stay away from political and interpersonal 
collisions. 
 From 1919 to 1925, Dai Fanglan had worked at several agricultural schools and 
farms in four provinces. He had no chance to conduct serious scientific research until 
joining the Southeastern University in 1923. Nevertheless, this good situation was soon 
interrupted by interpersonal conflicts. Guo Bingwen (郭秉文), the president and founder 
of the Southeast University, was dismissed in 1926 because of strife among different 
                                                 
139 I would like to make a comparison between Dai Fanglan and Shen Zonghan, another great 
Chinese agricultural scientist and Cornell University alumnus. Shen Zonghan insisted on 
finishing his education despite the fact that his father strongly opposed this decision and that his 
family had been in heavy debt for decades. In this sense, Dai Fanglan was still following 
traditional Chinese ethics to fulfill his filial duty. 
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political factions (see chapter 1). Dai Fanglan was not a close friend of Guo Bingwen. 
However, as an American-trained scientist, he encountered hostility from some 
colleagues with different political concepts and was dismissed as well. During the 
following summer, Dai Fanglan got in touch with Guo Tanxian (过探先). (Guo Tanxian 
had studied at the University of Wisconsin and Cornell University as well, and was 
serving as director of the College of Agriculture and Forestry at University of Nanking.) 
With the help of Guo, Dai Fanglan joined the Jinda faculty in fall 1927.140  
        After occupational uncertainty for almost eight years, Dai Fanglan settled down at 
the University of Nanking (Jinda). As a missionary university supported by American 
funding, Jinda was able to protect its faculty and students from the chaotic warlordism. 
Compared with the earlier farm and schools, Jinda provided Dai much more stable and 
superior conditions for both his life and research. From 1929 to 1934, he published 
twelve research articles in academic journals in China (with two coauthored with Wei 
Jingchao, and one coauthored with Zhou Jiachi). By 1933, he was appointed as professor 
and director of the program of plant pathology, and his monthly salary had reached 270 
CND. He was among three of the highest paid professors at the College of Agriculture 
and Forestry in Jinda (the two others were Chen Rong, 陈嵘, and Shen Zonghan, 沈宗瀚
).141 
        During his eight years at Jinda, Dai Fanglan made significant advances in research 
about plant pathology and mycology. When newly settled down at the program of plant 
                                                 
140 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 22-26. 
141 Shen Zonghan, Memoirs of the Middle Age, p. 28. 
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pathology, Dai Fanglan focused his research on fungi related to crop and fruit diseases 
rather than the basic research of fungi classification and systematics. However, when 
continuing writing scientific popularization articles for the Kexue journal, he noticed that 
from the 1870s to the early twentieth century, all publications on fungi in China were 
published by foreigners.142 China only provided raw materials for the research of natural 
history, but could not really contribute to creating new scientific knowledge. Dai 
Fanglan’s pride and the feeling of dual-identity of being both Chinese and a scientist 
made it hard for him to accept China’s disadvantage in scientific research. 
        One of Dai’s conflicts with Albert N. Steward, director of the program of plant 
pathology at Jinda, finally motivated him to work on fungi classification. Steward 
promised to facilitate Professor Roland Thaxter (an American scientist from Harvard 
University) to collect fungi specimens in Southwest China. Dai Fanglan insisted that 
Jinda should keep one copy of the fungus specimen and send another copy to Harvard, 
and that it should be Chinese scientists’ duty and right to work on these fungi specimens. 
Steward was uncertain whether Chinese people were competent to carry out serious 
research on these fungi specimens, but he finally gave in to Dai Fanglan’s persistence. 
The problem was that there had never been Chinese scientists working on fungi 
taxonomy before. The research focus of Dai Fanglan himself had been plant pathology 
research and anti-disease crop selecting. However, to break westerners’ monopoly on 
                                                 
142 Dai Fanglan, “Collections of Fungi in China by Foreign Explorers,” Nanking Journal, 1(2), 
1932, pp. 537-548.  
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mycological research in China, he undertook the task of working on fungi specimens 
collected from Southwest China.143  
        Dai Fanglan’s 1930 article, “A new species of Uncinula on Acer Trifidum Hook and 
Arn,”144 marked the establishment of Chinese mycology. After that, Dai Fanglan shifted 
his research emphasis from practical pathology partly to identifying and classifying fungi 
in China, which became the research focus all through his life and has made him the 
founder of mycology in China. He also organized and instructed Chinese scientists and 
students in his program such as Zhou Jiachi (周家炽), Yu Dafu (俞大绂), Chen Hongkui 
(陈鸿逵), Qiu Weifan (裘维蕃),145 Wei Jingchao (魏景超), and Huang Liang to conduct 
research and surveys on fungi in East China. Dai Fanglan encouraged these younger 
researchers, stating that Chinese people should investigate and control national resources 
of their own and publish their findings as soon as possible to claim the achievements of 
Chinese scientists to the world.146  
        As a first-generation American-trained Chinese scientist and peer of Zou Binwen (
邹秉文), Dai Fanglan combined the desire to serve his country and scientific knowledge. 
He believed that contributing to science meant much more than pure scientific research. It 
also involved institution building such as establishing journals, civil societies, and 
                                                 
143 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 29-30. This was important work. Even today, only about 8% of fungal 
species around the world have been named, classified, and related to other fungi (the majority 
coming from Europe, China and the USA). Bryn Dentinger, personal communication, 29 April 
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144 This article was published in English in Volume 6, Issue 1 of Contributions from the 
Biological Laboratory of the Science Society of China: Botanical series, Nanjing: the Science 
Society of China, 1930. 
145 These four scientists later joined the Tsinghua IOA and worked closely with Dai Fanglan in 
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146 Cheng Guangsheng, p. 31. 
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training younger researchers. Since the late 1920s, Dai Fanglan played active roles in all 
these activities. For example, in May 1929, he collaborated with his Cornell alumni 
friends, such as Zou Bingwen and Deng Shuqun, to establish the Chinese Society for 
Plant Pathology. Also in this year, they applied for a grant from the China Foundation to 
support Herbert H. Whetzel, their professor and advisor from Cornell University, to come 
to China and give lectures. In August 1933, Dai Fanglan participated in establishing the 
Chinese Society of Botany. In 1934, he took the position of editor for the Chinese 
Journal of Botany.147 Dai Fanglan believed that these scientific journals, civil societies 
and lectures could help Chinese scientists communicate with international scientific 
communities on an equal basis.148 His participation in these activities suggested that Dai 
Fanglan did not consider the desire to conduct pure scientific research as an issue 
separated from his “love for China” at all. In Dai’s career, pure scientific research, as 
well as practical research and institutional establishment, were closely connected to each 
other because they were all ways to create good science and to serve China. In other 
words, for scientists like Dai Fanglan, “being a scientist” meant a good way to “being a 
Chinese person” and to fulfilling one’s love for China. 
        However, Dai Fanglan had never felt fully comfortable at this university because of 
its missionary background. The academic achievements did not relieve his feelings of 
humiliation. He had been looking forward to finding somewhere more comfortable for 
him. In 1934, Dai was planning to leave Jinda and had arranged a two-year research trip 
                                                 
147 The chief editor of this journal was Hu Xiansu (胡先骕, 1894-1968), a Harvard University 
botany Ph.D. and the first Chinese scientist working on taxonomy of plants in China. This journal 
stopped publication in 1937 because of the war.  
148 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 29-31. 
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to New York Botanical Garden and Cornell University. At this time, he received an 
invitation from Tsinghua University to direct a group of plant pathology at the newly 
established institute of agriculture—the group where he spent the rest of his career.149 
        Dai Fanglan’s attitude towards Jinda (from 1927 to 1934) exemplified the complex 
feelings of “first generation” Chinese scientists trained abroad, who returned to work at 
American-sponsored institutions. Dai Fanglan commented on his experience at Jinda that:  
        “Jinda was a missionary university, which I did not like to join in. 
However, I was unemployed at that time and not able to find anywhere else to 
settle down. … I often conflicted with foreigners because of their offending 
Chinese people. … Our living condition in Jinda was very comfortable and the 
research condition was also very satisfactory. However, I sincerely wished to 
move to some other place because of a sense of national pride. Therefore, when 
I received the invitation from Tsinghua, I accepted this opportunity at once.”150  
Dai Fanglan’s displeasure at Jinda was mainly aimed at the ideas of imperialism and 
colonialism behind these missionary schools instead of at his American colleagues.151 He 
had always felt humiliated by the fact that foreign scientists enjoyed more privileges than 
Chinese scientists on the land of China. Dai Fanglan acknowledged that western 
researchers’ works had significantly contributed to the development of science in China. 
He also had to admit that Chinese scientists had not been capable of conducting 
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systematic scientific research in many fields. However, he felt ashamed of the fact that 
western scientists were unrestricted in using research resources in China while Chinese 
scientists were so non-competitive. To deal with his feelings about these tensions, Dai’s 
strategy was to alter his field of expertise to become an internationally-renowned Chinese 
mycologist. Dai’s strong feelings of the dual-identity of being both Chinese and a 
scientist, especially “Chinese pride” significantly influenced his choice of research topics, 
which I will explore further in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  
 
2.4 Shen Zonghan: from University to Government 
       Unlike Zou Bingwen and Dai Fanglan, Shen Zonghan’s early years in pursuing 
education were very hard. His father was an educated farmer with little property, always 
wishing him to find a job as early as possible rather than to stay in school. Shen had to go 
against his father and family to make money for education after graduating from 
elementary school at the age of eighteen. For ten years he moved among Hangzhou, 
Beijing, Hunan, Anhui, and Nanjing to look for the chance of making a living and 
studying. Shen Zonghan took college education at the Beijing Agricultural College, but 
was disappointed by the bureaucracy in Beijing. He failed in the entrance exam of 
Tsinghua University, and therefore could not get financial support from the Boxer 
scholarship as Dai Fanglan and Zhao Lianfang did. During the frustrating years in 
Beijing, Shen converted to Christianity. This experience might explain a remarkable 
difference between the later careers of Shen Zonghan and other scientists at his age such 
as Dai Fanglan and Zhao Lianfang. Dai Fanglan admitted that missionary organizations 
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were a temporary patron of Chinese scientists, even while he struggled with feelings of 
anger toward these foreign organizations. Dai had worked at the same missionary 
university (Jinda) as Shen Zonghan did. The missionary patronage guaranteed that Dai’s 
research environment was much better than it would have been at a national university 
such as the Southeastern University. However, Dai considered the patronization as 
emblematic of foreigners’ superiority over Chinese people and felt uncomfortable and 
“humiliated” by the attitudes of the American faculty. On the contrary, Shen Zonghan 
never expressed such a feeling of being humiliated. I think it was largely because of his 
unpleasant experiences at the Chinese provincial schools and national agricultural 
colleges, and because of his faith in Christianity (which fit well with the former 
missionary schools). Shen had little affection for the national universities or Tsinghua 
scholarship, but was more willing to cooperate with missionary organizations. 
        In 1923, Shen Zonghan traveled to America at his own expense. He spent one year 
at the Georgia state University, studying cotton breeding. After receiving a master’s 
degree, Shen got sponsorship from his professor and friends and entered the agricultural 
college at Cornell University. Shen Zonghan took comprehensive training in crop 
breeding, genetics, and plant pathology under Professor Harry H. Love. Love was not 
only a famous crop breeding scientist and geneticist, but also had close connection with 
China. One of Love’s early students, John H. Reisner, was the founder and director of the 
College of Agriculture and Forestry at the University of Nanking (金陵大学, Jinling 
University, abbreviated as Jinda). In 1925, Reisner and Love had launched a long term 
cooperative project between Cornell and Jinda in order to improve Chinese agriculture. 
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Each year a Cornell professor would visit China and conduct research, training, and 
extension works based at Jinda.152 Meanwhile, Zou Bingwen, who was directing the 
agricultural section of the Southeastern University at that time, also invited Love, his 
early instructor of plant pathology, to visit Nanjing and to give lectures. Love was 
interested in these projects. He travelled to China during the 1925-1926 academic year 
and arranged for Shen Zonghan to go to Jinda as a fellow of the cooperative project in 
the following year. Shen exhibited outstanding ability in teaching, surveying, and 
assisting the American scientists. Both Reisner and Zou Bingwen invited him to join their 
college after graduation. Shen finally chose Jinda, because he noticed the bad effects on 
the university community of being involved in political factional struggles at the 
Southeastern University (see chapter 1) and believed that Jinda was able to guarantee a 
more stable environment for his research. 
        Shen Zonhan formally joined Jinda in winter 1927, the period after the Northern 
Expedition Army seized Nanjing and all foreigners fled. For almost one year, Chinese 
faculty at Jinda took charge of this university and Shen Zonghan got chance to 
communicate with the new government. The Nationalist central government exhibited 
great enthusiasm—at least seemingly—in improving agricultural production. At the 
beginning of 1928, Shen Zonghan attended a conference held by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Mines as a representative from academia to explore future development 
of China, and here he made an important early proposal for coordinated agricultural 
research, education, and extension. Shen proposed that the new government establish a 
                                                 
152 See Reisner and Love, The Cornell-Nanking Story: The First International Agricultural 
Cooperation Program in Agriculture by Cornell, 1962.  
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national agricultural research station to conduct agricultural research and coordinate the 
works of provincial agricultural programs. This proposal gained wide acceptance at the 
conference and was received by the government with sincere respect (although it 
disappeared for years after entering the Nationalist bureaucracy). Shen Zonghan was 
encouraged by the seeming intentions and actions of the Nationalist government. He 
expressed this feeling to H. H. Love: “The political situation of China at present is much 
better than 1925 when you were in China. The leaders in the Government highly 
appreciate importance of agricultural improvement.”153 
       Despite these positive feelings toward the Nanjing Nationalist government, Shen did 
not consider governmental organizations good places to fulfill his desire to serve China. 
In March 1929, he refused an appointment from the Nationalist government as the 
Commissioner of Agriculture and Mining of Shanxi Province and chose to stay at the 
University of Nanking. Shen explained this decision as that “I could perhaps serve my 
country better by sticking to my present job.”154 By “serving the country”, Shen 
Zonghan—similar to most of his peer Chinese agricultural scientists—meant to bring 
advanced knowledge and techniques into agricultural production and to increase crop 
yield. The ultimate goal was to improve the lives of Chinese people and to enrich the 
country, rather than enrich the national government. Therefore, “serving his country” 
meant to Shen a very strong notion of love and caring for his country and country people. 
                                                 
153 Shen to Love, January 29, 1929, Harry H. Love Papers, Box 14, folder 35, Kroch Library, 
Division of Rare & Manuscript Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
154 Shen to Love, April 10, 1929, Harry H. Love Papers, Box 14, folder 35, Kroch Library, 
Division of Rare & Manuscript Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
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        During the following five years, he endeavored in agricultural education, research, 
and extension at Jinda to fulfil his desire of serving China with agricultural improvement. 
He refused an appointment to be director of the College, but took the task to establish 
more cooperative stations in other provinces for crop research and extension (see Figure 
6). These stations were built up and functioned by cooperating with local missionary 
schools such as Yenching University in Beiping and Chee-loo University in Jinan. 
Although Shen and some Chinese faculty at Jinda kept in close communication with 
scientists at the National Central University, the two universities at Nanjing did not 
cooperate much in establishing the experiment station networks. The NCU’s cooperators 
were mostly governmental organizations and its development was more entangled with 
political changes. In contrast, Jinda’s stations were fewer in number, but they were able 
to stay relatively independent from the turbulent political atmosphere and therefore they 
could maintain better continuity and consistency in their work of agricultural 
improvement and research (mainly breeding and extending crop varieties). The annual 
meeting of Jinda’s experimental stations soon became an important scientific seminar in 
the early 1930s.155 
        Shen’s achievement at Jinda was so remarkable that he received more and more 
invitations for appointments from governments. His first serious cooperation with 
governmental organization started in 1930, with the Zhejiang provincial government. 
This cooperation was largely because of his personal networks rather than the attraction 
of working for government. Born and bred in Zhejiang, Shen Zonghan felt he had a duty 
                                                 
155 Reports of the Tenth Conference of the Experimental Stations of the College of Agriculture at 
the University of Nanking, University of Nanking Press, Nanjing, 1935. 
 130 
 
to lend his expertise. In April 1929, Shen was invited and received by Zhang Jingjiang (
张静江), the Zhejiang Provincial President and one of the founders of the Nationalist 
Party. Zhang Jingjiang was planning to launch an agricultural improvement program for 
Zhejiang province. Considering Shen’s achievements and his origin in Zhejiang, 
President Zhang wanted to appoint Shen to take charge of this program. He tried to 
convince Shen that the situation of agricultural extension in Zhejiang was very stable by 
saying that “unless the communists get control of the Central Government the provincial 
government of Chekiang would not be greatly changed even though the Central 
Government changed hands”156 and that “if Zhejiang were unsafe, Nanjing must be even 
more chaotic, and you would not be able to continue research at Jinda either.”157 It was 
the time when the Central Plains War was about to break out among several chief 
warlords including Jiang Jieshi, and it seemed doubtful whether Jiang Jieshi and his 
Nationalist central government would continue be “central” after the war. However, 
Zhejiang province was not involved in this war. In addition, President Zhang Jingjiang 
was an elder statesman of Republican China with a high reputation in both politics and 
economics. Both Shen and Zhang himself were confident that Zhejiang province was 
more capable than the central government to guarantee a relatively stable environment for 
agricultural extension. Shen was largely convinced by President Zhang. Although he 
eventually declined this appointment, Shen Zonghan recommended Qian Tianhe (钱天鹤
, 1893-1972), another agricultural scientist born in Zhejiang with a master’s degree from 
                                                 
156 Shen to Love, July 4, 1930, Harry H. Love Papers, Box 14, folder 35, Kroch Library, Division 
of Rare & Manuscript Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
157 Shen Zonghan, Zhonghan, Shen Zonghan’s Memoirs: Memoir of the Middle Age, p.153. 
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Cornell, to serve as director for this provincial agricultural program. Moreover, he helped 
to persuaded Professor Harry H. Love from Cornell University to serve as chief 
technician for three years to provide scientific instruction. Since Love was not able to 
arrive in China until March 1931, Shen took over the chief technician job for several 
months in order to make preparations for Love’s arrival.158 
        At this time, Shen believed that his cooperation with the Zhejiang government was 
temporary. He confirmed this point to Love, his advisor and friend, by saying “I have not 
yet changed my decision for research and instruction.”159 His plan was to continue his 
normal works in Nanjing, and spend several days every month at Hangzhou, where the 
Zhejiang agricultural program was located, to take care of the startup affairs and prepare 
for Love’s arrival. However, an unexpected situation changed his plan irresistably: Shen 
Zonghan fell in love with and married Shen Liying (沈骊英, 1897-1941), a woman 
agricultural scientist. Shen Liying worked at the Zhejiang provincial agricultural program 
in Hangzhou, so they made their home at Hangzhou for about one year. During this 
period, Shen’s contact with Qian Tianhe and the governmental program was much more 
frequent than his expectation, which foreshadowed his later collaboration with Qian and 
the National Agricultural Bureau.  
        Shen Zonghan’s research work in Hangzhou lasted for about one year, during which 
he took charge of testing and extending wheat varieties from all over the world in 
Zhejiang province. In addition to the over fifty thousand wheat varieties collected by him 
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of Rare & Manuscript Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.. 
159 Shen to Love, June 27, 1930, Harry H. Love Papers, Box 14, folder 35, Kroch Library, 
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and his Jinda assistants, Shen got permission from the National Central University to test 
over four thousand wheat varieties collected and bred by the NCU. He also tested 591 
American wheat varieties from Jinda’s collections and 135 experimental varieties of the 
Jinda faculty.160  
        However, Shen was not able to finish the wheat tests in Zhejiang. After winning the 
Central Plains War, Jiang Jieshi started infighting within the Nationalist Party and 
dismissed Zhang Jingjiang, whom he had formerly respected as an elder. Zhang lost his 
control over Zhejiang Province in early 1931, and most of his followers in the provincial 
government were forced to leave. The agricultural program persevered, but was reformed 
and renamed as the Zhejiang Agricultural Improvement Station. Qian Tianhe quit and 
returned to Nanjing. Shi Ying (石瑛), the following director of the station, was a senior 
politician and was honored as the most honest and upright official in Republican China, 
but he did not understand field experiments of agricultural science. Therefore Shi Ying 
was less effective as a leader for agricultural research and extension in spite of his 
incorruptibility. When noticing that more than half of the varieties of Shen Zonghan’s 
wheat screening tests performed no better than the local wheat, Shi Ying worried that 
Shen’s works might be a waste of public money. Shi also thought that it was not 
necessary to employ American scientists (such as Harry Love) at a high salary, because 
he could not see agricultural improvement from the scientific works of Shen and his 
colleagues. Shen Zonghan had endeavored to persuade Shi Ying of the importance of 
scientific research in agricultural extension, but he finally decided not to continue his 
                                                 
160 Shen, Zhonghan, Shen Zonghan’s Memoirs: Memoir of the Middle Age, pp.153-154. 
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work in Hangzhou after this incident. Luckily, Zou Bingwen’s bank promised to continue 
to sponsor Harry Love’s work in China even though the Zhejiang provincial government 
intended to dismiss this program. In August 1931, Shen Zonghan quit this provincial 
program and moved back to Jinda along with his wife. Harry H. Love had arrived in 
April and took over the position of chief technician after Shen left.161 During changes in 
early 1931, Tian Tianhe left the Zhejiang provincial government and moved to Nanjing. 
Qian was soon appointed as vice chair of the preparatory committee of the National 
Agricultural Research Bureau. After July 1933, he became vice director and the one 
really taking charge of the operation of this bureau (the director was only nominal). Qian 
finally managed to persuade Love and Shen Zonghan to join the Bureau. But in 1931, 
even if the misunderstanding between Shen Zonghan and Shi Ying did not fundamentally 
change Shen’s attitude towards the government and its affiliated academic institutes all at 
once, this incident did remind him of the uncertainty of governmental organizations and 
problems inherent in working for agencies directed by non-scientists. 
        From 1931 to 1934, Shen Zonghan returned to education, research, and extension at 
Jinda. His most influential students, Ma Baozhi (马保之) and Jiangyanshi (蒋彦士), 
studied at Jinda under Shen’s instruction around 1930 and travelled to America for 
graduate education in famous agricultural colleges such as Cornell University and the 
University of Minnesota. With his recommendation, younger agriculturalists in Nanjing 
and Zhejiang, such as Jin Shanbao (金善宝), Feng Zefang (冯泽芳), and Lu Shougeng (
卢守耕)—got the chance to study at Cornell. His wheat breeding had significant 
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improvement with his wife Shen Liying’s assistance. They achieved a wheat variety with 
very outstanding qualities through pure line selection and named it as Nanking 2905 (金
大 2905, pronounced as Jinda 2905). This variety was early-maturing, resistant to most 
common wheat diseases along the Yangtze River, resistant to lodging (falling down in the 
field), and would increase the yield for 25%-30%. Nanking 2905 was the first and best 
wheat variety bred by a Chinese agronomist. It was tested by Jinda faculty and students 
near Nanjing in 1933 and quickly became very popular among local farmers.162 In 
addition to the breeding research, Shen Zonghan conducted genetic hybridization 
experiments of wheat and rice in order to make plans for further improvement of crop 
varieties. His experiments were repeated at Jinda’s cooperative stations. Although Shen 
did not have a chance to put his data into practical breeding tests, his experiments did 
enrich scientific knowledge on crops in China.  
        The results of these hybridization experiments were published in English in journals 
and presented at conferences such as the Fifth Pacific Science Congress. This is an 
excellent example of how American-trained Chinese scientists created not just physical 
hybridizations of crops such as new wheat varieties, but also new ideas and techniques. 
These techniques arose from both their American and Chinese experiences. They 
subsequently contributed to global circulations of scientific knowledge about crop 
breeding and genetics. The scientific knowledge was not a simple introduction or 
application of western science, but was hybridized and created in Chinese local 
                                                 
162 During the war, Shen Zonghan and his colleague found that the Nanking 2905 performed 
equally excellent in Southwest China. Before Jin Shanbao’s NCU 2419, Nanking 2905 was the 
most popular and widely-planted wheat variety developed by Chinese scientists. 
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environments. Then the newly-created local Chinese scientific knowledge returned to the 
West through publication in journals. Through this process, Shen Zonghan was fulfilling 
his love for China by carrying out the duty of a scientist, satisfying the “dual-identity” 
and creating knowledge that both contributed to international science and improved the 
lives of Chinese people.   
        In May 1933, Shen Zonghan attended the Fifth Pacific Science Congress at 
Vancouver and presented three articles of his recent research works. He took this chance 
to visit the United States and Europe to observe and study wheat breeding. Through his 
visits to agricultural institutes and stations in different states and countries, Shen was 
impressed by how the agricultural scientists managed to cooperate with non-scientists 
and to fit into their natural, historical, and economic environments in order to solve 
problems in agricultural production and increase crop yield. Shen had gradually changed 
his understanding on how to serve his country with agricultural science. He realized that 
it was impossible for several universities to build up an agricultural extension system for 
a country as huge as China.163 Such a task required a powerful national government’s 
coordination, but there was no such nationwide government stability in China at that 
time. Shortly after returning to Nanjing in September 1933, and sensitized to the 
possibilities, Shen Zonghan met with a chance to develop agricultural extension and 
research at the national level. 
        The years between 1932 and 1937 were relatively peaceful, and the Nationalist 
central government was finally able to concentrate on economic construction rather than 
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internal struggles. In 1934—six years after Shen’s 1928 proposal for a coordinated 
system of agricultural research, education, and extension—the National Agricultural 
Bureau (中央农业实验所 the Central Agricultural Experimental Institute) started 
functioning. Chen Gongbo (陈公博), the Minister of Industry, served concurrently as the 
director of this bureau (although he had little time to devote to the job). Qian Tianhe, 
Shen Zonghan’s friend and fellow Cornell alumnus was appointed as vice director and 
actually administrated all affairs of the Bureau. Mrs. Shen Liying joined this bureau and 
served as a technician (the Chinese title was “技正”, but it actually meant research 
scientist). Qian also invited Shen Zonghan with hearty enthusiasm. In fall 1934, Shen 
Zonghan decided to partly give up his research at Jinda and to join the National 
Agricultural Research Bureau. This decision surprised everyone, since Shen had always 
preferred research at the university. He later described this change as “the first significant 
shifting point” in his career. In his memoir, Shen Zonghan explained the reason of his 
decision:  
        “I did feel deeply that a private university might be capable in education 
and training, but not able to improve agriculture for the whole country.164 … As 
a newly established governmental organization, the Bureau was less stable and 
guaranteed considering the changeful personnel and funding. … I am an honest 
person believing in God and science, but I have neither political tact nor factional 
support. It would be hard for me to maintain a position in such a governmental 
institute. … However, I believe that the Central Government must have a well-
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established central agricultural bureau based on scientific research in order to 
improve agriculture in the entire country. Therefore I should join this bureau.”165 
        However, Shen confessed to Love in private correspondence another reason for his 
transfer—which I believe was a more important reason compared with the public one—
personnel conflicts at Jinda.  
        “It has been my great effort to cooperate with Mr. Heh166 in our crop 
improvement work during my last eight years. His action and sharp 
conversation in some cases hurt me so much as to lose my appetite and sleep. … 
As long as Mr. Heh is in our department of agronomy, I will resign my headship 
but will do my wheat breeding and instruction as before if he does not interfere 
[with] it. If he will still interfere [with] my research and instruction, then I have 
to leave the college entirely with great disappointment from our deans. I fear 
that [if] my research work will be interfered [with] by him, I can do instruction 
only. … ”167 
Clearly, Shen Zonghan’s moving to the National Agricultural Bureau was not only 
because of a belief in the KMT central government’s advantage in serving the country, 
                                                 
165 Shen, Zhonghan, Shen Zonghan’s Memoirs: Memoir of the Middle Age, pp.164-165. 
166 Hao Qinming (郝钦铭, C.M. Heh, 1896-1943) was one of the earliest cotton breeding 
scientists in China. He received bachelor’s degree from the University of Nanking in 1923 and 
then worked and taught there for almost twenty years. He became the director of agronomy in 
1927 and helped the College go through the big crisis of Chinization and de-Christianization in 
1927 and 1928. However, Heh did not get along well with many American-trained scientists, 
such as Zhao Lianfang (the “tiger professor” and “rice king,” who left and joined the National 
Central University, see section 3.4). When Heh visited Cornell in 1932 and 1933 to take graduate 
education, Shen Zonghan took the position of director of agronomy, which might be a trigger for 
the conflicts between Shen and Heh. 
167 Shen Zonghuan’s letter to Love, August 10, 1934, Harry H. Love Papers, Box 14, folder 35, 
Kroch Library, Division of Rare & Manuscript Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
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but also because of a desire to persist in his research without being interrupted by 
personnel conflicts. The government position happened to be a place that would allow 
him to escape from meaningless struggles. 
        In practice, the Bureau was a better place than Jinda for Shen Zonghan concentrate 
on research. In addition to a better personnel environment, Shen obtained more 
opportunities to meet high officials in the Nationalist government and had more facilities 
in applying his own thoughts in research and extension works and in receiving financial 
support.168 After a meeting with Jiang Jieshi in summer 1934, Shen Zonghan wrote to 
Love that “everyone recognizes the importance of centralization and coordination in 
agricultural endeavor. General Chiang [Jiang Jieshi] and his followers … appreciate the 
importance of our Bureau in cooperating with the provincial experiment stations. … The 
Bureau is receiving favorable attention from various sources, and it seems that it will be 
easier for us to get money than good personnel to carry on the work.”169 
        As for personnel, Shen Zonghan’s title at the Bureau was “chief technician (总技正
)” and he actually served as leading scientist of the section of crop improvement, which 
was independent from other sections such as animal husbandry, agricultural economics, 
and fertilizer science. Director Qian Tianhe gave Shen a great deal of freedom to choose 
his research topics and colleagues. Shen set up cooperation between the Bureau and 
Jinda’s experimental stations with little difficulty and therefore continued his breeding 
                                                 
168 The College of Agriculture and Forestry at Jinda suffered financial difficulties in 1935. If 
staying at Jinda, Shen could hardly have enough funding for his research as at the Bureau. Shen 
to Love, April 2, 1935, Harry H. Love Papers, Box 14, folder 35, Kroch Library, Division of Rare 
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research started at Jinda. In addition to Shen Liying, Shen Zonghan recruited several 
other Jinda or Cornell graduates170 to his team, therefore he need not make any change in 
his usual way of working. He was satisfied with the new situation: “I only change the 
location of my laboratory and office, but have even more time concentrating on my 
research.”171 Actually, an important part of the extension of Nanking 2905 was finished 
in the Bureau. The Shen couple and their colleagues also bred a series of new wheat 
varieties on the basis of Nanking 2905, which were numbered and named as the Bureau (
中农, Zhongnong) varieties, such as the Zhongnong 28, Zhongnong 166, and Zhongnong 
62 hybrid wheat. Through the breeding of these hybrids, Shen Zonghan was able to apply 
his achievements from the genetic experiments completed during his Jinda years. 
        In addition to research and extension, Shen Zonghan took advantage of his personal 
network and the position of governmental scientist in promoting scientific 
communication between China and the West. For example, he invited western scholars to 
make touring lectures in China. In addition to Harry H. Love, two scientists with 
international reputation took long trips in China in 1935 and 1936: bio-statististician John 
Wishart from the University of Cambridge had taught statistics at the Bureau for six 
months, and crop breeding scientist H. K. Hayes from University of Minnesota spent ten 
months visiting the Jinda cooperative stations with Shen and his assistants at the Bureau 
and held short-term training seminars at these stations. The Bureau had almost 
established an academic exchange program with several British institutes. Unfortunately 
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171 Shen to Love, November 13, 1934, Harry H. Love Papers, Box 14, folder 35, Kroch Library, 
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the war in 1937 broke off these communications. In his correspondence to Harry Love, 
Shen confessed that he believed that these foreign scholars would benefit his Chinese 
students by presenting diverse approaches to conduct scientific research (rather than 
simply introducing advanced knowledge). In other words, Shen Zonghan thought that 
agricultural sciences in China, or at least in Nanjing, was much more advanced than 
before, and agricultural scientists had surpassed the step of simply studying from the 
westerners. Shen encouraged younger scientists at the Bureau to refer to ideas and 
methods of the famous western scientists, but to develop Chinese agricultural sciences 
based on local natural and social conditions. 
         In his spare time, Shen Zonghan wrote some bulletins in English to introduce the 
works of his colleagues at the Bureau and Jinda as well as the progress of the agricultural 
sciences in China. These bulletins were published by the Bureau and sent to American 
agricultural colleges and stations by Shen’s Cornell professors and friends. Therefore by 
the early 1940s, the name of leading Chinese agricultural scientists—such as Zhao 
Lianfang, Shen Liying, and Dai Fanglan—were well known in American scientific 
communities. He also wrote bulletins in Chinese to introduce important agricultural 
knowledge and progress in western agricultural sciences. These bulletins were spread in 
China through the extension programs of the Bureau and Jinda, and some of them were 
used as textbooks in the Bureau’s programs training middle level agricultural technicians. 
        From his time at Cornell in the 1920s to the outbreak of war in 1937, Shen Zonghan 
was in frequent contact with his Cornell professor Harry H. Love. In their 
correspondence, Shen’s underlying goal as a Chinese scientist is clearly articulated. By 
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1937, his desire to serve his country through agricultural research and education 
remained constant, although he moved from university to the government and adjusted 
his working pattern accordingly. We can see that the application that was central to 
Shen’s desire to “serve his country” was always to improve crop yield by applying 
advanced agricultural knowledge and techniques. While working for the government, 
however, Shen gradually became aware of the limitation of this idea. In the 1930s, the 
economic structure of rural China usually played roles more important than pure 
production of crops in improving the lives of Chinese people. Agricultural science could 
not solve these larger economic problems. Therefore, after the war broke out, when Shen 
succeeded Qian Tianhe as vice-director of the Bureau, he chose a different strategy: he 
changed the emphasis of his work from scientific research to the coordination of 
agricultural scientists and the non-scientists in agriculture. I will explore this shift in 
Chapter 4. 
 
2.5 Summary 
        Missionary universities provided patronage for Chinese agricultural scientists in the 
very chaotic warlord era, but these advantages also embodied foreigners’ privilege over 
Chinese people and highlighted the crucial tension between the Chinese and the foreign 
in Republican China. When nationalism gradually grew and Chinese intellectuals became 
more aware about their national identity, missionary universities faced a very 
complicated situation. They had to reform themselves and stressed their Chinese identity 
in order to remain attractive for patriotic Chinese intellectuals. Chinese scholars might 
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take advantage of missionary universities’ superiority in stable funding and international 
communication. Their love and loyalty for China as their mother country was similar, 
which meant that these scholars shared similar goals as their colleagues in national 
institutes: serving China through science and knowledge. But their strategies were 
different because of missionary universitys’ closer connections with the westerners. 
When the scholars at the Southeastern University were struggling and negotiating among 
diverse political forces, Dai Fanglan was able to conduct high level fundamental 
scientific research such as establishing a new discipline in order to establish China’s 
status in the international community. When critics were debating whether Chinese 
people should allow foreign programs to survey Chinese land, Shen Zonghan and his 
colleagues were able to critically evaluate western scientific knowledge, developed new 
knowledge from Chinese circumstances, published in English, and increased the 
reputation of Chinese scientists among western scholars. The history of missionary 
universities is usually seen as independent from the history of higher education in China, 
because missionary schools were usually operating or sponsored by foreigners and were 
not directly administered by the Chinese government. However, in my opinion, at least 
for the studies of agricultural scientists in Republican China, those in missionary and 
national universities could contrast with and complement each other, because they 
illustrated and exemplified how patriotic Chinese scientists with similar motivations and 
goals took very distinct but effective strategies to realize the goal of serving China 
through agricultural sciences. 
 
 143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Locations of Agricultural Experimental Stations of Jinda. All of them were 
established and run by cooperating with local missionary schools.  
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Chapter 3 The	Nanjing	Decade:	Rise	of	Agricultural	Science	in	
National	Universities	and	Institutes,	1927‐1937								
 
        By 1926, the Nationalist Party had effectively controlled the entire Guangdong 
province, organized its own military force—the Nationalist Revolutionary Army, and 
found several allies from the other warlords and the Communists. From May 1926 to 
summer 1928, the Nationalist Party and its allies launched a Northern Expedition aiming 
to unify China. The Northern Expedition army captured Nanjing in March 1927, and 
established this city as its national capital. By December 1928, all the remaining warlords 
in the northeastern, southwestern, and northwestern China claimed to be subordinate to 
the Nationalist government in Nanjing. Therefore, it seemed that China had finished its 
disintegrated status and reached unification after chaos of almost two decades—but only 
in form.172 Because of the location of the new national capital, the ten years between 
1927 and 1937 (sometimes counted from 1928, the year when the Nationalist government 
replaced the Beijing government to be the legitimate government of China) was usually 
called the “Nanjing Decade.” 173 It was also considered as the “Golden Age” or “Golden 
Decade” of Republican China, especially for the urban bourgeoisie.   
        During the ten years when Nanjing was the national capital, the Nationalist central 
government took a series of reforms, for instance: gradually replacing the stratocracy led 
                                                 
172 Some historians of modern China commented that the Northern Expedition was merely some 
new warlords replacing the old warlords. See Bai Shouyi, ZhongGuo TongShi, volume 12.  
173 Some historians claim that the Nanjing Decade started in 1928, when the Nationalist Party 
unified China in form. Considering the development and change of agricultural science, I prefer 
April 1927 as the beginning time. 
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by military forces with a single-party-state politics with a larger portion of intellectual 
politicians involved, unifying currency and weights and measures to make convenience 
for the development of business and industry and to improve domestic and international 
communication in these fields, unifying taxation systems within the eastern provinces 
under its domination, initiating infrastructure projects such as building railways, 
launching a New Life Movement to enhance civilization of Chinese society, constructing 
elaborate and operable regulations for education, and starting a Rural Revival Movement 
to improve critical problems in rural China—especially the problems related to 
agricultural production.  
        However, to what extent these reforms actually changed China remained a question. 
The Nanjing decade was an era of fragmented decentralization, foreign threats, and a 
tendency of unification and nationalism. The country suffered continuous civil wars—
between the Nationalist Party and the remaining warlords, between the Nationalist Party 
and the communists, and among the warlords who were beyond the control of the 
Nanjing government—in almost all areas except for the region near Nanjing. The 
Japanese had effectively occupied the northeastern provinces (Manchuria) and were 
beginning to poke around in the areas near Beijing and Shanghai. Most of rural China 
was beyond the influence of the Nationalist government, even in the eastern area. 
Historians have noticed the inconsistencies of this era. Some earlier historians of sciences 
and modern China, Peter Buck and James Reardon-Anderson, for example, are inclined 
to focus on stability and unification the Nationalist Nanjing government had brought to 
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China.174 Reardon-Anderson admits the tensions but argues that “the Nanking 
government provided to the coastal, urban, and privileged sectors of China a degree of 
stability, security, and direction that had been unknown in that country for more than a 
generation.”175  
        While I agree with these historians’ argument that the social environment for the 
development of science and higher education in this decade was better than that in the 
warlord era, I would like to stress in this chapter some aspects of tensions rather than 
simply analyzing positive changes brought by the new “strong central authority” (as 
Reardon-Anderson describes). My case studies can exemplify development of sciences in 
the historical transition brought out by the Nanjing government’s reforms, but more 
important, they would excellently illustrate that, even within the coastal and urban 
regions, security and unification was not stable at all. Tensions between the foreign and 
the Chinese, between the local and the central, and between the scholars and the state 
were always playing significant roles in the development of sciences and scientific 
education.     
        Compared with scientists from other disciplines and places, agricultural scientists at 
national universities in Nanjing and Beijing (Beiping) are very good case studies to 
exemplify the tensions I have mentioned. On the one hand, both cities were centers of 
culture and education throughout the Republican period and both held an important 
                                                 
174 See Buck, Peter, American Science and Modern China, 1876-1936, Cambridge University 
Press, 1980; and Reardon-Anderson, James, The Study of Change: Chemistry in China, 1840-
1949, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
175 Reardon-Anderson, The Study of Change: Chemistry in China, 1840-1949, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 174.  
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position in the development of science, but their positions as political center/periphery 
exchanged because of the Nationalist government choosing Nanjing as its capital. Beijing 
had formerly been the center of political and cultural activity; but now it was replaced by 
Nanjing. The quickly shifting political positions highlighted a different social atmosphere 
of political centers and peripheries as well as how the scientists would adapt to their local 
environment and deal with the outside tensions, while trying to conduct high-level 
scientific research and education and apply their achievements in science to improving 
their country. On the other hand, agriculture related sciences were usually expected to be 
practical and beneficial for the country and the people. However, the state and the 
scientists’ understanding about what was “practical” and “profitable” might be somewhat 
different, and this could cause tension.  
        Meanwhile, the second generation of scientists with western training backgrounds 
were gradually succeeding their predecessors and taking important positions in scientific 
institutes and organizations. Here I would like to consider the Chinese scientists 
completing American education and returning to China during the 1910s and early 1920s 
as the first-generation American-trained Chinese scientists, and those returning after the 
late 1920s as the second generation. The numbers of second-generation scientists were 
much larger than the first generation. Compared with the earlier returnees such as Zou 
Bingwen, Guo Tanxian, and Dai Fanglan (whom I introduced in chapters 1 and 2), the 
second generation usually had better educational backgrounds and higher degrees, which 
implied that according to western academic evaluation standards, they might be more 
capable and reliable in creating high-level scientific knowledge. The second-generation 
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scientists also had better research environments. In the early twentieth century, there were 
very few scientific institutes and organizations in China. The most critical task for the 
first-generation of American-trained Chinese scientists was to establish institutions for 
scientific research, education, extension, and domestic and international communication. 
During the Nanjing Decade, when more and more high-level universities and scientific 
institutes and societies had been established in China, the second-generation scientists 
were able to work in professional environments that were much better-established than 
that of the first generation. They were more capable of creating and circulating more 
advanced scientific knowledge to help China, of becoming important in international 
science, and sometimes (but not always) of applying their achievements to agricultural 
and industrial production to improve China’s strength.  
        In this chapter, I explore case studies from the National Central University in 
Nanjing and Tsinghua University in Beiping (Beijing). These cases exemplified the 
motivations and strategies taken by Chinese scholars with American training to improve 
China during the Nanjing Decade. All the Chinese scholars in this chapter exhibited 
profound love for their country in their careers, and their activities suggested that all of 
them were endeavoring to improve their country—by elevating China’s status in the 
international scientific community, increasing agricultural production in order to enhance 
people’s lives, and strengthening the country’s ability to compete with other countries in 
all aspects—through creating and circulating scientific knowledge. These scholars 
worked in Beijing (named as Beiping during this period) and Nanjing (the national 
capital during this decade), which were two cultural and academic centers of China at 
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that era. However, because of the unstable and chaotic political situation as well as 
regional differences caused by geography and history, working environments at these two 
locations were very different and kept changing. Beiping declined from being the capital 
to the political periphery, while Nanjing became the new national capital and received 
more support (as well as more restrictions) from the Nationalist central government. 
Patriotic scholars at these two cultural and academic centers needed to take different 
strategies to improve China through agricultural science. Some of these strategies fit in 
the new situation, some did not. Although their strategies had limited effects in 
improving the life of Chinese people and increasing agricultural production in all of 
China, during the Nanjing decade, agricultural sciences in Chinese universities and 
institutes flourished and quickly got closer to western scientific communities. 
 
3.1 Decline of Beijing and Rise of Nanjing: the Unsuccessful Test of the 
University District System 
        From 1927 to 1929, the Nanjing Nationalist government appointed Cai Yuanpei to 
take charge of education. Cai tried a trial implementation to reform the Chinese 
educational system, which was named the “University District System” (大学区制).176 
Under this system, the Ministry of Education and provincial departments of education 
were abolished. Education would be regulated by “University Academy” at the central 
                                                 
176 Bai, Shouyi, ZhongGuo TongShi DiEr Ban: Di ShiEr Juan, JinDai (The General History of 
China, Second Edition: Volume Twelve, Modern Period 1919-1949), Shanghai Renmin Press, 
2013, No. 21, pp. 143-144. (白寿彝，《中国通史·第二版：第十二卷，近代》，上海人民出
版社，2013年，第 21册，143-144页) 
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government level and the leading university in each “university district”. (The ultimate 
goal was to only have one university in each university district.) Presidents of universities 
would take charge of all educational administrative affairs—from primary to higher 
education—within the university districts. This was only put into practice in Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, and the Beiping-Tianjin area, and only lasted for up to two years. Therefore it 
did not change Chinese higher education significantly. However, the university district 
system did bring positive alterations to China’s academics and sciences. For example, it 
catalyzed the establishment of the Academia Sinica (the National Central Academy) and 
the National Academy of Peiping, which later functioned as the highest academic 
research and administration organizations in Republican China.177 Moreover, I believe 
that this trial reform had reflected a series of problems of the educational, political, and 
social situations in Republican China, especially tensions between the central and the 
local and between inflexible western ideas and local Chinese realities. Therefore, it would 
be helpful to briefly introduce this reform before exploring the work of agricultural 
scientists in universities around China. 
        After settling down in Nanjing in April 1927, the Nationalist government appointed 
Cai Yuanpei178 to administer educational affairs of the country. On June 7 1927, Cai 
                                                 
177 After 1949, the two academies were merged into the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). 
178 We have met Cai Yuanpei in chapter 1 when discussing the Peking University. Cai was the 
most well-known, most influential, and most respectable educationalist in Republican China. 
During the strife of changing university president at the Southeastern University, when president 
Guo Bingwen was expelled, even Guo’s enemies had to admit that Guo was not too bad—“we 
can hardly find a more satisfactory president within the entire China, except for CAI YUANPEI. 
But Mr. Cai would not accept this position.” This was evidence of Cai’s position as the leading 
educationalist in China. Moreover, Cai was also a politician and one of the founding fathers of the 
Nationalist Party. After Sun Yat-sen’s passing away, Cai supported Jiang Jieshi to be the new 
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Yuanpei submitted a proposal to the Nationalist central government and requested 
reforms for the Chinese educational system. He believed that the uneven development of 
education in China during the warlord era was largely because of the bad administrative 
system and a chaotic political environment that greatly interfered with education. Cai had 
always been stressing the importance of academic research in university education since 
his years at Peking University, and at this time, he was trying to separate education from 
political interference and to improve Chinese educational autonomy by introducing this 
French system of “University districts:” 
        “The proper way is to model the French system to set the university 
district as the unit of educational administration. All educational affairs 
within the district should be taken care of by the university presidents, and all 
the colleges should collaborate to resolve difficult problems, so that all the 
educational implements have their basis in academics.”179  
        In addition, Cai Yuanpei suggested that University Academy should replace the 
Ministry of Education in the Central government: “I believed that the Ministry of 
Education had been too bureaucratic during the recent years… The best way to change 
bureaucratic to academic is to change the Ministry of Education into the University 
Academy.” The University Academy’s duty was to take charge of educational affairs 
beyond the duty of each university district, to regulate the relations between different 
                                                                                                                                                 
leader. After taking control, Jiang Jieshi supported Cai’s reforms in education and academics in 
return.  
179 Cai Yuanpei, “Proposal of Reforming the Educational Administrative System”, June 7 1927, 
The Complete Works of Cai Yuanpei, Vol. 5, Beijing: China Press, 1988, pp. 134-135. (蔡元培，
“请变更教育行政制度呈”，1927年 6月 7日，《蔡元培全集·第五卷》，中华书局，1988
年，134-135页) 
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university districts, and to found and administrate national academic organizations such 
as the Academia Sinica and the national museum and library.180 The purpose of Cai’s 
proposal was to guarantee the independence of education in China by putting academics 
in control rather than politicians; and to make the educators pay more attention to 
research and cultivating younger personnel rather than being too distracted by the 
political and social environment. However, the later development of this reform was 
totally contrary to Cai’s expectation. Some problems of Cai’s system were reflected in 
the conflicts between the National Central University and Jiangsu Province as well as 
resistance from the universities in Beijing, including tensions between the central and the 
local and competitions among diverse political forces. 
        Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist Government in Nanjing quickly passed Cai’s 
proposal, and decided to set Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces as the first two university 
districts on June 28, 1927. Jiangsu province was required to form the Fourth Sun Yat-sen 
University District, because the Nationalist party had controlled the Southeastern 
University and renamed it as the Fourth Sun Yat-sen University in order to memorialize 
their former party leader.181 When this university changed its name yet again into the 
                                                 
180 Cai Yuanpei, “Proposal of Establishing the University Academy” & “Constituent Instrument 
of the University Academy,” The Complete Works of Cai Yuanpei, Vol. 5, pp. 138-140. (蔡元培，
“提议设立大学院案”、“大学院组织法”，《蔡元培全集·第五卷》) 
181 In 1924, the Nationalist government established a national university in Guangzhou and 
named it as Sun Yat-sen, founder and leader of the Nationalist Party. Sun passed away in 1925 
before the Nationalist Revolution succeeded. To memorialize Sun Yatr-sen, whenever conquered 
a government-supported university or college during the Northern Expedition, the Nationalist 
Party would rename it as Sun Yat-sen University. The one in Guangzhou was the first one. Then 
Wuhan University, Zhejiang University, the Southeastern University, and the National Henan 
University were renamed as the second, third, fourth, and fifth Sun Yat-sen universities. But both 
politicians and scholars noticed how troublesome this way of naming would be, so later in 1927, 
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National Central University in May 1928, the university district was renamed as the 
central university district correspondingly. This university district existed for about two 
and half years from July 1927 to the end of 1929, and from the very beginning, it 
received continuous criticism and complaints from all interest groups involved: the 
university itself, the Nationalist central government, the Jiangsu provincial government, 
and elementary and secondary educators within Jiangsu province. 
        The most crucial issue for the Fourth Sun Yat-sen University/National Central 
University and its university district was about funding. During the warlord era, it was the 
Jiangsu provincial government taking on the chief sponsorship of the Nanjing Higher 
Normal School/Southeastern University. In return, the university gave more 
consideration to the benefit and need of Jiangsu province than of other places. This 
pattern could work when Nanjing was politically peripheral. After 1927, however, the 
Nationalist central government decided to transform the Southeastern University into its 
capital university and to build it as a model of China’s higher education, which implied 
that the transformed university should not give so much preference to Jiangsu province as 
before. However, the Nationalist central government continued requiring the Jiangsu 
provincial government to fund this university—largely because the Nanjing Nationalist 
government was still fighting with other warlords and was in a financial shortage at this 
time. To make things worse, Jiangsu province had set certain revenues from commercial 
taxations as special funds for education during the warlord era. The new Nationalist 
                                                                                                                                                 
the second, third, and fifth Sun Yat-sen universities returned to their original names, and the 
fourth one finally changed its name into the National Central University. It was a “revolutionary” 
era full of all types of endeavors to reform China, and we can see so many successful and 
unsuccessful explorations just within the scope of higher education! 
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government decided that these revenues should be taxed by the central government 
directly, rather than the provincial governments. As compensation, the Jiangsu province 
could keep farming taxes for educational funding. The problem was: farming taxes were 
largely impacted by natural conditions and were much less stable than commercial 
taxation. As a result, the actual income of Jiangsu provincial government decreased 
during 1927-1932 compared with the years before 1927. As a result, the discontented 
provincial government started to default on educational funding.182  
        However, from the position of the university, the transformation from the 
Southeastern University to the National Central University did improve the development 
of the university remarkably. From 1926 to 1930, the annual budget for this university 
increased from about eight hundred thousand Yuan to 1,920,000 Yuan.183 By comparison, 
Peking University’s annual budget in 1930 was 900,000 Yuan. By 1929, the National 
Central University had set eight schools including liberal arts, sciences, laws, education, 
agriculture, engineering, business, and medicine, while other national universities usually 
only had three to five schools (for example, Peking University had three schools of 
liberal arts, sciences, and laws). The total number of students at the Central University 
was 1731, almost twice of that of the Peking University (966). During 1927 and 1928, 
because of the turbulent social and political situations in north China, many students and 
                                                 
182 See Xu Xiaoqing, ZhengJu Yu XueFu: Cong DongNan DaXue Dao ZhongYang DaXue 1919-
1937 (Politics and Universities: From the Southeastern University to the Central University, 
1919-1937), Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2009, and ChengPuXiongWei 
YangYangDaFeng: ZhongYang DaXue XiaoZhang Luo JiaLun (Biography of Luo Jialun, 
President of the Central University), Shandong Education Press, 2012. 
183 In practice, the university usually could get only two thirds to three fourths of the budget from 
the governments. See Xu Xiaoqing, chapter 3. 
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scholars transferred to the Central University from other universities in the North 
(especially from Peking University, the old capital university), which greatly enhanced 
the educational and academic strength of the Central University.184 
        Unfortunately, the university administration paid too much attention to maintaining 
its scale and superiority as the new capital university and model of China’s higher 
education, while it relatively neglected its duty of administrating all educational affairs 
within the university district—especially those of primary and secondary education. The 
effect of this unfair treatment was very noticeable when the Jiangsu provincial 
government was defaulting on its educational allocation and all schools had to face 
financial shortages. In June 1928, the association of middle schools in the Central 
University District submitted a petition to the University Academy at the Nanjing 
government to accuse the Central University of ignoring primary and secondary 
education in Jiangsu province. This petition also commented sharply that: 
        “The Central University was the center of this country’s academics. Then 
its funding should be afforded by the central government. We primary and 
middle schools in Jiangsu province should not be under the direct regulation of 
the central government, and our funding should not be allocated together with 
the university. … Since the educational administration system within this 
country has not been unified, it is too luxurious to imitate the French system at 
                                                 
184 See Xu Xiaoqing, ZhengJu Yu XueFu: Cong DongNan DaXue Dao ZhongYang DaXue 1919-
1937, chapter 3, and Chen Pingyuan, DaXue You Jingshen.  
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this time. Cutting our feet to fit the shoes will inevitably bring out bad 
results.”185 
        The situation was even more complicated and chaotic in North China. When the 
Nationalist government believed that they had controlled Beijing, the earlier political and 
cultural center, it changed the name of this city into Beiping186 in June 1928, and 
announced a series of instructions of educational reforms in August, the most noticeable 
of which was to integrate nine universities in Beiping and Tianjin into a new “Beiping 
University” for the Beiping university district. However, most universities in this area 
had a much longer history than national universities in the South, and the students and 
scholars were proud of their distinct histories and traditions. They were severely upset by 
the Nanjing government’s instruction to combine them. From November 1928 to June 
1929, students from Peking University, Peking Normal University at Beiping, and the 
Beiyang University at Tianjin launched marches and strikes to preserve their universities 
and resist the Beiping university district. For more than half a year, higher education at 
Beiping—the educational, academic, and former political center of the country—was 
almost paralyzed.187 
                                                 
185 “Petition from the Association of Middle Schools in the Central University District,” June 
1928, pp. 7-8, in Cai Yuanpei, The Complete Works of Cai Yuanpei, Vol. 5, Beijing: China Press, 
1988 (蔡元培，《蔡元培全集·第五卷》，中华书局，1988年). 
186 In Chinese, “京 (Jing)” means the capital of a country. Beijing (or Peking, 北京) means the 
north capital, while Nanjing (or Nanking, 南京) means the south capital. Beiping (or Peiping, 北
平) was an old name of this city and was only used for several decades during the 14th and 15th 
centuries. Local residents had considered this city as a capital for over thousand years. Therefore, 
when the KMT government prohibited the name “Beijing,” it irritated many local people, 
especially university students and scholars.  
187 For trials in Beiping during this period, see Wang, Xuezhen, Beijing Da Xue Ji Shi, 1898-1997 
(Peking University Chronicle, 1898-1997), Beijing: Peking University Press, 1998, volume 1 (王
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         Even within the Nanjing central government, there were more and more higher 
officials opposing the university district system. The Nationalist Party used to encourage 
and rely on student and mass activism to overthrow the warlord governments, but once 
becoming the legitimate central government, it had to turn to emphasizing disciplines and 
social stability and putting more control over the thoughts and behaviors of university 
students. Therefore, Cai Yuanpei’s idea of keeping education independent from politics 
seemed more and more inappropriate. In October 1928, after calls for impeachment from 
his party members, Cai had to resign his position at the University Academy and 
transferred to take charge of the Academia Sinica. Within the same month, the 
Nationalist central government ceased the University Academy and resumed the Ministry 
of Education. In July 1929, the Ministry of Education officially abolished the university 
district system and resumed Department of Education in each provincial government. The 
Central University was required to continue administrating educational affairs in Jiangsu 
province until the end of 1929, in order to maintain stability in regions around Nanjing, 
the national capital.188 
         The two-year trial of the university district system shows that mechanically 
introducing western institutions without adapting them to local realities would not help 
                                                                                                                                                 
学珍，《北京大学纪事，1898-1997》，北京：北京大学出版社，1998年，上册), and Xiao, 
Caoren, Beijing Da Xue Yu Jin Xian Dai Zhongguo (Peking University and Modern China), 
Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2005 (萧超然，《北京大学与近现代中国》,北京：中国
社会科学出版社). 
188 Xu Xiaoqing, ZhengJu Yu XueFu: Cong DongNan DaXue Dao ZhongYang DaXue 1919-1937 
(Politics and Universities: From the Southeastern University to the Central University, 1919-
1937), Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2009, and ChengPuXiongWei YangYangDaFeng: 
ZhongYang DaXue XiaoZhang Luo JiaLun (Biography of Luo Jialun, President of the Central 
University), Shandong Education Press, 2012. 
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China at all. In most cases, it was beyond the ability of university administrators and 
scholars to deal with the governments and local public at the same time. This system 
could run well in France because a strong central authority was able to guarantee the 
education system’s independence from local political interference. In Republican China, 
the central government was not capable of effectively controlling the local forces, and 
therefore not capable of providing support and protection for education—either in 
funding or in administration. Although unsuccessful, the trial of the university district 
system demonstrates that when introducing western institutions and approaches, it was 
important and critical to be flexible and pay close attention to local Chinese conditions. 
Cai failed, even though he was Chinese and a powerful official with high social 
reputation, because he failed to adapt the French “university district” system to the 
situation in China. By comparison, American-trained scientists were more accomplished 
in introducing agricultural sciences and education in universities, because they were more 
successful in adapting the foreign ideas to specific local political, social, and economic 
situations.  
 
3.2 Chinization of Tsinghua: From Tsinghua School to National Tsinghua 
University 
        When Peking University was fading from the history of agricultural sciences in 
China in the late 1920s, another university dominated by American-trained scholars 
rapidly ascended at Beiping: the Tsinghua University. It is necessary to briefly introduce 
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the establishment of Tsinghua University before exploring its agricultural studies. As I 
have mentioned in the Introduction, the Boxer Indeminty started to select and prepare 
Chinese students to study in the United States. in 1909, and in April, 1911 Tsinghua 
College was opened as a preparatory school for these selected students. At first, this 
school provided education at the level of secondary school and the first two years of 
college. Students at Tsinghua College received education to prepare for further studies 
abroad. However, during the late 1910s and the early 1920s, scholars at Tsinghua decided 
that, if they were contented with the status of a preparatory school, Tsinghua would lose 
its roots in Chinese culture. Although early graduates from Tsinghua often stressed the 
humiliation of China, they were also actually trained western-style and relatively weakly 
in Chinese knowledge, even though the students themselves did not mean to be that way. 
As a preparatory school, Tsinghua was more like a secondary school or junior college at 
first. Its students were only prepared to go to an American university rather than to work 
or study in China directly. Students and scholars from other national universities often 
laughed at Tsinghua students for their poor knowledge and skill as Chinese people. In 
addition, the school was completely dependent on the refund of American Boxer 
indemnity. If this situation continued, whenever the Boxer Scholarship finished, 
Tsinghua School would be finished.189 To avoid such a fate, in 1925 Tsinghua set up its 
college department to provide full college education. About two thirds of the annual fee 
from the Boxer Scholarship was used to support the college. The newly-established 
college was able to get the best faculty in China because its alumni who had received 
                                                 
189 Historical Materials of Tsinghua University, Vol. 1, pp. 276-277. 
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graduate degrees from the United States were likely to come back and work at Tsinghua. 
In addition, Tsinghua’s financial support was much more stable than other famous 
universities supported by Chinese governments, which made it very attractive for 
students. 
        Although transforming into a full-time university, by the middle 1920s, Tsinghua 
seemed more like the western universities rather than other Chinese universities. In 
addition to its administration under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (rather than under the 
Ministry of Education), for many times, it was inclined to get closer to the westerners 
rather than its Chinese countrymen when making important decisions. For example, in 
April 1922, when the Anti-Christianity Movement was rising in both Shanghai and 
Beijing, Tsinghua School still provided its campus to the World’s Student Christian 
Federation for the eleventh conference of this federation, which received fierce criticism 
from Chinese scholars. In 1926, when preparing to establish its first agricultural 
department, Tsinghua University chose to cooperate with the missionary Yenching 
University sponsored by American Christian organizations, rather than the Beijing 
Agricultural University. It was not until 1928, when the Nationalist Government took 
over Tsinghua, that Tsinghua really became a university of China. 
        As a school with a strong foreign background, Tsinghua experienced a remarkable 
shift of “Chinization” in its institution and administration after 1928. In June 1928, 
military powers in North China reached a compromise with the Nanjing Nationalist 
Government. They acknowledge the Nanjing Government as the central government of 
China (only formally). The Nationalist government became the new legitimate Chinese 
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government with international recognition, while local military forces remained powerful 
in regions far away from the reach of the Nanjing central government. As already 
described for Tsinghua, during the Warlord Era (from 1916 to February 1928), it was 
always at the national capital, ranked as the best school in China, and because of its 
relations with the United States, it was under the administration of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In contrast, from 1928 to 1948 (the Nanjing decade and the Sino-
Japanese War), Tsinghua was always at a place outside of the political center—first in 
Beiping, later in exile in Kunming during the war. This means that local support was 
important for the development of this school. Tsinghua suffered another big change: it 
was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Education of the 
Nanjing central government. This meant increased scrutiny by the Nationalist Party. 
Tsinghua scholars and students had to deal with new situations and to find a proper 
balance between the central and local political forces for its further development. 
        In August 1928, the Nationalist government changed Tsinghua’s name into the 
“National Tsinghua University” and put it under the joint-administration of the ministries 
of foreign affairs and education. In September 1928, Luo Jialun (罗家伦) assumed the 
presidency of Tsinghua with the appointment of the Nanjing government.  Luo Jialun (罗
家伦, also named Luo Zhixi, 罗志希, 1897-1969) was a historian, educationalist, 
diplomat, and political activist in Republican China. He studied at Peking University 
from 1917 to 1920, and was a very outstanding figure in the May Fourth Movement in 
1919. Then he conducted research studies in history and philosophy at Princeton, 
Columbia, and universities in London, Berlin, and Paris for seven years. During this 
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period, he wrote and translated several academic books to compare Chinese and western 
cultures and history, which later became influential among Chinese scholars.  
        When appointed as the president of Tsinghua, Luo Jialun publically claimed that his 
chief purpose was to make Tsinghua a university to improve China’s own academics by 
saying “the only purpose of my taking charge of Tsinghua was develop the independence 
of Chinese academia (我去办理清华，除谋中国的学术独立外，他无目的).” He 
proposed three principal concerns for Tsinghua’s future development: first, the sciences 
China needed; second, Tsinghua’s existing basis; and third, local conditions of Peiping.190 
Luo’s reforms were carried out mainly in four aspects. Firstly, Luo moved the 
administration of Tsinghua to the Ministry of Education of the Nanjing Nationalist 
government completely. From then on, Tsinghua was to be under the management of the 
Chinese government—at least in form.191 Secondly, Luo moved the administration of the 
“Tsinghua fund” from the minister of foreign affairs to directors of the “China 
Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture” (“China Foundation” for short). 
These directors were non-governmental famous people from both China and the United 
States. This move was in part calculated to reduce corruption and mismanagement of 
funds. Thirdly and fourthly, he re-organized the departments and re-allocated funds. Luo 
Jialun increased inputs in purchasing academic books and scientific research equipment 
                                                 
190 Luo Jialun, “Reports and Plans for Reforming University Affairs (整理校务之经过及计划),” 
November 23, 1928, Historical Materials of Tsinghua University, Vol. 2 (1), p. 5. 
191 In practice, part of the Tsinghua scholars and students did not accept this fact heartily. In 
addition, some times the leaders of Tsinghua also stressed their American background in order to 
claim more benefit. For details about these scholars and students’ thoughts, see Liu Yun, GuFan 
YuanYing: Chen DaiSun’s 1900-1952, and Liu Chao, XueFu Yu ZhengFu: QingHua DaXue Yu 
GuoMin ZhengFu De ChongTu Yu HeZuo.  
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and materials expanded the library, set up more buildings for research and education, and, 
correspondingly, cut off some programs he believed to be redundant—including the 
program of agriculture. This program had an important history in the early development 
of Tsinghua School, and scholars have not paid much attention to it (indeed no published 
history exists). 
        From 1928 to 1930, Luo Jialun made a series of reforms aimed at rebuilding 
Tsinghua into a university to serve the Chinese people and setting up a foundation to 
develop Tsinghua into a comprehensive research university. One of Luo’s most 
unpopular reforms was to apply military regulations to the students, which aimed to 
improve the students’ discipline and patriotism. Luo’s reforms were based on his 
outstanding ability, decisive personality, as well as the  support of the Nationalist central 
government, while the Tsinghua scholars and students, no matter how patriotic they were, 
had got used to the autonomy and freedom brought by its unique background (under the 
looser control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not Education). Therefore, although the 
Tsinghua students admitted that Luo was capable and had done a lot of good things for 
Tsinghua, they disliked Luo’s reforms. Moreover, many Tsinghua people preferred other 
political forces to the Nationalist government. As a result, Luo was expelled by the 
Tsinghua student union in 1930.192 In the following paragraphs, I will briefly introduce 
Luo’s reforms and how the thoughts and careers of Tsinghua agricultural scientists would 
be influenced by these events. 
                                                 
192 Li Jingqing, “Storms at Tsinghua,” September 1930, Historical Materials of Tsinghua 
University, Vol. 2(1), pp. 82-86. (李景清，“清华学潮的前后”，1930年 9月，《清华大学史
料选编》，二（上），82-86页). 
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        At the very beginning of its establishment in the early 1910s, Tsinghua had a 
mandate to build up an agriculture program. Its college students organized an association 
of agriculture to prepare for further study in agricultural sciences in the United States.  In 
1921, Yu Zhenyong (虞振镛), a Tsinghua College graduate with an M.S. degree in 
animal husbandry from Cornell University, organized a program of agriculture and 
provided optional courses such as crop science, horticultural science and animal 
husbandry for college students at the Tsinghua College. This program was changed into a 
department in 1926, with Yu Zhenyong as the director. Yu Zhenyong continued teaching 
optional courses for college students and did not enroll students for the agricultural 
program. In 1928, when Tsinghua was reformed into the National Tsinghua University, 
this department had only one faculty member (Yu Zhenyong) and no full-time students. 
Tsinghua President Luo Jialun believed that this program was not running well and 
therefore closed it. Yu Zhenyong continued agricultural activities by collaborating with 
other organizations, such as the National Association of Mass Education Movements led 
by Yan Yangchu (晏阳初, Y. C. James Yen) and the Yenching University.193 Together 
they established an experimental farm to conduct research on livestock breeding. At the 
same time, in 1928, they started an agricultural school to provide training for practical 
farming technicians and literate peasants. The experimental farm and the school did not 
run well either and was finally suspended in 1930 when Yenching University decided to 
give up. At the request of Yenching University, the University of Nanking (Jinda) took 
                                                 
193 Yenching University was the best missionary university in North China and its campus 
neighbored Tsinghua’s campus. The University of Nanking (Jinda) was the best missionary 
university in Nanjing and had the best agricultural school in China at that time. 
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over the experimental farm. Researchers from the School of Agriculture in the University 
of Nanking kept this farm for their studies in plant breeding. Yu Zhenyong left and joined 
the School of Agriculture in the National Peiping University.194 
        Meanwhile, Luo’s reorganizations received both positive and negative comments, 
while his militarization program irritated both students and faculty at Tsinghua. Because 
of its background, Tsinghua had high autonomy and strong democratic atmosphere before 
1928. It also had a unique tradition of “professors managing the school” (“教授治校”)—
when facing important events, the professors would get together and vote to make 
important decisions. Luo’s strong and arbitrary personality enabled him to make the 
reforms quickly and efficiently, but also challenged Tsinghua’s democratic tradition 
significantly. He was tolerated by Tsinghua people for almost two years mainly because 
of two reasons: firstly, some of his reforms really benefited Tsinghua; and secondly, he 
was supported by the Nationalist central government. But this situation did not last long. 
        In spring 1930, the “Central Plains War” broke out. It was a civil war between the 
forces of the Nanjing Nationalist government and a coalition of three warlords: Feng 
                                                 
194 For the agricultural program of Yu Zhenyong, see Liu Chao XueFu Yu ZhengFu: QingHua 
DaXue Yu GuoMin ZhengFu De ChongTu Yu HeZuo (University and Government: Conflicts and 
Cooperations between Tsinghua University and the Nationalist Government, 1928-1935), Tianjin 
Renmin Press, 2015; Liu Yun, GuFan YuanYing: Chen DaiSun’s 1900-1952 (The Lonely 
Traveler: Biography of Chen Daisun, 1900-1952), Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2011; and 
Xu Xiaoqing, ChengPuXiongWei YangYangDaFeng: ZhongYang DaXue XiaoZhang Luo JiaLun 
(Biography of Luo Jialun, President of the Central University), Shandong Education Press, 2012. 
Also see “The Agriculture Department’s Effort in China’s Agricultural Improvement and 
Education,” by Zhu Junpeng from the Tsinghua University Archives (“注重中国农业改良的农
业学系”，朱俊鹏，清华大学档案馆) 
http://xs.tsinghua.edu.cn/docinfo/board/boarddetail.jsp?columnId=00401&parentColumnId=004
&itemSeq=5352. For how the University of Nanking took over the farm, see Shen Zonghan’s 
memoir, volume 2.  
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Yuxiang (冯玉祥) controlling Shaanxi, Gansu, Henan, and part of Inner Mongolia; Yan 
Xishan (阎锡山) controlling Shanxi province; and Li Zongren (李宗仁) controlling 
Guangxi province in south China. This war involved more than ten provinces and lasted 
for about six months. The Nationalist government lost its control over Peiping during the 
summer. As a result, Luo Jialun lost his political support. On May 20, 1930, some radical 
students took advantage of the situation and launched an “Expelling Luo Movement (倒
罗运动),” supported by the student union. Luo Jialun was forced to resign and went back 
to Nanjing. 195 
        Although Luo Jialun was forced to leave Tsinghua and Beiping, he still had gained 
approval and sympathy from a considerable number of scholars and students at Tsinghua 
and from the Nationalist government. Chen Yinque (陈寅恪), professor of both Tsinghua 
and PKU and the most prominent historian in China at that time, characterized Luo Jialun 
this way: “Zhixi (Luo Jialun) had huge merits and virtues at Tsinghua. He built Tsinghua 
into a real national university. Regardless of this achievement, Zhixi is still an 
unparalleled president in the history of Tsinghua. … When Tsinghua was under the 
Ministry of Education… the presidents were usually familiar with administration but 
unprofessional in academics. … There was never a Tsinghua president so acquainted 
with both traditional and western knowledge as Zhixi was—I’m afraid that there would 
not be in future!” Jiang Jieshi, leader of the Nanjing Nationalist government, also praised 
Luo Jialun in 1931 that “President Luo had remarkable achievement in running Tsinghua, 
                                                 
195 Liu, Chao, XueFu Yu ZhengFu, chapter 3.  
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not only in the university affairs, but also in transmitting the ideals of our Nationalist 
Party and the policies of the central government.”196 These comments indicated that 
scholars and politicians had different expectation for the president of a top university and 
that Luo Jialun was an uncommon person able to fulfill the expectation of both sides. 
However, he was also a victim of the disordered historical context. 
         The student union and the faculty soon noticed that the radical students expelling 
Luo Jialun were not thinking about Tsinghua’s benefit and development at all but were 
followers of Yan Xishan, the warlord controlling Peiping at that time. They refused to 
accept the president arranged by this warlord, but they did not like the presidents 
nominated by the Nanjing government either.  The conflict between Tsinghua and the 
governments lasted for over a year and finally got resolved in October 1931, when Mei 
Yiqi (梅贻琦) became the new president. Mei was the one acceptable candidate for both 
Tsinghua and the Nanjing government. He was among the first Boxer students studying 
at Tsinghua School, received a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusate in 1914, and had worked as the 
university dean for years in the 1920s, but happened to be visiting the United States from 
1928 to 1930, and therefore was not involved in the strife. He was very familiar with 
Tsinghua’s traditions and knew how to handle the strong feeling of the Tsinghua faculty 
and students. In addition, he had worked in the Nationalist government and knew how to 
deal with the politicians. From 1931, Mei Yiqi was Tsinghua president for over 17 years 
and he was considered as the most successful president (although many of his actions 
                                                 
196 Xu, Xiaoqing, ZhengJu Yu XueFu, pp. 263-264.  
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were following the ways designed by Luo Jialun). After struggling between the desire to 
maintain democratic autonomy and the desire to be the school of the Chinese people for 
several years, Tsinghua staff and students finally found a balance and compromise under 
Mei, and the Tsinghua scientists were able to settle down and apply their knowledge to 
serve China.197  
 
3.3 Establishment of the Tsinghua IOA 
        In the early 1930s, after winning the “Central Plains War” and stabilizing the 
political situation in North China, the Nanjing Nationalist government started the “Rural 
Revival Movement” in order to promote agricultural production and the living standard 
of Chinese peasants. Considering its limited control over the country, the Nanjing 
government had to enlist support from people outside the Nationalist party. Patriotic 
intellectuals were the people most likely to support the Nanjing government’s reforms, 
and therefore, agricultural education became an important part of this movement. In May 
1933, the Nationalist government set up a special “Rural Revival Committee” to 
administrate the “Rural Revival Movement.” As a response to this movement, in June 
1933, The Ministry of Education in Nanjing issued Instruction Number 5825, which 
required Tsinghua to establish a school of agriculture in order to investigate important 
issues of agricultural production in North China and to train agricultural researchers.198  
                                                 
197 Liu, Chao, XueFu Yu ZhengFu, chapter 3 and chapter 4. 
198 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2-1-162, p. 1. 
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        Because of the unsuccessful experience of the earlier agricultural department and 
schools, the Tsinghua University was not very enthusiastic about establishing this new 
school. The University committee believed that Tsinghua should focus on developing 
liberal arts, sciences, and engineering, rather than including too many programs. In 
addition, there were already other agricultural colleges in North China. In Beiping, the 
Beijing Agricultural College was battered during the reform of University Academy, but 
it was still running. The Shandong University had already set up a school of agriculture in 
Qingdao with departments of agronomy, forestry, and sericulture, which seemed able to 
conduct investigation and research of agriculture in North and East China. Therefore 
Tsinghua claimed that it was not necessary to build up a new agricultural school in 
Beiping, and was inclined to decline the instruction from Ministry of Education with this 
reason.199 
         Another problem (not as openly discussed) was about funding. The Tsinghua 
University committee was short of income at that time. Tsinghua’s financing came from 
the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture (the China Foundation) 
which relied on the returning fund of the Boxer Indemnity. However, payment stopped in 
1932 and was in arrears in 1933. Tsinghua had just established a new engineering school 
with three departments at the beginning of 1932 and was not prepared for this suspension. 
Although Tsinghua finally went through this crisis with one million Chinese dollars 
(CND) in interim funds from Ministry of Finance in the nationalist government and three 
hundred thousand CND in bank loans, construction of the engineering school had been 
                                                 
199 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2-1-162, pp. 2-6, and Cheng Guangsheng, p. 37. 
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largely delayed and the university could hardly afford a new school. In March 1932, the 
university committee had publicly announced that faculty and students should not apply 
to establish new programs or departments.200  
        However, Wang Shijie (王世杰), the Minister of Education, implied that the 
Ministry of Education would require the China Foundation to move part of the Tsinghua 
fund to support the National Wuhan University to establish an agricultural school in 
Central China if Tsinghua refused to create a school of agriculture.201 Considering the 
possibility of a major funding reduction, the Tsinghua university committee finally 
decided to establish an agricultural research institute as a compromise so that they could 
                                                 
200 Since its establishment in 1924, the China Foundation started to manage funds returned by the 
US from the Boxer Indemnity. The Chinese central government paid the Boxer Indemnity to the 
United States government, which then allocated the surplus portion to the China Foundation. 
Then the China Foundation earmarked the fund to programs related to culture and education in 
China. Because of Luo Jialun’s efforts, the running of Tsinghua funds was moved to the China 
Foundation in 1928. Due to the worldwide economic crisis, in 1932 the Nationalist government 
could hardly pay the Boxer Indemnity to its creditor nations and had to ask for extension of the 
payment. The United States therefore diminished support to the China Foundation. As a result, 
the Tsinghua University could not receive funds from the China Foundation that year. See 
Journal of the National Tsinghua University, No. 379, March 9th, 1932 (《国立清华大学校刊》
第 379期). Also see Yang Tsui-hua, Patronage of Sciences: The China Foundation for the 
Promotion of Education and Culture, Taipei, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1991, 
pp. 61-68 (杨翠华，《中基会对科学的赞助》，台北，中央研究院近代史研究所专刊 65，
1991年, 第 61-68页) and Qiu Huafei, “China and the United States’ negotiation on extending 
payment of the Boxer Indemnity in 1933,” Archives of the Republic of China, 2005 Issue 2, pp. 
75-79 (仇华飞，“1933年中美延期偿还庚款问题之交涉”，《民国档案》2005年第 2期，第
75-79页).  
201 Cheng Guangsheng, Biography of Dai Fanglan, the Institute of Microbiology, Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, 2008, p. 37. (程光胜，《戴芳澜传》，中国科学院微生物所，第 37
页。) The minister Wang Shijie (1891-1981) was a British-and-French-trained jurist and 
educationist. He had been founder and the first president of the National Wuhan University. As a 
successful politician and lawyer, he asked to inscribe on his gravestone only one title—“the 
former president of the National Wuhan University”.   
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still keep all their funds from the China Foundation. This institute was to focus on the 
most necessary and beneficial research topics for a future expanded agricultural school. 
        From December 1933 to September 1934, Mei Yiqi, president of the Tsinghua 
University, appointed three professors from the department of biology—Chen Zhen (陈
桢), Li Jidong (李继侗), and Dai Lisheng (戴立生)202—to organize the new Institute of 
Agriculture. The university committee set several operating principles. Firstly, 
considering the tight budget, this institute should be as frugal as possible; the university 
would only allocate an annual income of twenty thousand Chinese dollars for three years. 
Secondly, the institute should have no more than two disciplines. Thirdly, the new 
institute should take full advantage of existing researchers and equipment. And fourthly, 
leading researchers of the new institute should be Chinese scientists with substantial 
experience in independent research and with good scientific reputations internationally.203 
        At this time, Tsinghua had competition in the agricultural research and education 
areas. Since 1927, Nanjing had become the center of agricultural science and education in 
China. The University of Nanking was definitely the most outstanding in agriculture 
                                                 
202 All the three biology professors were American-trained agricultural scientists. Chen Zhen 
(1894-1957) received a bachelor’s degree from the School of Agriculture in the University of 
Nanking before he got sponsorship from the Tsinghua College in 1919. He studied at the 
department of agronomy in Cornell University for two years; he then transferred to Columbia 
University in 1920 and studied in the group of T. H. Morgan. After returning China, Chen Zhen 
had worked at the Department of Biology in Tsinghua University for twenty-six years (1926-
1952). Li Jidong (1897-1961) majored in forestry in the University of Nanking and entered the 
school of forestry in Yale University with Tsinghua sponsorship in 1921. He was the first Chinese 
scientist to receive a doctoral degree in forestry in the United States. Dai Lisheng (1898-1968) 
received a doctoral degree from the Stanford University and had been the founder of vertebrate 
zoology in China.  
203 For preparation and establishment of this institute, see Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2-
1-200. 
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science. It was the first university in China to set up a school of agriculture. By the 1930s, 
the University of Nanking (Jinda) College of Agriculture and Forestry had established 
eight departments and a group engaged in agricultural science extension.204 All the 
leading agricultural scientists in Jinda were American specialists or American-trained 
Chinese scientists. American agricultural experts such as Harry H. Love and Clyder 
Myers had arranged long-term cooperation with the University of Nanking and conducted 
their research in China for over five years.205 Strong research teams along with sufficient 
and stable funding made the School of Agriculture in Jinda unrivalled in contemporary 
China. Also in Nanjing, the National Central University was sponsored by the central and 
local governments, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the China Foundation. It had six 
programs: agronomy, horticulture, husbandry, sericulture, biology, and plant 
pathology.206 However, except for Shen Zonghan’s plant breeding studies in Jinda, most 
agricultural research in Nanjing was based on the natural conditions in East China, which 
were quite different from those in North China (where Tsinghua was located). 
        In South China, the School of Agriculture in Lingnan University, another famous 
missionary university in Guangzhou, had four departments: agronomy, horticulture, 
husbandry, and sericulture. This school put particular emphasis on sericulture because 
                                                 
204 The Centennial Records of Nanking University: Historical Materials of the University of 
Nanking, pp. 253-256. 
205 See The Stubborn Earth and Shen Zonghan’s Memoirs. 
206 “Statistics of the Programs in Each School, 1933,” The Centennial Records of Nanking 
University: Historical Materials of the National Central University, p. 313. 
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silk production was a mainstay of industry in Guangdong Province.207 National Sun Yat-
Sen University’s agriculture school emphasized rice breeding as well as economic plants 
research in south China.208 Since the cooperative agricultural program of Tsinghua and 
Yenching University terminated in 1930, by 1933 the only comprehensive university in 
North China with an agricultural school was the National Shandong University, which 
concentrated on forestry and sericulture.  
        Considering the specialties of other universities and the principles suggested by the 
Tsinghua University committee (as mentioned above), the three organizers decided to set 
plant pathology and entomology as major disciplines for the new agricultural institute. 
These foci might avoid redundant scientific construction in North China and set up 
Tsinghua’s own advantage in competition with other agricultural programs, especially the 
ones in the National Shandong University. Meanwhile, it was possible for Tsinghua to 
invite agricultural experts from other universities to join the new agricultural institute. 
        In March 1934, Dai Lisheng, Chen Zhen, and Li Jidong reported to President Mei 
Yiqi their suggestions on the new institute. This institute would be named as the Institute 
of Agriculture in Tsinghua University (清华大学农业研究所, Tsinghua IOA) and would 
include two independent research groups: the Division of Pathology, and the Division of 
Entomology. Each group would engage one professor, one or two research assistants, and 
several staff members. Tsinghua University provided 10,000 Chinese dollars (CND) as 
                                                 
207 Chen Guojin and Yuan Zheng, Momentary Splendor: Sixty-four years of Lingnan University, 
Guangdong Renmin Press, 2008, pp. 50-51 &  83-84 (陈国钦，袁征，《瞬逝的辉煌：岭南大
学六十四年》，广东人民出版社，2008，页 50-51,83-84). Also see Yang Tsuihua, p. 155.  
208 Yang Tsuihua, pp. 153-156. 
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starting funds to purchase equipment. In the following three years, the institute could 
receive 20,000 CND every year,209 with 11,600 CND as salary, 6,400 CND for academic 
publications, and 2,000 for research trips. The three biology professors also listed five 
scientists as professor candidates: Dai Fanglan (戴芳澜, one of the two scientists featured 
above), Deng Shuqun (邓叔群),210 and Tu Zhi (涂治)211 for pathology; Yang Weiyi (杨
惟义)212 and Liu Chongle (刘崇乐) for entomology. Four of the five candidates—Dai 
Fanglan, Deng Shuqun, Tu Zhi, and Liu Chongle—were Tsinghua College alumni and 
had received postgraduate degrees in American Universities with the aid of Tsinghua 
                                                 
209 Tsinghua’s annual expenditure for the entire university in the early 1930s was 1,200,000 CND. 
See Mei Yiqi, “General Report of Tsinghua’s University Affairs during the Past Year”, in 
Historical Materials of Tsinghua University, volume 2, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 1990, 
pp. 21-39. Originally published in Qinghua Fu Kan, volume 39, No. 7, April 29, 1933.  
210 Deng Shuqun (1902-1970), was a scientist of mycology, plant pathology, and forestry. He 
started the studies of forests in Northwest China and higher fungi in China. Deng Shuqun 
graduated from the Tsinghua College in 1923 and finished his studies at the agricultural school at 
Cornell University in 1928 (double majoring in forestry and plant pathology). After returning to 
China, he had worked at Lingnan University, Jinda, the National Central University, and the 
Academia Sinica. He was elected as the Academia Sinica academician in 1948 and CAS 
academician in 1955. His younger brother Deng Tuo (邓拓) was a famous CCP journalist and one 
of the first intellectuals sacrificed in the Cultural Revolution. Deng Shuqun was persecuted to 
death in 1970.  
211 Tu Zhi (1901-1976) graduated from Tsinghua in 1924 and received his doctoral degree in 
plant pathology from the University of Minnesota in 1929. From 1929 to 1938, Tu Zhi worked at 
Lingnan Unviersity, Sun Yat-sen University, Wuhan University and Henan University as 
professor. He supported Marxism and the CCP and had been imprisoned by the nationalist 
government for this reason. During the war, Tu Zhi took the position of president of the 
Northwestern Agricultural School and explored agriculture, forestry and graziery in Xinjiang. 
After 1950, he took charge of translating foreign agricultural publications from English, French, 
German, and Russian into Chinese. Tu Zhi was selected as CAS academician in 1955. 
212 Yang Weiyi (1897-1972) was a European-trained entomologist. He had been the first scientist 
to work on Hemiptera in China and the first to provide a systematic way to describe the regional 
distribution of insects in China. 
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(Boxer) scholarships. Finally, Tsinghua decided to invite Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle to 
join this institute.213           
        When receiving invitations from Tsinghua, both Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle were 
willing to join the institute in their Alma Mater. However, both of them had already 
planned research trips to the United States. Bernard O. Dodge214 had already arranged a 
two-year visiting research trip to the New York Botanical Garden for Dai Fanglan and the 
China Foundation had awarded a grant of 7, 500 CND per year to support this research 
trip. Liu Chongle also applied for support from the China Foundation in 1934 and 
planned research travel through the United States and Europe between October 1934 and 
April 1936.  
        In July 1934, Tsinghua reached an agreement with the two professors: Dai Fanglan 
and Liu Chongle accepted their appointments and abbreviated their research trips to one 
year. Tsinghua would count their absences as sabbatical. During the 1934-1935 academic 
year, research assistants in the two groups would undertake some surveys and make 
preparation for research under the two professors. Li Jidong from the department of 
biology would provide advice for the assistants when necessary. After returning to 
Tsinghua, Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle were expected to focus on research and 
popularization of agricultural sciences rather than teaching. Tsinghua attempted to 
                                                 
213 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2:1-200, pp. 6-10. 
214 It seems that Dai Fanglan had been deeply influenced by Dodge in his fungi studies. 
According to the memoirs of Shen Shanjiong, a younger scientist at Tsinghua IOA, Dai Fanglan 
had recommended his students interested in microbial genetics to read Dodge and Carl C. 
Lindegren’s works on Neurospora. See Shen Shanjiong, “Opportunities: Memoirs of Shen 
Shanjion,” in Memoirs of Prominent Academicians, edited by Han Cunzhi, volume 1, Shanghai: 
Shanghai Science Technology and Education Press, 2003, p. 388. (沈善炯，“机遇”，《资深院
士回忆录》，韩存志主编，第一卷，上海：上海科技教育出版社，2003年，第 388页).  
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appoint Dai Fanglan as the chair of the Tsinghua IOA. However, Dai Fanglan had little 
interest in taking administrative positions all through his life215 and declined 
determinedly. Liu Chongle was even more indifferent to this position. Therefore, the 
Tsinghua IOA at this time had two independent divisions but no chief leader.216 Despite 
this peculiar formation, Dai Fanlan and Liu Chongle maintained their two research 
groups through the remaining of their careers, even when these groups moved among 
many different research institutes.217 
                                                 
215 I would like to say: Dai Fanglan’s indifferent attitude triggered some troubles later. In 1949, 
the CCP government required agricultural schools in Tsinghua and Peking University to integrate 
with the agricultural division from the North China University to establish the Beijing 
Agricultural University (BAU). Again, Dai Fanglan firmly refused to be president of the BAU. 
However, he was the only person acceptable for scientists from both Tsinghua and Peking 
University. As a result, no scientist could take this position, and Le Tianyu (乐天宇, 1901-1984), 
a USSR-trained communist agriculturalist, actually started to take charge of the BAU. Le Tianyu 
insisted on replacing American sciences with Lysenkoism, which resulted in severe conflicts 
among faculty members and finally caused reorganization of the BAU and some American-
trained scientists’ leaving. Conflicts at the BAU remind me of another institute: Shanghai 
Institute of Biochemistry in Chinese Academy of Sciences. In the 1950s and 1960s, CCP also 
attempted to reform western-trained scientists in this institute. Fortunately, Wang Yinglai (王应
睐, 1907-2001), chair of the institute and a British-trained biochemist, negotiated and 
compromised with the CCP and pacified the western-trained scientists. The Institute of 
Biochemistry survived plenty of political movements without severe destruction. It even won 
fame as the “Little Cambridge” during the Cultural Revolution. For scientists and scientific 
organization in a turbulent era, sometimes it was very significant to be tactful. However, to deal 
with administrative and interpersonal affairs, scientists usually had to sacrifice their research.  
216 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 37-38. 
217 At the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, Tsinghua had to suspend the Institute of 
Agriculture and these two divisions had to merge with the department of biology in the National 
Changsha Temporary University. In summer 1938 Tsinghua restored the Institute of Agriculture, 
so Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle returned to their original positions. In 1947 this institute was 
formed into a school of agriculture and the research groups became departments in the new 
school. In September 1949, the agricultural schools in Tsinghua and Peking University (along 
with the North China Agricultural University from communist area) integrated into the Beijing 
Agricultural University (BAU); therefore Dai and Liu’s groups joined the departments of 
pathology and entomology in BAU. In 1952 and 1953, after series of political and interpersonal 
conflicts, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) got agreements with the BAU to reorganize 
several research groups in BAU—including Dai and Liu’s groups—into CAS. Dai Fanlan and Liu 
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        After meeting with President Mei Yiqi and other professors in July 1934, Dai 
Fanglan invited his student, Zhou Jiachi (周家炽), to be a research assistant in the 
division of plant pathology. Zhou Jiachi was Dai Fanglan’s student at the School of 
Agriculture in Jinda and had been working as a research assistant at Lingnan University 
for one year. The division of entomology invited Mao Yingdou (毛应斗), a new graduate 
from the department of biology in Yenching University, to be a lecturer. Due to the 
limited research resources, by the summer of 1935, the lecturer and research assistant 
mainly conducted surveys and collections near Peiping.  
        Besides engaging researchers, President Mei Yiqi continued negotiating with the 
Ministry of Education and the local government in Peiping for some suitable places as 
experimental fields for the Institute of Agriculture. Mei Yiqi’s original objective was the 
ruins of Yuan Ming Yuan (圆明园, the Old Summer Palace destroyed by French and 
British troops in 1860 during the Second Opium War). The Yuan Ming Yuan ruins 
covered an area of 3.5 square kilometers and it was next to the northwest corner of the 
Tsinghua campus, which was very convenient for Tsinghua IOA researchers to conduct 
field experiments. Mei Yiqi proposed his application to Minister Wang Shijie in a letter 
on July 8, 1933. However, Mei underestimated an important factor: since the destruction 
of the palace buildings in the 1860s, local peasants had gradually moved into this site for 
farming and residence, and local officials could not control them.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Chongle spent the rest of their lives in CAS. Their research groups finally become the Institute of 
Microbiology and the Institute of Zoology in CAS.  
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Chaotic political circumstances since the late Qing Dynasty had created entangled 
property claims related to the Yuan Ming Yuan ruins. In the early 1930s, the Peiping 
local government was managing the property. Concerned about income, the Peiping 
government did not want to give this site to Tsinghua. It was only a few years after the 
nationalist government’s unifying China, and the Peiping government was not fully 
subordinate to the central government. As mentioned before, the central government was 
still powerless in many parts of China and was unwilling to displease the local 
government for Tsinghua’s sake. Therefore, the Ministry of Education suggested that 
Tsinghua negotiate with the Peiping local government directly. Tsinghua spent more than 
half a year and took some tactful means to solve this difficulty. For example, President 
Mei Yiqi had written several times to Shen Pengfei (沈鹏飞), an early Tsinghua School 
graduate who was working as director of the Department of Higher Education at the 
Nanjing government, to ask for help. However, the local officials were not the root of the 
problem. Peasants living on this site over decades believed that Tsinghua was looting 
their land and resolutely resisted Tsinghua’s taking over. They wrote to President Mei 
with angry questions,218 and accused Tsinghua of bullying and oppressing poor peasants 
at Yuan Ming Yuan to the peasants’ union of Peiping Nationalist party headquarters (see 
Figure 7). Tsinghua’s higher intellectuals with an American-training background could 
                                                 
218 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2-1-162, pp. 66-70. This might be an interesting case. 
The original letter was written in very literary classical Chinese, with very beautiful hand script. 
It highlights the class differences between the local peasant farmers and the bourgeois scientists, 
and ends with death threats against University officials. The general idea of this letter was: the 
noble elite Tsinghua scholars were lying to the Nanjing government; Tsinghua was not promoting 
agriculture at all, but just wanted to rob the poor peasants to take profits for themselves; the poor 
peasants could only make their lives by farming and would die if losing their lands, so, if they had 
to die, they might kill someone who had caused the misfortune for revenge 
 179 
 
hardly expect to be trusted by the local Chinese peasants (who were suspicious of both 
higher education and foreign influences). As a result, Tsinghua IOA was never able to 
use this convenient land during its entire existence from 1934 to 1947. Moreover, the 
Tsinghua officials learned to carefully consider the desires of the local people.219  
        The episode of the Yuan Ming Yuan land, along with some later conflicts between 
the Tsinghua IOA and local peasants in Peiping or southwest China, suggested an 
unpleasant fact to most American-trained Chinese agricultural scientists: no matter how 
“Chinese” they considered themselves and how enthusiastic they were to serve China, 
their identity as “American-trained scientists” determined that Chinese peasant farmers 
would consider them as outsiders and were inclined to keep distance from them. 
Although these scientists were able to fluently communicate with high politicians and 
famous international scientists, most (not all) of them lacked the skill to closely 
communicate with and gain the trust of the peasants, who were directly working on 
agricultural production in China. This character implied that these scientists often were 
not able to directly apply their knowledge and had to cooperate with the governments or 
other agricultural activists.  This episode is also an example of how difficult it was for the 
scientists to find research facilities in such chaotic times (and this was the so-called 
“golden age!”). 
        When Dai Fanglan returned from his sabbatical in August 1935, Tsinghua IOA still 
had no experimental fields. Researchers borrowed three rooms from the department of 
biology as a laboratory—one bigger room for the division of entomology and two smaller 
                                                 
219 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2:1-162-1.  
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rooms for the division of plant pathology. At the request of Dai Fanglan, Tsinghua gave 
the IOA 0.06 square kilometers of land on campus for research. As for equipment, 
Tsinghua IOA managed to borrow books and laboratory supplies from other biological 
institutes such as the department of biology in Tsinghua and the Fan Memorial Institute 
of Biology. But they had to subscribe to agricultural journals themselves, and 6400 CND 
per year was far from enough. Generally speaking, Tsinghua IOA started its research 
program under very limited economic conditions.220 
        From 1934 to the summer of 1937, research by the Tsinghua IOA staff was 
generally based on the North China area and its particular agricultural problems. The 
Division of Entomology conducted surveys on insect pests, beneficial insect breeding, 
and life history of insects. It also collaborated with the department of chemistry for 
insecticide research. In addition to Mao Yingdou, this division engaged Zhu Bao (朱宝, 
later changed his name into Zhu Hongfu 朱弘复 in December 1939) and Fan Xinrun (范
新润) as research assistants in 1935 and Guo Haifeng (郭海峰) in 1936. All the three 
research assistants were Tsinghua graduates—Zhu Hongfu (1910-2002) and Guo Haifeng 
from the department of biology while Fan Xinrun was from the department of chemistry. 
The division of entomology published thirteen academic articles and some popular 
science pamphlets (such as An Elementary Introduction to Insects, 《昆虫浅说》, see 
                                                 
220 Yan Wanying, “The Institute of Agriculture in Tsinghua University during Wartime”, in 
Tsinghua University and Science and Technology in modern China, edited by Yang Jian and Dai 
Wusan, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2006, pp. 211-222.  Originally published on 
Historical Materials of Chinese Science and Technology, No. 4, 1987. (闫万英，“抗战时期的清
华大学农业研究所”，《清华大学与中国近现代科学技术》，杨舰，戴吾三编著，北京：
清华大学出版社，2006年，页 211-222。原载《中国科技史料》1987年第四期). 
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Figure 8) during the prewar period. Scientists at the division of plant pathology 
conducted surveys on plant diseases and fungi in North China. Zhou Jiachi cooperated 
with Professor Li Jidong at the department of biology and kept contact with Qiu Weifan 
and Wei Jingchao at Jinda for his survey research when Dai Fanglan was in the U.S. 
After Dai Fanglan returned, this division increased with two research assistants—Shi Lei 
(石磊) and Wang Qinghe (王清和). Dai Fanglan led and instructed these younger 
scientists to identify pathogens of diseases of millets, white pear, sorghum, wheat, and 
barley, which were crops and fruits widely planted in North China at that time. 
Meanwhile, they continued a fungi taxonomy project which Dai Fanglan had started at 
Jinda by collecting and identifying fungi in North China.221 
        In this way, Tsinghua IOA started its work with American-trained scientists who 
had to negotiate between the central government and local conditions. They quickly 
adapted their research projects to the local fungi, insects, crops, and fruits. They were 
good at working with limited research resources. Compared with its rivals in Nanjing 
(such as the agricultural programs at the University of Nanking or the National Central 
University), the Tsinghua IOA received less governmental interference and the faculty 
had a fair amount of autonomy in designing their research and education. Although this 
was a new agricultural institute in the mid-1930s, it was positioned to succeed over the 
next twenty years because of the strong academic background support from Tsinghua and 
its politically marginal location among Chinese universities, which allowed it to be 
flexible and able to thrive in chaotic circumstances and adapt to local conditions. 
                                                 
221 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2:1-200, pp. 17-26. 
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3.4 The National Central University: to be “Central” via Research and 
Education 
        When the Northern Expedition Army reached Nanjing in 1927, Zou Bingwen was 
forced to leave the Southeastern University because his political attitude was very 
different from the Nationalist Party. Wang Shanquan (王善佺, a University of Georgia 
graduate and cotton scientist) became the head of the Agricultural School of the 
Southeastern University. Continual change of the top management of this university 
caused remarkable shake-ups of the faculty members. The Southeastern University was 
reorganized and renamed for several times within the following three months, and it 
finally transformed into the National Central University (NCU). 
       Although transformed from the Southeastern University, the National Central 
University had qualities quite distinct from its predecessor. While the Southeastern 
University had put more emphasis on balancing the conservative and the revolutionary, 
and maintaining academic and educational autonomy, the Central University, as a capital 
university at the new political center, had to pursue a way to be a leading model for 
national universities in China, which meant more scrutiny, less flexibility, and a more 
conservative approach. Once it was selected by the Nationalist government to be the 
“central” university, this pursuing became inevitable for both the university people and 
the outsiders. New political and social conditions proposed big challenges for the NCU. 
As the capital university of the Nanjing Nationalist government, it received more support 
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from the Nationalist central government than other national universities (in both materials 
and policies, as I described in earlier part of this chapter). Meanwhile, it had to take on 
more duty for the state—although the state was not powerful enough to effectively 
operate in the entire country. The university scientists had to take proper strategies to 
relieve tensions different from those before 1927, when the Southeastern University was 
at the political periphery. The years between 1927 and 1932 may be considered as a 
transition for NCU from peripheral to central. American-trained scientists still counted 
for more than half of the faculty of the agricultural school. They made significant 
progress in education and research—for example, Zhao Lianfang’s (赵连芳) educational 
reform and rice research, Feng Zhaochuan’s (冯肇传) cotton projects, and Deng 
Shuqun’s (邓叔群) plant pathology research and forestry survey. As for extension 
programs, because of wars and the turbulent social environment, the agricultural 
scientists were not able to expand their works in practice. Their extension and 
experimental research remained near Nanjing in the extension station established by Zou 
Bingwen. But their surveys accumulated experience and knowledge about problems of 
agricultural extension in rural China, and after Luo Jialun took the position of university 
president in 1932, the NCU got a great boom in agricultural extension. Luo helped to 
solve funding problems and relieved tension between the NCU and the Nationalist 
government. He inspired in students and scholars a sense of responsibility to the country 
and to realize the love for country through creating, circulating and applying knowledge 
for China at a leading level. In addition, he took proper strategies to communicate with 
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different people and organizations and expand extension programs to over ten provinces 
in China. 
        But in the years leading up to Luo Jialun’s presidency, efforts to bring western ideas, 
seeds, and practices were not very successful in extension as the scientists hoped. The 
case study of Zhao Lianfang (赵连芳, 1894-1968) will best illustrate the strategies and 
achievements of American-trained scientists at NCU during this transition period. Zhao 
Lianfang was born into a rural-gentry family222 in Henan province in 1894, the year when 
China was crushingly defeated in the first Sino-Japanese War. Zhao recalled that the 
humiliation of 1894 had stimulated him to love his country and people all through his life 
(“after the Sino-Japanese War, China lost its army, navy, and huge area of lands.…[the] 
fate of the country is so miserable that people feel deeply righteous indignation. That’s 
the origin of my love for the country and country people all through my life,” 中日一战
，丧师失地…国运多蹇，民情鼎沸，此毕生爱国忧民之由来也).223 The Qing 
government’s reforms in education in the 1900s (see chapter 1) enabled Zhao to enter 
modern-style primary school and to learn world geography and enlightenment ideas. As a 
teenager, Zhao gradually formed the conclusion that China was extremely undeveloped in 
comparison to western countries (especially Japan). When the 1911 revolution broke out, 
he decided to participate in the revolutionary army, to overthrow the Qing government, 
and to establish a new China. Two years later, however, Zhao became disillusioned. He 
realized that serving in the army meant nothing but being involved in the warlords’ 
                                                 
222 His family believed that they were grand-grand-sons of the Song emperors. 
223 Zhao Lianfang, Zhao LianFang BoShi HuiYiLu, Taipei: Zhao Zhang Xiao Song, 1970, p. 1. 
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fights, which was far from accomplishing his desire to serve his country. In July 1913, he 
decided to leave the army and to devote his future to the study of scientific knowledge 
abroad. To be more specific, he made a plan to pursue agricultural science, because “our 
country has huge territory and population. Agriculture is the foundation to establish the 
country, but agricultural science is still underdeveloped. We should conduct more study 
in agricultural science in order to enrich the country, to benefit the people, to improve the 
production, and to prosper the rural area (以我国地广人稠，农业为立国之本，而农业
科学未发达，为富国利民，应特别从事农业科学术之研究，以促进生产，繁荣农村
),”224 This is Zhao Lianfang’s understanding of how to serve the country and people. 
Similar to the agricultural scientists I have introduced, Zhao considered benefits of 
Chinese people as the key of his love for China, and believed that improvement in 
agricultural science would ultimately benefit the people and country. 
        Zhao then spent three years on lessons of secondary schools and practiced English at 
a missionary school (博文书院, Wesley College) in Wuchang (武昌). Then he traveled to 
Beijing and was admitted by the Tsinghua College after very competitive exams.225 
During the years at Tsinghua, he was active in student movements, and launched an 
agriculture club (农社) to prepare for studying agricultural sciences in the U.S. In 1922, 
Zhao finished his education at Tsinghua and travelled to America for college and 
graduate studies. At that time, earlier Boxer students had returned to China and brought 
                                                 
224 Zhao Lianfang, Zhao LianFang BoShi HuiYiLu, p. 8. 
225 Zhao was admitted by both Peking University and Tsinghua, but PKU only allowed him to 
enter the section of Liberal Arts, which was quite different from Zhao’s interest. In addition, Zhao 
believed that PKU was too bureaucratic at that time. Therefore he chose Tsinghua. See Zhao 
Lianfang, Zhao LianFang BoShi HuiYiLu, pp.11-12. 
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back information on American universities. Zhao Lianfang consulted some senior 
Tsinghua alumna and decided to enter the Iowa state University for undergraduate and 
the University of Wisconsin for graduate studies.  
        At the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Zhao Lianfang studied crop breeding and 
genetics under Professor Leon Jacob Cole and Professor Royal Alexander Brink. He was 
very interested in Mendelian genetics and its application. With a strong desire to learn 
how to enrich China and benefit Chinese people, Zhao chose rice breeding and genetics 
as his research topic, because he believed that rice was the most important food crop for 
the lives of Chinese people. Wisconsin was not a rice-production area, so Zhao had to 
conduct experiments in the greenhouse. It was the time when genetics was growing 
quickly in the United States. Considering the state of the field, Zhao Lianfang paid more 
attention to genetic experiments rather than field studies. He published a series of articles 
in the journal Genetics in 1927 and 1928, including “Linkage Studies in Rice,” 
“Disturbing effect of the glutinous gene in rice on a Mendelian ratio,” and “Cytological 
Studies in Rice.” In these articles, Zhao conducted hybridization experiments of eight rice 
varieties, explored twelve traits, and identified twenty-five genes of three linkage groups. 
He was the first in the world to map rice genes. In addition to the courses and research, 
Zhao paid close attention to the educational systems of American universities, which he 
borrowed for his later career in Chinese universities.  
        Zhao Lianfang returned to China via Europe in 1928. When newly arrived in 
Nanjing, he received invitations from both Zou Bingwen (邹秉文), who was serving as a 
special advisor to General Feng Yuxiang (a warlord in North China, and one of the chief 
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power in the Central-Plain War, as I mentioned early in this chapter), and Guo Tanxian (
过探先), who was director at the agricultural school of the University of Nanking 
(Jinda).226 Zhao was not willing to be involved in political struggles at his time, so he 
chose to be a professor at Jinda, with a hope to conduct academic studies to serve his 
country and people. However, to continue the research started in the U.S., he needed too 
much funding, equipment, research lab, and assistants, which Jinda was not able to 
provide.227 Therefore, after one-semester’s teaching work, Zhao left Jinda and answered 
invitations from Zou Bingwen. In January 1929, with the help of Zou, Zhao Lianfang 
became an agricultural expert in the Guangxi provincial government. Unfortunately, wars 
broke out very soon between the Nanjing Nationalist government and the Guangxi 
warlords, and the provincial agricultural scientists could not continue their work at all. In 
June 1929, Zhao had to resign and returned to Nanjing. At this time, Wang Shanquan 
visited him and suggested that he join the NCU. Considering that NCU was a “national” 
university, Zhao believed that this was the place where he would be able to fulfill the 
aspiration of “enriching the country and benefiting the people.” He accepted this position 
and was appointed as director of the department of agronomy, teaching genetics and crop 
breeding. 
        Zhao Lianfang quickly noticed that the situation at the NCU was not positive. Both 
faculty and students were disturbed by the unstable political situation and could hardly 
                                                 
226 We have met these two Cornell graduates in chapter 1. They were both working at the 
Southeastern University before 1927. 
227 As I have introduced, at this time, Jinda was facing a tricky situation and needed to balance 
between the new Chinese government and the American missionary sponsors. It was not a good 
time to apply for funding to start new projects. 
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concentrate on studies. Zhao described NCU as: “Situation of the university was not 
ideal. Both inside and outside environments were often insecure. There was little 
atmosphere of scientific research. The students were not enthusiastic in studying. 
Considering the country was newly unified and the central government was newly 
established, such situation was understandable. The faculty members were not interested 
in their works as well. … I recollected the vigor and vitality of famous American 
universities, and felt that we were too inferior in enthusiasm and persistence of scientific 
research.”228 Moreover, although educational funds for NCU increased in form, it was 
usually delayed in actuality (see part of the University Academy and tensions between 
Jiangsu province and the Nanjing government), and allocation for the agricultural school 
was not stable. Zhao Lianfang was facing shortages of both people and funding. 
        Zhao took advantage of his position of department director at once. He succeeded in 
applying for an appropriation from the Boxer Scholarship program (the China 
Foundation) to improve cotton, wheat, and rice. This stable outside fund enabled his 
department to conduct continuous research on these plants. Although his own research 
interest was rice, Zhao paid attention to research and extension of wheat, cotton, and 
soybeans as well. The experience of this period endowed him with a comprehensive 
understanding on agriculture in China, and enabled him to work as a governmental leader 
in his later career. 
        Zhao’s American training experience was reflected in his works at the NCU. For 
instance, he insisted on lecturing in both Chinese Mandarin and English. This was tough 
                                                 
228 Zhao, Zhao LianFang BoShi HuiYiLu, pp. 39-40. 
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for students with less English background.229 Zhao spent a lot of time after class on 
answering the students’ questions and translated English references into Chinese to help 
these students. He believed that the students would benefit from such stringent learning 
and would be more capable of handling advanced scientific knowledge from the West. 
Another example was his emphasis on field practice. When studying at the Iowa state 
University and the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Zhao was deeply impressed by 
American agricultural schools’ stressing practice and field experiments. In China, 
practice was not highlighted for agricultural college students. Actually Zou Bingwen had 
pointed out in his 1922 book Agricultural Education in China that the lack of field 
practice was a crucial problem for Chinese agricultural colleges (see Chapter 1). But 
years later, when Zhao entered the NCU, this problem still remained. Zhao required all 
students in his department, no matter girls or boys, to conduct field practice in their junior 
and senior years. In addition, he required all faculty members to hold posts as 
technicians, so they needed to finish field surveys and research to fulfil their position. 
Zhao received heavy complaints during the first year. But the study atmosphere of the 
department became much better. Agriculture graduates from the NCU quickly became 
very popular in the job market and exceeded those from Jinda in both quality and 
quantity. Zhao’s famous students of this period included Tang Wentong (汤文通), 
founder of rice and soybean studies in Taiwan; Ye Changfeng (叶常丰), leader of rice 
breeding and extension in Zhejiang and founder of seed science in China; and Guan 
                                                 
229 He was given a nickname “Zhao Tiger (赵老虎)” by some students.   
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Xianghuan (管相桓), the most outstanding geneticist of rice in China during the 1940s.230 
Interestingly, Guan Xiangheng established and taught at the Sichuan Agricultural College 
after 1949, and had deep influence on Yuan Longping (袁隆平), the most well-known 
rice scientist in China after the Cultural Revolution. Yuan had recalled many times how 
Guan’s genetics helped him to find a direction in studies of hybridizing rice, and the first 
hybridized rice variety he achieved was derived from two varieties Zhao Lianfang 
developed in the 1930s. In this sense, Zhao’s efforts in research and education have made 
significantly positive contributions to agricultural science in mainland China until the end 
of the twentieth century, even though he himself had moved to Taiwan after 1949. This 
example is very important. Yuan Longping has been characterized as an example of a 
true Chinese scientist—domestically trained and contributing to an authentically “native” 
Chinese science.  However, the fact that Zhao Lianfang’s genetics influenced Yuan 
Longping to this great degree demonstrates that the current “native” Chinese agricultural 
science is, in fact, a hybrid involving American elements brought by American-trained 
Chinese scholars during the Republican era.231  
                                                 
230 Zhao, Zhao LianFang BoShi HuiYiLu,  pp. 40-42. Also see Xia Rubing, ZhongGuo JinDai 
ShuiDao YuZhong KeJi FaZhan YanJiu (Science and Technology of Rice Breeding in Modern 
China), Beijing: ZhongGuo SanXia Press, 2009, chapter 3. 
231 Zhao, Hanmo, “GuoMin KeXueJia: Yuan LongPing Yu 1960-2013 De GuoJia XuShi 
(People’s Scientist: Yuan Longping and National Affairs, 1960-2013),” RenWu (People), Beijing: 
Renmin Press, August 2013, volume. (赵涵漠，“国民科学家——袁隆平与 1960-2013的国家
叙事”，《人物》，2013年 8月号). Yuan Longping is considered as a national hero and known 
by almost every Chinese people because of his achievement of cultivating high-yield rice helps 
resolve food problem of Chinese people. Yuan took all his school education in Communist China. 
In her 2012 HSS presentation, Sigrid Schmalzer considered Yuan Longping as an example of 
“native” and “local” to contrast with scientists returned from America. “Transnational Science 
and Knowledge in Transit: The Movement of Agricultural Knowledge within and between China 
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        Although his major interest was academic studies, Zhao Lianfang kept an eye on 
extension and governmental policy on agriculture as well. For Zhao, agricultural 
extension meant propagating and spreading new strains of crop plants to farmers. His 
earlier experience at the Guangxi provincial program made him more aware about the 
importance of land ownership, marketing, and capability of farming people than many 
scholars who remained in academia. He supervised research on rice, wheat, and cotton at 
several experimental farms of NCU, and cooperated with local governments at Kunshan (
昆山, Jiangsu province) and Zhengzhou (郑州, Henan province) to establish farms for 
further extension. Limited by funding and personnel, Zhao did not achieve a lot in 
extending the new strains they developed during his years at the NCU. But he 
investigated the conditions of agricultural education and extension in China and explored 
its major problems: 
        “In foreign countries, when introducing a new crop strain, the government 
would consider it as a scientific project and set up special programs operated by 
scientific experts. While in our country, such programs are managed 
(unprofessionally) by missionaries, Japanese merchants, Chinese merchants, or 
philanthropists. Some governmental organizations claim to promote and spread 
American cottons. But they are actually just transporting (the seeds) for the 
farmers and were not really doing (the extension [work of training and 
marketing]). … There are mainly four problems: 1) the introduced strains have 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the U.S., 1940s – 1980s,” History of Science Society Annual Meeting, 16 November 2012, 
San Diego, California. 
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not been screened; 2) some of the seeds purchased (abroad) are not purebred; 3) 
once introduced, there is no domestication step [such as scientists identifying and 
helping new varieties to adapt to the local environment] before extension; 4) 
after the introduction, there is no further step to screen and select seeds, so the 
introduced strains gradually deteriorate. …”232  
        Zhao’s comments were from the standpoint of a scientist and did not touch on other 
essential issues such as the land ownership and the non-cooperation of peasants. He 
realized that in such a chaotic era, it was impossible for the university scientists to 
succeed in agricultural extension without governmental facilitation. Although he had 
previously considered academics as the best way for him to fulfill the desire to enrich the 
country and benefit the people, after 1933, he gradually shifted the emphasis of his works 
to governmental affairs. It was the year when the Nationalist central government 
launched the “Rural Revival Movement” and the Central Agricultural Experimental 
Institute (the National Agricultural Bureau) started to function. As a famous agricultural 
scientist and department director at the National Central University, Zhao was frequently 
invited to governmental conferences and consulted for advice. Finally, in summer 1934, 
he left NCU and took the position of chief of the agricultural department of the National 
Economy Commission (全国经济委员会农业处). He believed that at this stage, he could 
                                                 
232 Zhao Lianfang, “Future Plan for Cotton Breeding in Our Country,” speech at the Conference 
of Chinese Cotton Improvement in 1931, pp. 10-12. (赵连芳，“今后我国棉作育种应取之方针”，
中国棉产改进统计会议专刊，演讲页 10、12，1931 年。《中国现代农业史资料·第三卷》，
929页) 
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be more effective by supervising agricultural development more broadly rather than 
focusing on specific research and education problems. 
        Before Zhao Lianfang’s departure, the year 1932 marked an important crisis and 
turning point in the history of the NCU. A severe flood hit provinces in East China in 
1931, resulting in large-scale crop failures and famine (the National Economy 
Commission was established partly because of this disaster). Jiangsu was one of these 
provinces, and its farming tax income significantly decreased by almost one third. As a 
result, the NCU only received about 10% of its annual budget from the Jiangsu provincial 
government in 1932. Scholars could hardly continue their work under such difficult 
conditions. Many famous scientists, including Feng Zhaochuan and Deng Shuqun, left 
the NCU at this time. To make things worse, the Japanese troops occupied the 
Northeastern provinces in 1931 and attacked Shanghai in early 1932. College students at 
Nanjing, the capital city, were upset by these events and were very dissatisfied by the 
government’s weakness. The NCU students struck to denounce the Japanese and to 
condemn the Nationalist government. The university president at that time was expelled 
by the students. Defaulted faculty would not help, and the situation at the university 
became out of control. By summer 1932, the Nationalist government was considering 
closing their National Central University. It was not until October 1932, when Luo Jialun, 
whom we have met in the section about Tsinghua IOA, took up the position of president 
of the NCU, that the tensions got relieved. Students and faculty were able to calm down 
and return to their routine studies.  
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        Luo Jialun was not the most typical American-trained Chinese scholar. After 
finishing college education, he won sponsorship from Peking University to travel abroad. 
From 1921 to 1926, Luo spent six years on studies of history and philosophy at five 
famous universities in four countries, but did not take degrees. Luo’s later political and 
academic activities demonstrated that he had been influenced by different diverse western 
traditions and endeavored to hybridize Chinese reality with what he had learnt from the 
west. For example, in his most well-known academic book, Science and Metaphysics, he 
compared traditional Chinese culture and ideology with western science and philosophy, 
and examples of science were mainly from American cases. After returning to China in 
1926, Luo taught at the Southeastern University. Because of his early experience in the 
New Culture Movement and the May Fourth Movement, his academic achievement in 
historical studies, and his political preference to the Nationalist Party, he was appointed 
by Jiang Jieshi to taking charge of the Central Political School, where Luo borrowed 
French political institutions to train Nationalist officials for China. When taking charge of 
Tsinghua, he proposed to build Tsinghua into a university of Chinese people with an 
academic level as high as Princeton University. And after becoming president of the 
National Central University, Luo adopted the model of the University of Berlin to 
stimulate faculty and students at NCU. With all these western models he borrowed, Luo 
Jialun was expressing a similar ideology that Chinese intellectuals should struggle to 
benefit China and the Chinese people, and the tools should be rational and academic 
knowledge rather than radical political activities.233 
                                                 
233 About Luo Jialun’s experience and thoughts, see Xu Xiaoqing, ChengPuXiongWei 
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        Ironically, the reforms Luo made at the Central University seemed similar to those 
he had brought to Tsinghua in principle: to solve financial difficulties, to stress the 
importance of improving Chinese academia, and to establish an ideology of serving 
China through academic knowledge. While he was expelled from Tsinghua, he became 
the most successful president in the history of the Central University. I think the huge 
contrast was largely because Tsinghua was located at the political periphery, with more 
emphasis on adapting to local conditions and keeping its independence. This context was 
quite different from that of the Central University, located in the nation’s political center.  
        When Luo Jialun started to serve as the university president at the Central 
University in October 1932, it was just one year after the September 18 Incident and the 
Japanese had controlled all the Northeastern provinces and started to deploy military 
forces near Shanghai and Beiping. Most Chinese intellectuals became aware that a great 
war between Japan and China would be inevitable. In this situation, scholars and students 
at the National Central University could hardly concentrate on their studies. A shortage of 
funding significantly disturbed regular education. More and more young students felt 
unsatisfied with staying in school and wished to contribute to protect the country in a 
more direct way, so more and more students were involved in marches and propaganda. 
Luo Jialun believed that resisting the Japanese meant much more than military action; 
China required high-level sciences and academics to be a nation able to rival Japan 
comprehensively. In order to prepare for the war, China had an urgent necessity of 
cultivating capable people to strengthen the country—including intellectuals. As the 
                                                                                                                                                 
YangYangDaFeng: ZhongYang DaXue XiaoZhang Luo JiaLun (Biography of Luo Jialun, 
President of the Central University), Shandong Education Press, 2012. 
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national capital university, NCU’s primary responsibility for the country should be 
closely connected with the country’s necessity. Luo wrote: 234 
        “To resist the Japanese, are our students at the Central University able to 
compete with students at the Tokyo Imperial University? Are professors at the 
Central University comparable with professors at the Tokyo Imperial 
University? Does the Central University rival the Tokyo or Kyoto Imperial 
University?... 
        To resist our enemy, we must figure out the real targets. We should see 
whether we can rival the Tokyo Imperial University. We need not pay attention 
to outsiders’ rumors about our university—we just need to work harder. Our 
program of aviation aims to train personnel to manufacture planes, but we 
cannot make it public; our school of medicine aims to heal the wounded and 
rescue the dying during the war, but we cannot make it public; our program of 
animal husbandry aims to raise warhorses and to explore the northwestern area, 
but we cannot make it public either. … At this time, loving the country means 
not only marches and public propaganda, but also research and discussion to 
figure out resolutions. Now the most important necessities are funding, capable 
people, and international communication. I believe that the Central University 
should be a base to give advice and directions for resisting the Japanese, rather 
than base of marches and propaganda. Everyone is able to conduct marches 
                                                 
234 Xu, Xiaoqing, ZhengJu Yu XueFu, p. 293. 
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and propaganda. … We should be a base able to produce all types of capable 
personnel.”235 
He stressed the responsibility of the National Central University “to be the base of giving 
advice for the reviving of the country/nation (民族复兴的参谋本部)” and believed that 
this was the only effective way of being a “central” university.236 In this way, Luo was 
able to comfort and calm down the indignant students. Before Luo, other scholars and 
politicians had appealed to ideas of serving the country with science or knowledge. For 
example, Zhu Jiahua (朱家骅), the president taking charge of NCU before Luo Jialun, 
had published essays about “studying to save China (读书救国).”237 However, Luo was 
the first to effectively convince young Chinese intellectuals with the idea of serving 
China through science and knowledge. President Luo Jialun’s speeches suggested a way 
different from political activism to express and realize the love for their country: 
endeavoring to create, circulate, and apply knowledge for China. 
        In the 1930s, the National Central University was so superior in recruiting 
outstanding students that other universities in the area controlled by the Nationalist 
government could never match it. According to Zhu Kezhen (竺可桢), president of the 
                                                 
235 Luo Jialun, “Establishing the Central University a Base for Reviving the Nation and Resisting 
the Japanese” on January 6, 1936, Selected Works of Mr. Luo Jialun, Volume 5: Speeches, pp. 
454-455.  
236 Luo Jialun, “Responsibility of the Central University,” speech on October 17, 1932, The 
Centennial Records of Nanking University—Historical Materials of the University of Nanking, 
Nanjing University Press, 2002, volume 1, pp. 296-301. 
237 Xu, Xiaoqing, ZhengJu Yu XueFu, pp. 193-194. 
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National Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, when the best universities238 recruited 
students, two thirds of the most excellent students preferred the NCU. Considering that 
Luo Jialun had served as university president successfully for almost ten years, these 
thoughts should have been a common view of the mainstream of students and faculty at 
the National Central University. And when these elite students graduated, they would be 
members of the powerful elite in Chinese society. Had the Anti-Japanese War and the 
Communist Revolution not happened, Luo Jialun’s thoughts of serving the country with 
science and knowledge might have shaped the future of China. 
        In addition to the ideology of serving China through knowledge and science, Luo 
Jialun significantly improved funding, the scale, and academic communications of NCU. 
The agricultural school was the most remarkable example. Luo Jialun reorganized the 
programs, re-employed faculty for the six new-established departments, and encouraged 
and facilitated NCU scholars to communicate and cooperate with their western 
colleagues and other academic institutes in China at that time, such as the Academia 
Sinica and the Science Society of China. Although Zou Bingwen and Guo Bingwen 
started the agricultural school with four departments and one extension station, annual 
funding for this school did not have a stable guarantee, and it did not expand for ten 
years. After persuading the Nationalist government to increase allocation for the NCU 
from the central government budget, Luo started to build a new site for the agricultural 
                                                 
238 In his diary, Zhu Kezhen only recorded several universities in South and East China. Beiping 
was not effectively controlled by the Nanjing government, and Tsinghua and Peking University 
were recruiting independently from those universities in the South.  
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school at once.239 At this time, Tsinghua IOA only had three offices and experiment 
rooms borrowing from the department of biology; the Beijing Agricultural College fell in 
a series of political battles in Beiping and could hardly continue normal education; the 
National Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou also enjoyed support from the Nationalist 
government, but its studies were highly local-centered because of its natural environment 
and location in the most southern part of mainland China. Therefore the College of 
Agriculture at NCU had an overwhelming advantage among national agricultural 
colleges. A noticeable fact about Luo’s achievement was that, during the pre-war years 
Luo served as president, NCU quickly established extension stations in ten provinces (see 
figure 14) by cooperating with local governments, while before 1932 the extension sites 
were limited to an area near Nanjing. 
        More importantly, Luo’s efforts were remarkable because they promoted the study 
of animal husbandry, and therefore changed the structure of agricultural studies in China. 
By the time when Luo Jialun started to take charge of NCU, the most well-known 
Chinese agriculturalists (such as Zou Bingwen, Shen Zonghan, Dai Fanglan, and Zhao 
Lianfang) were mainly focusing on plant pathology and agronomy, but attempts to 
improve animal husbandry usually suffered frustrations (for example, Yu Zhenyong and 
the agricultural program at Tsinghua and Yenching University).240 This was largely 
                                                 
239 Luo Jialun, ZhongYang DaXue Zhi ZuiJin SanNian (The Recent Three Years of the National 
Central University), ZhongYang DaXue, 1935.  
240 The only well-known example was the hybridization of the Dingxian pig (定县猪), sponsored 
by the Mass Education Movement.But even for this successful case, the pig existed in only one 
county (Dingxian, base of the Mass Education Movement), and it had little influence on the larger 
part of China. See Sigrid Schmalzer, “Breeding a Better China: Pigs, Practices, and Place in a 
Chinese County, 1929-1937,” The Geographical Review, 92(1): 1-22, January 2002. 
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because of the extremely underdeveloped circumstances for the agricultural sciences in 
China. Studies such as plant pathology and agronomy required relatively less cost in 
funding, time, and material investment, and therefore were easier than the studies of 
animal husbandry. Luo Jialun took charge of NCU’s unique advantage in financial and 
political sponsorship, and designed a long-term all-around development plan for the 
agricultural sciences, including an emphasis in animal husbandry. The department of 
husbandry was assigned an independent farm on the new campus near Nanjing. Scientists 
at this department introduced quality livestock varieties from foreign countries, including 
cattle from California and Holland, horses from Australia, pigs from Britain, and turkeys 
and chickens from America.241 Studies of domesticating and extending the livestock 
varieties were disturbed by the war starting in summer, 1937, but not suspended. Aware 
of the danger of the coming war, Luo Jialun started searching for a new campus in the 
Southwest of China and making preparation for a timely retreat. NCU agriculturalists 
shipped their research varieties (seeds and animals) and equipment to Chongqing, the 
wartime capital. During the following eight years, NCU was the only college with serious 
studies of animal husbandry in unoccupied areas. These studies not only supported the 
necessities of the army, as Luo Jialun proposed in his pre-war speeches, but also provided 
consultancy for the food industry in Sichuan province. Although Luo himself was not an 
agriculturalist, his efforts guaranteed the superiority of NCU in the Chinese agricultural 
sciences, which even influenced the Nanjing Agricultural College after 1949. 
         
                                                 
241 Luo Jialun, ZhongYang DaXue Zhi ZuiJin SanNian; also see Liu Yun, GuFan YuanYing: Chen 
Daisun’s 1900-1952, p. 182. 
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3.5 Summary 
        In the history of modern China, the period from 1927 to 1937 was usually named as 
the “Nanjing Decade.” This decade was considered as the “golden age” of the Chinese 
bourgeoisie and nationalist intellectuals. It was a relatively peaceful period in Republican 
China. Despite continuous civil wars and threaten of the coming invasion from Japan, 
Chinese intellectuals in chief cultural centers, such as universities and institutes in 
Nanjing and Beiping, were able to conduct serious and systematic academic work. The 
central government took some action to promote agriculture, as Zou Bingwen and his 
colleagues had expected, since the Warlord Era. Institution of agricultural science and 
education gradually took shape. National agricultural colleges and institutes operated by 
Chinese people quickly grew during this decade. More and more agricultural scientists, 
both foreign- and domestic-trained, could concentrate on agricultural science rather than 
struggling for an academic career or being distracted by non-academic circumstances. 
Long-term research and successful extension programs seemed possible during this 
period, and the new circumstances provided new stimulation for intellectuals devoting 
themselves to China and agricultural sciences. 
The existing patterns of Western colonialism shifted during this period, as well. 
With the end of the Boxer funds, western economic influence waned. Missionary colleges 
and schools were forced to re-organize under the Nationalist government. As a school 
with a strong foreign background, Tsinghua experienced a remarkable shift of 
“Chinization” in its institution and administration after 1928. Western faculty and staff 
members were replaced by Chinese personnel, and programs were re-oriented toward 
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local priorities. Yet in the case of the agricultural sciences, American ideas and practices 
had already been incorporated into Chinese science. Indeed, Chinese agricultural science 
was, and is, a hybrid involving American elements brought by American-trained Chinese 
scholars during the Republican era. American-trained Chinese scientists succeeded in 
introducing and maintaining their vision for agricultural scientific research and education 
in universities because they adapted foreign ideas to specific local political, social, and 
economic situations.   
        We can also see in this period a younger generation of scientists who shared more 
common professional characteristics with their western colleagues, such as being more 
devoted to academic research rather than focusing on establishing new institutions or on 
political activities, as the first generation did. This shift of western-trained Chinese 
scientists was largely because of changes in their professional environment. During the 
decade after 1928, when more and more high-level universities and research institutes 
had been established in China, the second-generation scientists were able to work in more 
established professional environments than had the first generation—but as the number of 
scientists increased significantly, they also needed to demonstrate much higher scientific 
research ability to compete for a chance to work in this better environment. They were 
more capable of creating more advanced scientific knowledge to help China, of becoming 
important in international science, and sometimes (but not always) of applying their 
achievements to agricultural and industrial production to improve China’s strength. The 
younger-generation of scientists’ self-identity of being Chinese and the love for their 
 203 
 
country were as strong as that of their precursors. They just expressed this love in some 
different ways.  
Chinese scholars such as Cai Yuanpei, Dai Fanglan, Liu Chongle, Zhao Lianfang, 
and Luo Jialun had tried diverse strategies to improve their country and science. Their 
efforts and exploration did not always succeed during this decade, but had built up a 
foundation for the next stage of the development of Chinese agricultural science. During 
the following years, Chinese agricultural scientists retreated to the Southwest, some to the 
new political center, and some to the periphery. In the desperation of wartime exile, they 
made astonishing contributions in both serving China and their academic studies, as I will 
explore in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 7. In 1934, Tsinghua scientists attempted to rent former government lands for a 
research station. Unfortunately, peasants already lived there under rental agreements with 
the previous governments. This photo shows the first page of a letter from some Yuan 
Ming Yuan peasants to President Mei Yiqi in 1934. The original letter was written in 
very literary classical Chinese, with very beautiful hand script (the peasants, poor and 
uneducated, must have engaged an old-school intellectual to write this letter). The general 
idea of this letter was: the noble elite Tsinghua scholars were lying to the Nanjing 
government; Tsinghua was not promoting agriculture at all, but just wanted to rob the 
poor peasants to take profits for themselves; the poor peasants could only make their 
living by farming and would die if losing their lands, so, if they had to die, they might kill 
someone who had caused the misfortune for revenge. This is an example of how difficult 
it was for the scientists to find research facilities in such chaotic times. (Tsinghua 
University Archives, file 1-2-1-162, p. 66) 
 
 205 
 
 
Figure 8. This is the cover page of the first volume of Brief Introduction of Insects 
(Kunchong Qian Shuo, 《昆虫浅说》), a four-volume serial popular science booklet 
published by the Division of Entomology at Tsinghua IOA in 1935, aiming to introduce 
important pests and beneficial insects in North China to local peasants. These 
publications included the basic biology of the insects, including life cycles, and were 
intended to be educational. (Tsinghua University archives, file 1-2-1-200, p. 29) 
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Figure 9. Scientists of the Tsinghua IOA. Taken in 1937, Peiping. (Tsinghua Annual 
Journal, 1937) 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Buildings, equipment, and cattle of Agricultural College at the National 
Central University, 1935 (Luo Jialun, ZhongYang DaXue Zhi ZuiJin SanNian, 1935) 
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Figure 12. Devices for silk (left) and soil chemistry (right) research (Luo Jialun, 
ZhongYang DaXue Zhi ZuiJin SanNian, 1935) 
 
  
Figure 11. Dairy Cattle introduced from Holland (Luo Jialun, ZhongYang DaXue Zhi 
ZuiJin SanNian, 1935) 
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Figure 12. Farmers expressing their appreciation to the NCU agriculturalists, in spring 
1933 (Luo Jialun, ZhongYang DaXue Zhi ZuiJin SanNian, 1935) 
 
 
Figure 13. NCU extension stations built between 1932 and 1937 	
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Chapter 4 The	Wartime:	Surviving	and	Thriving	in	Conflicts	and	
Displacement,	1937‐1946	
 
        Serious military conflicts between China and Japan started in 1931, when the 
Chinese government and army lost Manchuria after the September 18 incident. Then in 
1932 and 1935, China and Japan fought regional battles in East and North China 
respectively, near Shanghai and Tianjin. After 1935, the Nanjing Nationalist government 
had actually given up its military control of the provinces near Beiping in North China, 
which were not its traditional sphere of influence. In 1937, the July 7 Incident and August 
13 Incident signaled a coordinated Japanese campaign: the Japanese army and navy 
started to attack Beiping, Tianjin, and Shanghai. Thus began the second Sino-Japanese 
War. In China, the eight years from 1937 to 1945 were usually called the Anti-Japanese 
War or the War of Resistance (抗日战争). Among the tensions I have discussed in earlier 
chapters, the tension between “Chinese” and “the foreign” was doubtless the most 
important during this period. Foreign invasion caused tremendous difficulties and 
dramatically altered the conditions under which Chinese intellectuals functioned; but it 
also had an unintended consequence. Pressure from the foreign (especially the Japanese) 
could effectively stimulate intellectuals’ love for their country and desire to serve the 
country through their efforts—and encourage them to do some of their best work despite 
the terrible conditions.  
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        With the Chinese people’s nationalism stimulated by pressure from outside enemies 
and the danger of national subjugation, the prestige and authority of the Nationalist 
Government quickly increased. In spite of their diverse political attitudes, Chinese 
scholars with profound love for their country considered the Nationalist government as a 
symbol of China, because it was the only legitimate political power to represent the 
entirety China. There were still warlords disagreeing with the Nationalist government 
remaining in unoccupied China, such as Long Yun (龙云) in Yunnan, Li Zongren (李宗
仁) and Bai Chongxi (白崇禧) in Guangxi, and Sheng Shicai (盛世才) in Xinjiang. They 
continued subtly resisting some decisions from the Nationalist government to conserve 
their own forces, as I will explore in the section about Tsinghua IOA. However, they also 
gave up their military and part of their political autonomy in order to unite and fight 
against the Japanese. As a result, the Nationalist central government’s control over 
unoccupied China was much more effective than it had been during the pre-war period. 
        Meanwhile, China had an urgent need to increase agricultural production to support 
people’s living and the cost of the war, which required contributions from agricultural 
scientists. During the war, all major agricultural and industrial production areas fell into 
the hands of the Japanese. The Nationalist government had to depend on the unoccupied 
regions, including southwest China, as the base of operations and to support the country. 
During the war, the areas formally controlled by the Nationalist government included 
Sichuan, Yunan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and parts of 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Shanxi, and Zhejiang 
provinces. The southeast provinces were the front lines in the fight with the Japanese, and 
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Shaanxi and Shanxi were interspersed by base areas of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). Therefore, the Nationalist central government could only effectively practice 
reforms in the Southwest to improve agricultural production. At a temporary national 
party congress in March 1938, the Nationalist government passed the Wartime Principles 
for state Establishing (《战时建国纲领》), which stressed that agriculture should have 
precedence over other industry and transportation. In April 1939, the Nationalist 
government launched its first national production conference to make a comprehensive 
plan for agricultural improvement. This conference outlined several essential points for 
wartime agricultural development, including improving food production, providing raw 
materials for industrial production, and increasing exportation of economic agricultural 
products.242  
        The Southwest had been an extremely backward region in China until that time. 
Even the most productive province, Sichuan, needed to import rice every year in the 
1930s. Before the war, cotton production in the Southwest only counted for 4% of the 
national production. Thus the challenge of promoting science and technology to elevate 
agricultural production in this region was huge and crucial. The National Agricultural 
Bureau (中央农业实验所, Central Agricultural Experimental Institute) left Nanjing and 
moved to the Southwest. It finally set a base in Chongqing, the wartime capital where the 
Nationalist government settled, and its researcher members were distributed to Sichuan, 
                                                 
242 Wu Weirong, “Agricultural Development in rear area during the Anti-Japanese War,” Studies 
of Modern History, 1991 No. 01, Beijing: Institute of Modern History in Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, pp. 221-243. (吴伟荣，“论抗战期间后方农业的发展”，《近代史研究》，
1991年第 01期，北京：中国社会科学院近代史研究所，页 221-243). 
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Guangxi, Guizhou, Hunan, and Yunan, and established a series of agricultural research 
laboratories and extensions in these provinces.243 During the following eight years, the 
National Agricultural Bureau took charge of agricultural research in academic 
organizations and of the popularization of advanced agricultural knowledge and 
techniques. On one hand, the Bureau operated financial and scientific aids to research 
institutes in the Academia Sinica (the National Central Academy) and chief universities 
for research in improving agricultural production. On the other hand, this Bureau 
functioned as a governmental branch to help each county establish a department of 
agricultural popularization and more agricultural clubs in villages in order to pass 
agricultural knowledge and techniques to local peasants directly.244 Its research and 
extension emphasis moved to the regions in West China, which had never been covered 
before (see Figure 16 for the Bureau’s active regions before and during the war).245 This 
shift of working emphasis at the National Agricultural Bureau represented the shifts 
many scientists made from the coastal provinces. Some of them had to change their 
research fields, and some had to change from science to politics. 
        In order to fit in its new roles, the National Agricultural Research Bureau reformed 
in its organization and changed its leaders. Qian Tianhe, the former vice director taking 
charge of the Bureau, was promoted into Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Shen 
                                                 
243 Shen Zonghan’s letter to Harry H. Love, June 22, 1938, Harry H. Love Papers, Box 14, folder 
36, Kroch Library, Division of Rare & Manuscript Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, New 
York. 
244 Li Zidian, “The Brief History of the Central Agricultural Experimental Institute,” Historical 
Archives, 2006.4, pp.113-120 (李自典，“中央农业实验所论述”，《历史档案》，2006.4，
113-120页). 
245 Shen, Liying, Annual Report of the National Agricultural Bureau, 1940 
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Zonghan, the outstanding agricultural scientist and educator I discussed in chapter 2, was 
appointed as vice director of the Bureau and became the one actually taking overall 
charge of agricultural science in wartime China. Shen recalled that this appointment was 
the second shifting point in his career.246 He had to give up his own research and devoted 
himself to political and administrative affairs. Because of the retreat and reforms of 
academic institutes, many famous and productive agricultural scientists took positions in 
various non-research oriented organizations. For example, Feng Zefang, director of the 
Agricultural School at the National Central University, served as a part-time scientist at 
the National Agricultural Bureau. Shen Liying, wheat breeding scientist and Shen 
Zonghan’s wife, served at the Bureau and a Guizhou provincial extension program at the 
same time. 
        The universities from coastal provinces also retreated and reorganized, and this 
process illustrated the ongoing tension between the central and provincial governments 
and how university scholars managed to fulfill the desire of serving China through 
science and knowledge. The Nationalist central government was more willing to support 
universities and institutes from Nanjing and Southeast China (the base area of its 
government), especially the National Central University. Although it continued 
supporting universities from North China, funding for these universities was reduced. For 
example, Tsinghua, Peking, and Nankai Universities’ annual appropriations from the 
central government were reduced to 75% of that before the war. In addition, national 
universities from the North were usually required to unify temporarily for the wartime 
                                                 
246 Shen, Zonghan, ZhongNian ZiShu (Memoir of My Middle Age), pp.196-198. 
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urgency. Tsinghua, Peking, and Nankai Universities formed the National Southwest 
Associated University. When the central government allocated extra money to 
universities, the Associated University only counted as one unit even though it was 
composed of three universities, while the National Central University from Nanjing 
maintained its independence and counted as one unit as well. The actual result was that 
Tsinghua, PKU, and Nankai would receive less support from the Nationalist central 
government compared with their rivals from the base area of the Nationalist government.  
        On the other hand, some provincial governments were very passionate in inviting 
these northern universities to relocate to their area. Before the war, the Hunan provincial 
government started cooperating with Tsinghua in agricultural experiments and education 
and assigned lands and infrastructure to Tsinghua in 1935. When the Tsinghua University 
and its neighbors from the North planned to move to the southwest, they received 
enthusiastic invitations from both the Yunnan and Guangxi provincial presidents. The 
university leaders finally decided to move to Yunnan because it seemed farther from the 
battlefront and safer at that time, but the Guangxi government was so zealous that the 
universities had to send several very famous professors there to express their denial 
gracefully.247 All these provinces were still influenced by political and military forces 
that disagreed with the Nationalist government. They were all underdeveloped before the 
war and their governors believed that the top universities from North China could help 
them to develop both education and economics. Universities and scholars from North 
                                                 
247 See Liu Yun, GuFan YuanYing: Chen Daisun’s 1900-1952, p.181. 
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China found a balance between these political forces and got the chance to survive and 
thrive in the chaotic environment. 
        In this chapter, I will explore cases from the National Central University (NCU) and 
the Tsinghua IOA and argue that the war brought opportunities as well as challenges. 
Agricultural scientists at these two institutes worked within similar Chinese-foreign 
tensions, but they held opposite status within the central-local tension. NCU, centrally 
located in Nanjing before the war, could count on Nationalist government support; 
whereas Tsinghua, from the North, was more peripheral and less well-favored.  I will 
focus on the works of four second-generation scientists: Feng Zefang and Jin Shanbao at 
NCU; and Tang Peisong and Liu Chongle at Tsinghua IOA. All these scientists had 
expressed motivations of love for China and the desire of serving the country through 
science. They all made valuable scientific contributions despite the migration forced by 
the war. However, their strategies were quite different due to their different 
circumstances.  
 
4.1 Opportunities for Agricultural Science Brought by the War: Agricultural 
School at the National Central University in Chongqing, the Wartime Capital 
        Just as the Nationalist central government’s prestige increased in the run-up to war, 
the National Central University became more and more appealing for patriotic Chinese 
intellectuals and young students because of its central status. And this university deserved 
respect, in both material and non-material conditions and academic performance. Because 
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of Luo Jialun’s in-time actions for the retreat, NCU was able to borrow troopships to 
move its research and education materials to the Southwest. Faculty and staff at the 
agricultural school even paid their own funds to hire commercial ships and moved all the 
research livestock to Chongqing (which took almost one year), because they did not want 
to leave anything to the enemy.248 As a result, NCU’s loss was much smaller than other 
leading national and private universities. Because of its location, NCU had close 
connections with the Nationalist Central government. Its education and research usually 
appeared more practically oriented toward protecting and constructing the country. 
Although the National central government’s control over NCU was much stronger than 
over other academic institutes, under the most critical tension between China and the 
foreign, scholars’ autonomy seemed less important than the survival and development of 
China. Therefore NCU kept appealing to patriotic young scholars and students with 
strong love for their country. Among the best national universities, the “Big Four 
National Universities (国立四大名校)”249 during the war, the number of NCU’s 
applicants was even larger than the total of the other three.  
        During the eight years in Chongqing, the NCU Agricultural School had been 
directed by two American-trained scientists: cotton scientist Feng Zefang (冯泽芳, 
serving as director from 1938 to 1943), and wheat scientist Jin Shanbao (金善宝, serving 
                                                 
248 Liu Yun, GuFan YuanYing: Chen Daisun’s 1900-1952, pp. 182-183. 
249 The Big Four National Universities: the National Central University in Chongqing, the 
National Wuhan University in Leshan, the National Zhejiang University in Zunyi (Guizhou 
province) and Yishan (Guangxi province), and the National Southwestern Associated University 
(Lianda) in Kunming. They were called as the Big Five before and after the war, when Peking 
University and Tsinghua were independent from each other.  
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as director of the School from 1943 to 1948). Feng and Jin were representatives of the 
second-generation American-trained Chinese scientists. They both received college 
education at the Southeastern University in the early 1920s under Zou Bingwen’s 
mentoring. They both had served in agricultural extension programs sponsored by the 
Zhejiang provincial government.250 They both traveled to study at the agricultural school 
of Cornell University in 1930 through networks built by the first-generation scholars 
(with recommendations from Zou Bingwen and Shen Zonghan251). They both served at 
the National Central University after returning to China, and chose to work on wheat and 
cotton, the most important crops for Chinese people’s food and clothing. They both made 
remarkable contributions in crop breeding science. In addition, despite the frustrations of 
wartime conditions and the forced migration, they both made breakthroughs in their 
research fields stimulated by opportunities brought by the movement to new areas of the 
country. 
        Jin Shanbao (金善宝, 1895-1997) took professional education at the Nanjing Higher 
Normal School between 1917 and 1920. In 1920, Rong Zongjing (荣宗敬), the most 
well-known flour merchant in Shanghai, sponsored the Nanjing Higher Normal School to 
establish an experiment farm in Nanjing for wheat research. Jin Shanbao became a 
technician of this farm and worked there for six years (this farm was later reformed into 
the Dashengguan Experimental Farm of the National Central University). In 1927, he 
                                                 
250 I have introduced this program in Chapter 2; see the part of Shen Zonghan. 
251 See correspondence between Shen Zonghan and Harry H. Love in July and October 1930, the 
Harry H. Love Papers, Box 14, Folder 35, Kroch Library, Division of Rare & Manuscript 
Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
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received a bachelor’s degree through continuing education from the Southeastern 
University.  
          Jin Shanbao had a strong desire to improve his country through agricultural studies 
almost all through his life, but his attitude towards science (especially the scientific 
knowledge from western countries) changed significantly as his career developed. During 
the years at the Nanjing Higher Normal School/Southeastern University (1917-1927), Jin 
was studying and working under Zou Bingwen and other American-trained scientists. 
Although it seemed that he was far away from direct American training, his knowledge 
and skills were deeply influenced by American agricultural sciences through these 
teachers. When working at the experiment farm, Jin’s wheat research had a strong 
preference for local needs and situations, and he had a strong desire to improve Chinese 
wheat production by introducing improved varieties and methods from western 
countries.252 We will see that during Jin’s career, the local conditions greatly influenced 
his accomplishments. His most noticeable achievements at this stage included wheat 
breeding and surveys. He achieved and extended two high-yielding varieties (南京赤壳
and 武进无芒) suitable for the natural situation near Nanjing. These wheat varieties 
increased wheat production by as much as 20%.253 In addition, from 1925 to 1927, Jin 
investigated over 900 wheat strains from 790 counties in 26 provinces and published an 
                                                 
252 Wang Lianzheng, Preface for the Selected Works of Jin Shanbao, page 2.  
253 See Mo Dingsen and Zhou Fengming, “Reports on the Properties of Nanjing Chike and Wujin 
Wumang wheat,” Reports of Crop Research at the Agricultural School of the National Central 
University, Vol. 1, June 1929 (莫定森，周凤鸣，《南京赤壳及武进无芒麦粒物理性态研究
报告》); and Jin Shanbao, “Summary of the Recent Situations of Crop Breeding and Cultivation 
in China,” January 1936, in Selected Works of Jin Shanbao, p. 79. (金善宝，“中国近年来作物
育种和作物栽培的进步概况”) 
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article “Preliminary Studies of the Classification of Chinese Wheat Varieties” (“中国小
麦分类之初步”)254 in July 1926. This article modeled the American scientist Jacob 
Allen Clark’s Classification of American Wheat Varieties, and it was the first scientific 
work systematically exploring the properties, classification, and distribution of Chinese 
wheat. Limited by research conditions, Jin was not able to leave Nanjing. He collected 
wheat varieties from around the country by contacting local officials and received most 
of the samples by mail. However, his results were very reliable and correlated well with a 
later survey conducted by Japanese scholars in 1934-35. Jin’s 1926 article provided 
useful information for wheat research and cultivation in China during the 1930s.255  
        During the Nanjing Decade, both the Nationalist central government and provincial 
governments increased financial support for Chinese people studying abroad. Jin 
succeeded in acquiring governmental funds from Zhejiang province for studying in the 
U.S. in 1930. He studied plant physiology and genetics at Cornell University and 
University of Minnesota. During the years at Cornell, Jin Shanbao studied together with 
several other Chinese students including Feng Zefang (冯泽芳), Cheng Shifu (程世抚) 
Mao Baozhi (马保之), Lu Shougeng (卢守耕), and Guan Jiaji (管家骥), all of whom 
later became important agricultural scientists or scientific activists in China. They 
launched an agricultural club named “Society of Chinese Crops Improvement” (中华作
                                                 
254 Reports of Crop Research at the Agricultural School of the National Central University, Vol. 2, 
May 1929. (《国立中央大学农学院作物研究报告》，第二册，民国十八年五月再版) 
255 Jin Shanbao, “Thirty-year History of the Improvement of Wheat in China,” September 1943, 
in Selected Works of Jin Shanbao, Chinese Agricultural Press, 1994, pp. 110-111. (金善宝，“中
国近三十年小麦改进史”，《金善宝文选》，中国农业出版社，1994年，110-111页) 
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物改良学会, see figure), which later merged into the Agriculture Society of China (中华
农学会) and became a major part of this most authoritative agricultural civil society in 
Republican China. Jin was enthusiastic in learning more American agricultural 
knowledge and practice, rather than getting a degree. He recalled in his late years: “food 
is the first necessity of the people. Agriculture is the foundation for constructing the 
country. I would like to work for the ‘first necessity’ and the ‘foundation’… I was 
already 35 years old and could not afford spending my life on a degree thesis.”256 
        Another reason might explain Jin Shanbao’s giving up on completion of his graduate 
degree in the United States. Jin recalled many times in his later years: when studying at 
Cornell University, he felt deeply humiliated by some American students. Once at dinner, 
an American student embarrassed Jin by giving him some spoiled food and said: “there 
are so many Chinese people starving; you may bring the food for them so that they would 
not starve to die.” Jin was very upset, but he could only answer: “there are also hungry 
American people; please keep the food for poor people in Chicago Street.” After this 
unpleasant experience, Jin Shanbao decided to leave Cornell, partly because of these 
personal conflicts, but also because he wished to take action to improve China’s poverty 
as soon as possible.257 
        After returning to China in 1932, Jin became a professor at the National Central 
University, and worked there until 1948. Jin gradually realized that simply introducing 
                                                 
256 Li, Yan, preface of Jin ShanBao Yu ZhongGuo XianDai NongYe KeJi YanJiu (Jin Shanbao 
and Modern Chinese Agricultural Science and Technology), Beijing: Chinese Agricultural 
Science and Technology Press, May 2013. 
257 Jin, Shanbao, Selected Works of Jin Shanbao, Beijing: Chinese Agriculture Press, 1994. 
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western crop strains, techniques, and theories would not help China. When returning to 
NCU and the Dashengguan Experiment Farm, the farm he had worked at for six years, he 
found that wheat on over 16 acres of experimental plots had become infected with 
stinking smut. This wheat variety was an “elite breed” introduced by the Nanjing 
Nationalist government from America to relieve the 1932 famine in China. Noticing that 
the American relief wheat showed quality much better than local Chinese wheat, the 
Ministry of Agriculture commissioned agriculturalists at NCU to plant and domesticate 
this wheat variety. However, when selling the wheat, the American food company had 
treated all the grain with bacterial spores to prevent the Chinese government from 
domesticating the wheat (to protect its profits and its patent). It would not be a problem if 
just cooking the grains, but once the grains were planted, the spore would germinate 
along with the wheat seed and ruin the plants. Jin happened to see how the sick wheat 
germinated and grew, and he had to burn all of the plants. This unsuccessful experiment 
at NCU deeply stimulated Jin Shanbao. He became more determined that Chinese people 
must figure out ways on their own to improve Chinese agriculture.258  
        Jin continued referring to western knowledge, but in practice, he became more 
focused on local natural conditions and materials. This shift is reflected in his scientific 
writings. During his pre-war years at NCU, Jin’s most noticeable work was the book 
Practical Wheat Science (《实用小麦论》) published in 1934. This was the first 
Chinese book comprehensively exploring scientific knowledge about wheat in 
agriculture. Unlike his 1926 wheat classification article, which stressed his adopting 
                                                 
258 Ibid. 
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American methods, this 1934 book introduced advanced theories and methods in western 
countries, but with a strong emphasis of local preference:  
        “For evaluation and comparison, [I] use the wheat breeding methods from 
American Cornell University, but make proper changes according to local 
situations. … As for knowledge mentioned in this book, the parts of pure science 
are mostly referring to foreign publications, but those about practice are mostly 
from research discoveries in our country. For example, in introducing wheat 
classification, [I] borrow the wheat classification system of Pencival from England 
and Clark from America, but most of the wheat varieties are domestic from our 
country. All the foreign agricultural implements appearing in this book have been 
tested in China and have been proved to have good effect, so that they are suitable 
for the practical situation of our country.”259 
The Practical Wheat Science filled the gap in Chinese scientists’ studies of wheat. It 
covered topics such as the properties, classification, genetics, breeding, distribution260, 
cultivation, pathology, storage of wheat in China. This book was soon adopted by 
agricultural colleges and professional schools all over the country as a principal textbook, 
and it influenced younger Chinese wheat researchers all through the century. It is an 
example of the hybrid knowledge and practice created by western-trained Chinese 
scientists. Jin’s skillful hybridization of foreign theories and local realities in China was a 
chief reason for its success. 
                                                 
259 Jin Shanbao, Preface of the Practical Wheat Science, in the Selected Works of Jin Shanbao, p. 
308. 
260 The distribution part of this book was largely based on Jin Shanbao’s 1928 article. 
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        When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the entire National Central 
University moved from Nanjing to Chongqing, the wartime capital. This retreat to 
Chongqing brought difficulties for Jin Shanbao and his colleagues. Their earlier work 
was mostly based on conditions in Southeastern China, while the natural conditions in the 
southwestern provinces were quite different. They also needed to deal with the tough 
research and living conditions, like other scholars moving from the eastern provinces to 
the unoccupied western area. But this forced migration brought Jin Shanbao opportunities 
as well. For instance, he continued his research on wheat classification and distribution 
for decades, and published his conclusions in an article “Wheat Areas in China” in 1943. 
In this article, Jin analyzed 2834 wheat varieties from 28 provinces, and figured out three 
main wheat districts: the hard red spring wheat area, the hard winter and spring wheat 
area, and the soft red winter wheat area.261 This article established the foundation for the 
studies of wheat resources and distribution in China. The materials, methods, and 
theoretical analysis in this work were much more substantial and authoritative than his 
1926 article “Preliminary Studies of the Classification of Chinese Wheat Varieties.” In 
the 1920s, Jin managed to collect samples from around the country, but we can see that 
he included more representation of wheat varieties from the eastern provinces such as 
Zhili, Shandong, and Jiangsu. This result is largely because the relatively advanced 
scientific and educational level in these regions made Jin’s surveys easier. After his 1937 
forced migration, along with his assistant Cai Xu (蔡旭), he was able to conduct detailed 
                                                 
261 Jin Shanbao, “Wheat Areas in China,” in Selected Works of Jin Shanbao, pp. 101-102. 
 224 
 
investigations on wheat varieties in the southwestern provinces including Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, and Hunan.  
This shift was important for two reasons. For the country, these unoccupied 
regions were required to produce more food as soon as possible in order to support the 
large population fleeing from the eastern provinces. Therefore it was critical to figure out 
an accurate picture of the crop resources and potential in Southwest China. In addition, 
Jin pointed out that “in the southwestern provinces, the local landscapes, field 
environments, and farming systems are more complicated [than in the East and the 
North]; [therefore] the varieties and classification of wheat are more complicated. The 
Northern provinces have plain landscapes and simpler farming environments; the wheat 
varieties are not as complicated as in the South, and the range of cultivation for each 
variety is usually larger than the southern varieties.”262 Southwest China is a very 
mountainous region with a high degree of micro-climates and bio-diversity. The wheat 
varieties in this region were as diverse as the micro-climates, which had not been 
recognized before. Jin and his colleagues’ comprehensive exploration in the Southwest 
had increased scientists’ understanding of the global classification and distribution of 
wheat. Therefore they contributed to “pure” scientific knowledge by incorporating local 
Chinese conditions. 
                                                 
262 Jin Shanbao, “Thirty-year History of the Improvement of Wheat in China,” September 1943, 
in Selected Works of Jin Shanbao, p. 111. 
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        Another significant case deserving our notice was Zhongda 2419 (later renamed as 
Nanda 2419 after 1949263), one of the most outstanding wheat breeds in the history of 
Chinese agriculture. Since the early 1930s, Jin and his NCU colleagues had introduced 
over 3000 foreign wheat varieties for strain selection and breeding. Zhongda 2419 was a 
strain derived from the Italian Mentana and had exhibited fine properties such as a larger 
ear, more grains, early-maturing, and strong resistance to disease, pests, and falling down. 
During experiments near Nanjing, the yield of this strain was 250-500 kilograms per mu 
(1 mu =667 m2=0.16 acre), which was at least 30% more than local wheat strains. These 
promising experiments were abruptly interrupted by the war. Fleeing with seeds in his 
bags, Jin had to finish the later steps of his project near Chongqing and Chengdu in the 
west. This worried Jin because the growing conditions were so different. To his surprise, 
the variety Zhongda 2419 continued to be very productive and disease/pest/lodging-
resistant even in the new environment. In 1939, Jin Shanbao published an article 
introducing the virtues of this new wheat variety. Because of the unexpected interruption 
and migration during breeding research, this variety experienced tests in different natural 
environments and proved its exceptional adaptability. In 1941, the Zhongda 2419 was 
first extended into Sichuan province.264 Later it was introduced to over seventy million 
mu of lands along the Changjiang River. For over forty years it was the most primary and 
influential wheat strain in China. It had more than one hundred derivative strains, and this 
                                                 
263 “Zhongda (中大)” is the abbreviation of the “Central University,” and “Nanda” is an 
abbreviation of “Nanjing University.” After 1949, when the Communist Party defeated the KMT 
and unified China, the NCU lost its central status, and changed its name into Nanjing University. 
Therefore the crop strains named after the NCU had to changed their names as well. 
264 Jin Shanbao, “Thirty-year History of the Improvement of Wheat in China,” September 1943, 
in Selected Works of Jin Shanbao, pp. 116-117. 
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wheat family was later extended to all the seven chief wheat districts in China. Such 
outstanding performance has made Zhongda 2419 (Nanda 2419) a milestone in not only 
China, but also the history of wheat studies around the world. Jin Shanbao’s research 
brought real benefits to his countrymen (a higher-yielding wheat that would grow 
anywhere) and to the international scientific community (new information on wheat 
genetics and adaptation to unusual micro-climates). In this sense, it was the war and 
forced migration that facilitated the scientists’ research in new locations and under very 
different environmental conditions (although unwillingly at the beginning, probably) and 
to achieve such significant improvement. This case also suggested the “improvement” of 
the scientists themselves. During the process of seeking an approach to benefit Chinese 
people through science, Jin Shanbao had gradually become less dependent on foreign 
knowledge and more capable of expanding his research from the area around Nanjing to 
the entire country. He became more confident in his ability to improve China and 
contribute to global circulations of scientific information with the knowledge he had 
developed in the diverse and complicated natural and political conditions of Republican 
China.265 
        I would also like to emphasize that despite his age, Jin Shanbao was definitely a 
“second-generation” American-trained Chinese scientist. He received professional and 
undergraduate education at the Nanjing Higher Normal School/the Southeastern 
                                                 
265 Considering the fact that by 1937, the NCU had established experimental farms in so many 
provinces including Sichuan, Jin Shanbao would very likely send the selected wheat strains to 
diverse locations to test their qualities even without the war. But it was not likely that he could 
conduct the research at those locations himself. Therefore, it was the Sino-Japanese war and the 
forced retreat to the Southwest that facilitated Jin to develop his research from local to 
countrywide. 
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University, studied under the direction of first-generation American-trained scientists 
such as Zou Bingwen, traveled to the U.S. in the early 1930s for graduate education, 
entered well-established scientific institutions after returning to China, and devoted 
himself more to generating new scientific knowledge rather than founding new institutes. 
Compared with the working focuses of Jin Shanbao and Zou Bingwen (as I have 
described in chapter 1), we can see clearly the change in roles of American-trained 
scientists, which also reflected the development of agricultural science in China. The case 
of cotton scientist Feng Zefang (冯泽芳), Jin Shanbao’s schoolfellow at the Nanjing 
Higher Normal School and Cornell University, would exemplify this change as well.  
        Feng Zefang (1899-1959) studied at the Nanjing Higher Normal School from 1918 
to 1921. Then he worked as teacher and technician at several agricultural schools in 
Nanjing while taking continuing education at the Southeastern University. Feng received 
his bachelor’s degree in 1925. He served at some provincial agricultural farms and 
schools during the following four years, and published articles such as the “Properties 
and Classification of Chinese Cotton” (《中棉形态及其分类》, the first scientific work 
exploring Asian cotton strains in China) and “The Primary Report of Mendelian Genetics 
of Chinese Cotton” (《中棉之孟德尔性初次报告》). These researches were based on 
the knowledge Feng acquired from the American-trained scholars at the Nanjing Higher 
Normal School and the Southeastern University. In 1930, Feng Zefang traveled to the 
U.S. and studied genetics and cotton breeding at Cornell University. He received his 
doctoral degree in 1933.  
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        After returning to China, Feng served as a cotton expert at several governmental 
departments including the National Cotton Improvement Institute and the National 
Agricultural Research Bureau (the two institutes largely overlapped). Meanwhile, he 
taught at the agronomy department of NCU as a part-time professor. When President Luo 
Jialun reformed the NCU, most faculty members were required to serve solely full-time 
for this university. Feng, because of his outstanding academic and educational 
performance, was one of the few scholars able to keep job positions at other institutes and 
organizations. Due to this, and his connections to Cornell University, Feng succeeded his 
Cornell professor H. H. Love in taking charge of the countrywide experiment to test and 
screen 31 fine cotton breeds in over ten provinces in China. This project continued until 
1936. Feng and his colleagues identified two American cotton breeds showing high 
production and good quality in both north and south China.266  
        From 1936, Feng Zhaochuan started a series of surveys on the distribution of cotton 
producing areas in China. These surveys were sponsored and charged by the National 
Cotton Improvement Institute and the National Central University to investigate natural 
resources in West China in order to prepare for the coming war. In 1936, the political 
situation showed clearly that the war between China and Japan was inevitable. At that 
time, all the chief cotton producing and processing centers were in the coastal provinces, 
                                                 
266 Feng Zefang, “American Cotton Varieties Suitable for China,” Agricultural News, 1935, Vol. 
2, No. 27; “Another Report of the S. and D. Cotton Breeds,” Agricultural News 1936, Vol. 3, No. 
25; and “Research and Extension of the Stoneeville Cotton Breed,” Agricultural News, 1937, Vol. 
4, No. 17; in Feng Zefang Xian Sheng Tu Cun, pp. 51-54. (冯泽芳，“适于中国栽培之美棉新品
种”《农报》1935年第 2卷第 27期，“再论斯字棉与德字棉”《农报》1936年第 3卷第 25
期，“斯字棉之试验成绩与繁殖推广之现状”《农报》1937年第 4卷第 17期，《冯泽芳先
生图存》，51-54页) 
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which would doubtless become quickly engulfed in the fighting. The Nationalist 
government and its affiliated institutes (such as the Academia Sinica, the National 
Agricultural Research Bureau, and the National Central University) therefore were 
investigating the western provinces to make preparation for the coming war (as I have 
mentioned in chapter 3). As a chief scientist at the National Agricultural Bureau and 
professor of the National Central University, Feng led the cotton surveys in Western 
China and reported his discoveries in newspapers and academic conferences.267 After 
retreating to the Southwest in 1937, Feng continued his surveys and experimental 
research on cotton, based in Yunnan province.  During the war, his research focused 
mainly on two aspects: cotton producing areas in China, and “tree cotton” in Yunnan 
province. Studies in both areas shared similar goals: improving cotton production and 
building the cotton industry in the Southwest. 
        Because of the achievements of the previous “golden decade,” the Chinese cotton 
industry was almost able to be self-sufficient by 1936. However, the distribution of the 
cotton industry was very unequal around the country. According to Feng’s investigation, 
there were five big cotton producing areas in China: the Yellow River Area, the Yangtze 
River Area, the Early-Maturing Area, the Northwestern Inland Area, and the Southern 
Area. Feng argued that the growth of cotton varieties in different areas needed to be 
                                                 
267 Feng Zefang, “Distribution of Chinese Cotton Production and Its Relations with Climate and 
Geography,” presented at the 19th annual conference of the China Agriculture Society, 1936. (冯
泽芳，“中国棉产之分布及其与气候地理之关系”，1936年第十九届中华农学会年会论文提
要). Feng Zefang, “”Surveys of Cotton Producing Areas in Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan, and 
Expectations for the Future,” The Central Daily, March 6, 1936. (冯泽芳，“甘川滇三省棉区之
考察及其将来之希望”，《中央日报》，1936年 3月 6日) 
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keyed to different natural conditions such as temperature, precipitation, sunshine, frost-
free season, altitude, and soil. Therefore, cotton breeding and extension should be 
conducted within the proper area, or the production would decrease.268 Feng’s theory of 
the five cotton producing areas in China has been accepted by later cotton scientists and 
became a framework for cotton studies in China through today. 
        On the other hand, however, over 90% of the cotton industry was located in coastal 
provinces, especially the areas around Shanghai and Tianjin. As a result, after 1938, 
almost all the cotton mills fell in the Japanese-occupied area, and by 1939, cotton textile 
production in the Southwestern unoccupied area could hardly reach 5% of the annual 
production before the war. In 1940, Feng published an article “Rational Distribution of 
the Cotton Industry in China” (“我国棉工业区的合理分布”). In this work, Feng 
explored the problems of pre-war distribution of the cotton industry and pointed out that 
the cotton textile mills were too far away from the cotton producing area, which 
increased transportation costs greatly even during peaceful eras. Noticing the fact that 
most prewar cotton industry was controlled by foreign capital, especially Japanese 
capital, Feng believed that the unsound distribution of the cotton industry was a result of 
Japanese economic invasion rather than the spontaneous development of the Chinese 
cotton industry and production.269 
                                                 
268 Feng, Zefang, “Distribution of Chinese Cotton Production and Its Relations with Climate and 
Geography,” presented at the 19th annual conference of the China Agriculture Society, 1936.  
269 Feng, Zefang, and Harry H. Love, ZhongGuo De MianHua, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 
1935. 
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        Since his 1936 surveys, Feng Zefang noticed that in Yunnan province Mumian 
(wood cotton, 木棉) was a very vague term used to refer to a variety of plants. In other 
places in China, this term usually means “tree cotton” or kapok, a high arbor with 
beautiful red or orange flowers. However, through his field investigation and research, 
Feng realized that in most regions of Yunnan, mumian actually referred to two varieties 
of Island cotton and Egyptian cotton introduced by American and British missionaries 
since the late nineteenth century (Bombaceae, Gossampinu s. malabarica and Gossypinu 
barbadense L.). Chinese and Egyptian cottons were usually annual plants in other parts of 
China. However, Yunnan province, because of its latitude and altitude, had a warm and 
wet climate and it seldom snowed. Therefore Mumian in Yunnan became perennial and it 
would have high production if planted properly. Feng’s discovery of cottons in Yunnan 
was first published in January 1937 in MianYe YueKan.  In this report, Feng elucidated 
that the fiber of Mumian in Yunnan might be comparable with the fibers of Egyptian 
cotton and could be widely utilized in the cotton industry. He suggested that plantings of 
these two types of Mumian could be expanded in southern parts of Yunnan in order to 
support the cotton and textile industry.270 Such a detailed investigation, in such a remote 
area, was impossible without the pressure from the upcoming war. Feng’s (re)-discovery 
of Mumian in Yunnan revealed a uniquely adapted plant that had developed new growth 
patterns in response to the environment. Recognizing and propagating it, Feng not only 
helped Chinese wartime cotton production but also described new adaptations on the part 
                                                 
270 Feng, Zefang, MianYe YueKan , Volume 1, No. 2, 1937. (冯泽芳，“云南植棉考察报告附陈
改进意见”，《棉业月刊》1937年第一卷第 2期) 
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of the plant. In this sense, the war brought not only difficulties and frustrations, but also 
opportunities for the development of Chinese agricultural sciences. 
        After retreating to Chongqing, Feng Zefang continued travelling in western 
provinces and investigated cotton varieties in unoccupied China. During governmental 
reorganization in 1938, the National Cotton Improvement Institute merged into the 
National Agricultural Research Bureau. Feng became principal cotton scientist at the 
Bureau. Meanwhile he was promoted as director of the Agricultural School at the 
National Central University. Feng established a cotton experimental station at Poxi (婆兮
), Yunnan, to conduct genetic and cytological research of Chinese cottons and to breed 
cotton varieties for extension.271 He also traveled to Northern provinces and traveled in 
areas along the railway from Luoyang (Henan province) to Lanzhou (Gansu province) for 
surveys of cotton distribution. In May 1940, Feng Zefang published his article “MianHua 
QuYu ShiYan Zhi ChengJi Ji ZhongGuo SanGe MianHua ShiYing QuYu (Report of 
Regional Experiments of Cottons and Three Cotton Planting Areas in China),” which was 
the first scientific survey of cotton distribution to include all of China.272 
        Similar to senior American-trained agricultural scientists such as Shen Zonghan and 
Zhao Lianfang, Feng Zefang gradually realized that non-scientific factors usually played 
more important roles for increasing agricultural production and elevating Chinese 
people’s standard of living, and that simply conducting agricultural science was not 
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enough to serve and improve China. In a 1940 news report, Feng proposed that the 
bottleneck for availability of Chinese clothing was not cotton production in agriculture, 
but the industrial ability to store, transport, and process cotton. He pointed out that to 
resolve the shortage of textile products, “[improving the] textile industry was more urgent 
than planting cotton; storing and transporting was more urgent than producing (cotton) (
纺织急于种棉，储运急于生产).”273 The chief cotton productive regions were mainly 
inland, but almost all textile factories were in coastal provinces where electricity was 
reliable and social environmental was more amiable. Transportation services between the 
cotton productive regions and the coastal regions were extremely undeveloped. 
Therefore, the shortage of raw materials in the textile industry was mainly caused by the 
skewed distribution of industry and agriculture as well as disadvantages of transportation, 
which formed the most critical bottleneck for improving textile production. Improving 
cotton production through advanced science and technology was important, but not most 
urgent at that time. 
        The quality cotton varieties developed by Feng and his colleagues had been 
extended in most counties of Yunnan province and over 850 thousand mu (567 km2) in 
Shaanxi province, which could increase cotton production by up to 40.98%.274 However, 
although historians have noticed and explored how Feng’s cotton varieties was extended, 
I have not yet found any detailed historical works about how these cottons had finally 
                                                 
273 Feng, Zefang, “Current Problems of Clothing Materials,” SaoDangBao, November 29, 1940. 
(“现阶段的衣料问题”，《扫荡报》，1940年 11月 29日) 
274 Zeng, Yushan, Feng ZeFang Yu ZhongGuo XianDai MianYe GaiJin YanJiu (Feng Zefang and 
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influenced industrial production and Chinese people’s living. Since Feng Zefang publicly 
expressed his understanding about the importance of non-scientific factors in textile 
production, there might be some efforts from the government and academia about how to 
resolve the urgent problems Feng proposed. It may be an interesting and significant 
research topic for my future studies. 
        Through the cases of Jin Shanbao and Feng Zefang, we can see two facts about the 
NCU agricultural scientists. First, challenges and opportunities came along with the war. 
Scientists’ works were inevitably disturbed by displacement. However, forced migration 
could also have positive effects on agricultural scientists’ studies and allowed them to 
achieve results which were impossible without the displacement. Second, NCU scholars’ 
academic works were very practical and closely connected with urgent necessities of the 
country and state. Many of their research projects were directly assigned by the central 
government. This fact was largely because of its central status. The state, or the 
Nationalist central government, provided much more supports for NCU scholars than for 
intellectuals at institutes in the periphery. Meanwhile, its control over these scholars was 
much stricter. Agricultural scientists at NCU usually needed to partly give up their 
academic autonomy to work on what the state expected them to work on. This was not a 
big problem for these scientists. Under the wartime condition, it was easier than usual for 
patriotic intellectuals to give up private interests to the country’s benefit. Moreover, the 
Nationalist government’s control over the remaining part of China got strengthened 
because of pressure from outside, and it became a more effective agent to serve the 
country. 
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        Unlike those at NCU, scientists in the political periphery might have greater 
freedom in choosing their research topics. For example, scientists at the Institute of 
Agriculture at Tsinghua University held strong patriotic feeling for China as well, but 
they were far away from the state government. It is interesting to explore their strategies 
of balancing pure and practical research and serving the country at the same time.  
 
4.2 Agricultural Science in the Periphery: Tsinghua IOA in Kunming, 
Yunnan 
        When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937, it seemed that the 
Institute of Agriculture in Tsinghua University in Beiping faced an unfortunate fate to be 
terminated. The Japanese Army quickly occupied the campuses of several leading 
universities in North China, such as the Peking University and Tsinghua University in 
Beiping, as well as Nankai University in Tianjin. On August 28, 1937, the Ministry of 
Education instructed the three presidents—Mei Yiqi of Tsinghua, Jiang Menglin of 
Peking University, and Zhang Boling of Nankai University—to arrange a retreat to 
Changsha, Hunan province, in order to unite together and to continue education and 
research in exile during the war. On September 10, the Ministry of Education’s No. 
16696 Instruction joined the three universities and established the National Changsha 
Temporary University. The university officially opened on November 1, 1937. However, 
the war went much worse than Chinese people’s expectations. Shanghai and Nanjing fell 
into the hands of the Japanese army in November and December. Wuhan and Changsha 
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in Central China quickly became the front. From February to April 1938, the Changsha 
Temporary University had to move once again to Kuming and was renamed as the 
National Southwest Associated University (国立西南联合大学，abbreviated as 
Lianda).275 (See Figure 16, the map of Tsinghua’s movements.) 
        Tsinghua IOA was not totally unready for the retreat. Already when Japan plotted to 
create a separate puppet regime in North China in autumn 1935, the Tsinghua University 
had realized the danger and started to purchase land and buildings in Changsha to prepare 
for the retreat. In summer 1936, the Tsinghua IOA started a cooperative program with the 
Hunan Provincial Advanced Agricultural Professional School in Changsha in order to 
transfer its research focus to Central China.276  Nevertheless, no one had expected that the 
war would come so rapidly or that the Chinese army would be overpowered. Tsinghua 
IOA had to leave Beiping so hastily that they could neither harvest their plants nor rescue 
their research materials. Although a German company later helped the scientists move 
some equipment to Kunming, they had lost all the books and journals, research data, 
specimens, and seeds. On January 19, 1938, the Tsinghua university committee felt that it 
had no choice but to eliminate the Tsinghua IOA and to amalgamate it with the 
department of biology in Lianda.277  
        After arriving in Kunming, the southwest provincial capital city, the situation 
changed. Tsinghua University was willing to restore and expand the IOA for the sake of 
both the country and the university itself. According to Tang Peisong’s memoirs, all the 
                                                 
275 See John Israel, Lianda: A Chinese University in War and Revolution, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998. 
276 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2:1-201.  
277 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-40, p. 2. 
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three universities—Tsinghua, Peking University, and Nankai—believed that the 
association of Lianda was merely an expedient measure and that they would definitely 
separate after the war. Therefore, all three were willing to conserve forces for postwar 
development.278 After Shanghai, where the main office of China Foundation was located, 
fell into the hands of Japan, Tsinghua could not get its monthly funds any more. The 
central government’s fund for Lianda was 75% of the total of the three universities’ 
prewar funds, which, considering skyrocketing prices during the war, was clearly not 
enough for further development. Therefore, Tsinghua decided to request a loan from 
banks with its temporarily unavailable China Foundation fund as guarantee. The loan 
allowed Tsinghua to establish and expand several research institutes independent from 
Lianda. In June 1938, the Institute of Agriculture was restored and expanded in 
Kunming. Meanwhile, Tsinghua established the Institute of Radio Science, the Institute 
of Metallurgy, the Institute of Aeronautics, and the Institute of National Condition 
Survey. Ye Qisun (叶企孙) was appointed as chairman of these special institutes.279  
        The two prewar divisions got the opportunity to recruit new researchers with 
American postgraduate training backgrounds. Yu Dafu (俞大绂) and Lu Jinren (陆近仁) 
joined the divisions of pathology and entomology as associate professors respectively in 
July and October 1938. In addition, the Tsinghua IOA established a new division, 
Laboratory of Physiology, which later became the most active one. The new division was 
                                                 
278 Tang Peisong, “Wei Jie Zhao Xia Gu Xi Yang,” in Memoirs of Prominent Academicians, 
edited by Han Cunzhi, Shanghai: Shanghai Science Technology and Education Press, volume 1, 
2003,  p. 76. (汤佩松，“为接朝霞顾夕阳”，《资深院士回忆录》，韩存志主编，上海：上
海科技教育出版社，第一卷，2003年，第 76页) 
279 Historical Materials of Tsinghua University, volume 3, 1990, pp. 116-118. 
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chaired by Tang Peisong (汤佩松), whom I will introduce in the next paragraph. Yin 
Hongzhang, who had already been engaged with the department of biology in Lianda, 
also started to work at Tang Peisong’s group as an honorary fellow. Zhang Xincheng, 
Tang Peisong’s student and colleague at Wuhan University, joined the physiology group 
as an associate professor in May 1939. In summer 1939, Lou Chenghou (娄成后, 1911-
2009), Tang Peisong’s Tsinghua junior and University of Minnesota alumnus, returned 
from Minnesota after receiving his Ph.D. degree and joined Tang’s group with latest 
instruments for electrophysiology purchased from the United States. Therefore, Tang 
Peisong’s group became the best equipped plant physiology laboratory in southwest 
China.280 
        Tang Peisong (1903-2001) was born into a revolutionist family. His father Tang 
Hualong (汤化龙, 1874-1918) was a jurist, journalist, and politician and had taken 
important positions in the republican government, such as congress chairman and 
minister of education. Because of his political dissent, Tang Hualong was murdered by 
the KMT (the Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1918. Possibly due to the suffering of his 
father, Tang Peisong never had any positive opinion of the KMT government, even 
though he had been a passionate patriot all through his life.281 
        Tang Peisong took secondary education at Tsinghua College from 1917 to 1925. He 
described the Tsinghua fund in his memoirs with strong emotion: 
                                                 
280 Tang Peisong, p. 83. 
281 Tang Peisong, Wei Jie Zhao Xia Gu Xi Yang, p. 1 and p. 40.  
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        “The Tsinghua fund was from the returned part of the Boxer Indemnity. 
This indemnity was extorted by an Eight-Nation Alliance whose troops traveled 
overseas to invade and plunder our country land and to insult the Qing 
government. My schoolmates and I were educated with the four hundred and 
fifty million taels of fine silver from four hundred and fifty million Chinese 
people (over ninety percent of whom were poor people); that is, each Chinese 
person donated one tael of blood to cultivate us. I still feel profoundly guilty and 
grateful up to the present… I encouraged myself with the country’s humiliation 
and swore to study hard in order to reciprocate favours bestowed by the 
country.”282 
This quotation suggests one component of “love of China” for both the first and the 
second-generation American-trained Chinese scientists: they felt guilt and a passion 
to help China become strong and important in international science, because they 
owed their education to their countrymen. In addition, this strong feeling was not a 
love for the political state, but love for the social and cultural countrymen. All the 
three leading scientists in Tsinghua IOA including Tang Peisong were alumni of 
Tsinghua College, and the younger Tsinghua IOA researchers who later studied in the 
United States were all sponsored by the Boxer scholarship. As Tang articulated, this 
sponsorship had stimulated them to respond to the reality that their country was still 
in dire suffering and the best way for them to save the country and to repay their debt 
was their knowledge and its application. 
                                                 
282 Tang Peisong, pp. 1-2. 
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        Under the suggestion of Tu Zhi (涂治), his friend at Tsinghua, Tang Peisong came 
to the agricultural school in University of Minnesota in 1925.283 But he quickly 
transferred to the school of liberal arts because of a strong interest in pure research to 
explore the foundations of biology. He studied botany under William Cooper. During this 
period, Tang Peisong was exposed to the general physiology of Jacques Loeb and this 
raised his strong interest in exploring the fundamental nature of living creatures with 
physical and chemical principles. In summer 1927, Tang Peisong received his B.A. 
degree and won the first prize. He then was admitted by the plant physiology laboratory 
of Burton E. Livingston in the Johns Hopkins University and was deeply impressed by its 
graduate school. Ten years later, after becoming a professor in Tsinghua, he modeled his 
own research group after JHU’s advanced education. Tang Peisong received his Ph.D. 
degree in the summer of 1930. Then he spent the summers in 1930 and 1931 working as a 
research assistant at Woods Hole Marine Biological Laboratory, where he published two 
articles about the respiration intensity of sea urchins and asters, and tested the level of 
phosphagen in the lobster’s nerve conduction. During these summers, Tang Peisong got a 
chance to participate in the lectures and discussions of Otto H. Warburg, Leonor 
Michaelis, Frank and Ralph Lillie, Archibald Vivian Hill, and Otto Meyerhof. Influenced 
                                                 
283 Along with Tang Peisong, there were at least three other Chinese students at the UMN 
agricultural school—Tu Zhi, Zhang Kewei (张克威), and Sun Qingbo (孙清波). All of them 
returned to China and became leaders in the agricultural sciences. Zhang Kewei (1901-1974) was 
an animal husbandry scientist. He was the founder and first president of the Shenyang 
Agricultural College. Sun Qingbo had chaired the department of agricultural mechanics in the 
National Central University (Nanjing University) after 1948. 
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by these scientists, Tang Peisong decided to choose thermodynamics of plant respiration 
and photosynthesis as his lifelong career.284  
        From September 1930 to August 1933, Tang Peisong worked as a fellowship 
researcher and instructor at William John Crozier’s laboratory of general physiology at 
Harvard University. However, Tang Peisong’s understanding of in situ activation energy 
was quite different from the hypothesis of Crozier and they two did not get along with 
each other very well (later scientific discoveries have demonstrated that Tang was 
right).285 Tang Peisong started to contact universities in China for a faculty position. In 
spring 1933, he received an invitation from the National Wuhan University with an offer 
of $2,000 to launch a laboratory.286  
        When considering the Tsinghua IOA scientists’ returning to China after their 
training in the United States, we should remember that their affection for the country was 
not directly applicable to specific governments. For these scientists maturing in the early 
twentieth century, the country had been torn by warlordism for decades and the 
Nationalist central government was not necessarily representative of China for them. 
Most of these scientists were merely indifferent in politics, while a few of them were 
radical democrats and some were socialists. However, because of a sense of belonging, 
their self-identities as Chinese people were quite similar, and this encouraged them to 
return to build a stronger China. Tang Peisong explained this in his memoir:  
                                                 
284 Tang Peisong, pp. 30-32. 
285 Tang Peisong, chapter 5. 
286 This opportunity was arranged by Ren Hongjun (任鸿隽), Tang Hualong’s close friend and 
one of the founders of the Science Society of China. Tang Peisong, chapter 6. 
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        “The fund from [Robert] Marshall287 may guarantee my career and life 
in the U.S. Then why did I insist on giving up this fund and returning to 
chaotic China—China under the government of a party murdering my father 
in 1918? … Now I have got the answer: although my life in the U.S. has 
been very comfortable, there has always been a sense reminding me that I 
don’t belong here.”288 
Tang returned to China because he loved the country, but not the nation governed 
by the KMT party (the so-called Chinese Nationalist Party). It was the sense of 
“belonging to China” as a cultural and social entity—not a political one—that 
motivated Chinese scientists such as Tang to study in the U.S. and to return China 
to apply their knowledge to the social problems of their homeland. They wanted to 
use the advanced knowledge in science and engineering they had learned abroad to 
improve and rebuild their country despite the turbulent political situation. 
       Tang Peisong went back to China, where he started working at the National Wuhan 
University in fall 1933. He was the first scientist to teach and research general physiology 
in Chinese universities. From 1933 to 1937, he organized other physiologists to compile 
textbooks and to teach physiology courses in Chinese, established a laboratory of cellular 
physiology and general physiology, and invited several other western-trained scientists to 
join his research, including Lin Chunyou (林春猷), Gao Shangmeng (高尚萌), Wu 
                                                 
287 Robert Marshall was Tang Peisong’s labmate and close friend in the Johns Hopkins University. 
When hearing that Tang Peisong was planning to go back to China, Marshall strongly suggested 
Tang to stay in the U.S. and promised to set up a fund in a university in New York City to support 
the career and life of Tang and his family. Tang Peisong declined this generous offer and went 
back to China in August 1933.  
288 Tang Peisong, pp. 40-41.  
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Maoyi (吴懋仪), Yin Hongzhang (殷宏章), Zhang Xincheng (张信诚), and Shen Qiyi (
沈其益). From 1936 to 1938, Tang Peisong, Lin Chunyou, and Wu Maoyi published 
seven articles on the thermodynamics of cellular respiration in Journal of Cellular and 
Comparative Physiology. This group was at a very promising stage when the July 7 
Incident289 broke out. This incident refers to the battle between Japanese and Chinese 
armies near Peiping on July 7th, 1937. It marks Japanese troops’ comprehensive invasion 
of China and the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The war completely disrupted 
the physiology group, forcing them to move and adapt to new circumstances. 
        By the end of 1937, Tang Peisong was faced with three choices—he could stay with 
Wuhan University, which would retreat to Leshan (乐山) in Sichuan Province; he could 
obey the Ministry of Education, which had instructed him along with several medical 
scientists from Peiping and Nanjing to establish a medical college in Guiyang, Guizhou 
province; or he could accept the offer of Mei Yiqi, the Tsinghua president, who sent him 
a letter inviting him to join the Tsinghua IOA to organize a plant physiology research 
group. Tang Peisong was most interested in plant physiology and its economic 
applications, so his preference was to join Tsinghua IOA in Yunnan province. However, 
he also felt obligated to help the medical scientists. As a result, he first spent half a year 
establishing the Guiyang Medical College (March to August 1938), and then traveled to 
Kunming to start his research at Tsinghua IOA in August 1938.290   
                                                 
 
290 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-40. 
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        While Dai Fanglan’s patriotic activities were located mainly in universities and 
academic circles, Tang Peisong’s love for China and desire to serve his country seemed 
to be much more radical and showed in many ways. When the July 7 Incident broke out, 
Tang Peisong was extremely lost at the beginning and wondered what he could do for the 
nation. He quickly took two actions—first, recording BBC’s reports about the Anti-
Japanese War and spreading this international perspective with leaflets among faculty 
and students at the National Wuhan University; and, he applied to join the Nationalist 
government’s army to fight against the Japanese. The first action lasted for about one 
month and was very popular. Obviously, Tang could not have done this without his 
western experience and language skills. However, Wang Xinggong (王星拱), president 
of the Wuhan University, told him that some secret service members in the KMT 
government were investigating and punishing any activity that spread news different 
from official reports of the KMT central government. So Tang Peisong had to give up his 
leaflets. As for joining the army, only one military official treated Tang Peisong’s 
application seriously: General Hu Zongnan (胡宗南) invited Tang Peisong to join his 
troops in Shaanxi (Northwest China) to suppress CCP in Yan’an, which was 
unacceptable for Tang Peisong. Disappointed by the KMT government and army, Tang 
Peisong reassessed the situation and realized that the best and only reasonable way for 
him to serve his country during this crisis was scientific research and its applications to 
increase agricultural and industrial production.291 
                                                 
291 Tang Peisong, pp. 60-65. 
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        Tang’s life is an excellent example of how “love for China” and being a scientist 
created this dual-identity. At Tsinghua IOA, even the younger passionate patriots found 
that practicing science was the best way to serve their country. It is understandable that in 
the chaotic atmosphere of wartime China, researchers at the Tsinghua IOA presented 
their identity of being Chinese in many aspects other than science. Some patriotic 
activities involved political issues. However, usually these scientists would return to 
scientific studies. One example is Zhou Jiachi’s travels to Northwest China. Zhou Jiachi 
(1911-1998) took his college education at the School of Agriculture in Jinda from 1928 to 
1932. He first entered the department of agronomy but then transferred to pathology in 
order to study under Dai Fanglan. He was highly devoted in scientific studies but also 
enthusiastic in patriotic activities. After the September 18 Incident292, Zhou Jiachi 
participated in a series of public activities to appeal to the Nationalist government to 
resist Japanese invasion and to encourage Chinese compatriots in anti-Japanese activities. 
He even missed some courses and experiments required for his education—fortunately 
professor Dai Fanglan never blamed him for the absence but helped him to catch up and 
finish the B.S. thesis.293 After working as a research assistant in Lingnan University for 
one year, Zhou Jiachi joined the Tsinghua IOA at Dai Fanglan’s invitation. He had 
substantial achievements in plant pathology research and published four articles during 
the three years in Peiping.294 However, Zhou Jiachi had felt extremely depressed after the 
July 7 Incident. When hearing the Tsinghua university committee’s decision to suspend 
                                                 
292 The Japanese troops occupied Northeast China after September 18, 1931. 
293 Cheng Guangsheng, p. 27. 
294 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-88, pp. 10-21, Dai Fanglan’s report on the Division 
of Plant Pathology.  
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the IOA in January 1938, he decided almost at once to leave the university and travel to 
Northwest China in order to do something for the country more directly.295 From January 
to June 1938, Zhou Jiachi traveled to Yanan and received training at Shanbei Public 
School, a political school training revolutionaries for the CCP. However, when Dai 
Fanglan asked him to return the Tsinghua IOA in June 1938, he returned to his 
mycological and plant pathological studies at once. In Yan’an and returning to Tsinghua 
IOA, Zhou Jiachi was realizing his wish to contribute to the country in practice, by using 
his scientific knowledge and skills. 296 
        Now looking back to Tsinghua IOA in 1939, although it had three groups, its 
formation and operation became a problem again. Again, both Dai Fanglan and Liu 
Chongle were totally indifferent to being head of this institute. Tang Peisong was very 
interested in this managerial job, but as a newcomer and the youngest professor, it was 
inappropriate for him to take this position. Therefore the Tsinghua IOA stayed in three 
independent groups without an institute head.  
        Through early 1939, the Tsinghua IOA stayed together with Lianda at some 
temporary campus buildings in Kunming. However, after September 1939, the Japanese 
air force started to bomb Kunming. Air attacks became more and more frequent once 
Japanese troops occupied Hanoi, Vietnam in 1940. Many temporary classrooms and 
laboratories were ruined in the air attacks. The city was not a safe place any more. The 
                                                 
295 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-40. 
296 Qiu Weifan, “Professor Dai Fanglan,” in Yi En Shi (Recollection on Our Mentors), edited by 
Wu Ruzhuo, Wang Buzheng, and Xu Zenghua, Beijing: Chine’s Agricultural University Press, 
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Tsinghua university committee decided to rent lands in rural areas near Kunming and 
move the special institutes out of town to avoid air attacks. From January to September, 
1939, Mei Yiqi and Ye Qisun contacted the Department of Construction of Yunnan 
Province and signed a ten-year lease to rent a land of 165.87 mu (0.11 square kilometers) 
at Dapuji (大普吉), northwestern suburb of Kunming. From the end of 1939 to the 
summer 1946, Dapuji was the base for the divisions of pathology and physiology of 
Tsinghua IOA, as well as the base for the Institute of Radio Science and the Institute of 
Metallurgy. The division of entomology set an office in Kunming and rented a land of ten 
mu at Poxi (婆兮), a small town 170 kilometers south of Kunming, as their experimental 
farm to plant fruit-trees and sugarcane (important crops of the southwest).297 
        Living conditions at these villages were extremely tough. These prominent scientists 
had to build up houses as well as establish basic water and power systems for their lives 
and research. They also needed to deal with harassment from brigands, local peasants, 
and the soldiers protecting them.298 By 1939, the annual fund from Tsinghua for each 
research group had increased to 30,000 CND. In addition, the divisions of plant 
pathology and entomology received 8,000 CND annual stipend from CAEI; the group of 
                                                 
297 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-92, “Documents and Contracts about How the 
Tsinghua IOA’s Rented Lands at Dapuji”. 
298 Before Tsinghua, some scholars from the National Sun Yat-Sen University had moved to a 
farm near Dapuji, and they suffered robbery in February 1940 (see Tsinghua University Archives, 
file 1-3:3-92, p. 31). At the request of President Mei Yiqi, Long Yun (龙云), chairman of Yunnan 
province, sent some soldiers to Dapuji for a security guard. From then on the Tsinghua 
researchers had to tolerate noise from the soldiers. In addition, local peasants along with the 
soldiers usually came to the experimental farm and garden of Tsinghua IOA to steal fruits. The 
elegant Tsinghua intellectuals could hardly stop such rude harassment.  
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general physiology had a grant of U.S. $2,500 from the Rockefeller Foundation.299 
Although the funding had increased, the scientists had to repurchase apparatus and 
journals, and, different from in Peiping, there were few other research organizations in 
Kunming to share research equipment with Tsinghua IOA. The financial situation for the 
Tsinghua IOA became even tougher after 1940, when severe inflation happened in 
Southwest China.  
        However, in the villages the scientists were finally able to stay far away from air 
attacks and to settle down for their research and education. Since the summer of 1939, 
when Lianda restarted to recruit graduate students, Tsinghua IOA had accepted many 
graduate students from the departments of biology and chemistry as research assistants. It 
provided a relatively peaceful environment for graduate students to conduct experimental 
research and finish their studies at the master’s level. Also after 1939, Lianda restarted 
the exams to select talented Chinese students to study in the U.S. The Tsinghua IOA 
functioned as a preparatory training institute and allowed the selected biology and 
agriculture students to undertake short-term research before going to the U.S.300  
        Because all professors at Tsinghua IOA were American-trained scientists and 
familiar with English and American culture, they played an important role in receiving 
western scientists. After 1941, when the United States joined the Allies of WWII, China 
restored its diplomatic communication with it and Britain. Academic communications 
                                                 
299 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-88, draft reports of the Institute of Agriculture in 
1940.  
300 From 1942 to 1945, some lecturers in Tsinghua IOA went to study in the U.S. as well, for 
example, Mao Yingdou, Jiang Huaizhang, and Zhu Hongfu. 
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became active as well.301 Tsinghua IOA scientists’ contribution to the local-global 
circulation of scientific knowledge lasted till the 1970s and 1980s. 
        During its early development, Tsinghua was established as a preparatory school for 
the Boxer students. It had been highly inclined to prepare students for practical studies 
because according to the agreement between the American and the Chinese government, 
more than 80% of the Boxer students must major in practical knowledge such as science, 
engineer, medicine, and agriculture. The primary goal for training western-style 
intellectuals was to introduce practical knowledge directly beneficial to China. In 
addition, China was underdeveloped in both economics and scientific institutions, and the 
leadership was not willing to support pure scientific research without obvious use. It was 
very hard for Chinese scientists to have equal academic communication exchange with 
their foreign colleagues. Since the late 1920s, however, scientific research and education 
institutions had greatly improved in many areas of China, as mentioned above. It was no 
longer an extravagant hope for the Chinese people to create international-level scientific 
knowledge within their home country. At this time, Tsinghua had evolved to a leading 
university in China, which meant that it needed to maintain both its teaching and research 
at a high level. On one hand, Yu Zhenyong’s unsuccessful agricultural department 
suggested that simply applying agricultural knowledge and directly teaching the peasants 
was not enough for the development of agricultural department in a leading Chinese 
university. On the other hand, pure research without application was definitely unsuitable 
for the actual conditions of Republican China, because most parts of the country were 
                                                 
301 For example, Joseph and Dorothy Needham had visited Dapuji and built up a close friendship 
with Tang Peisong and other scientists in the physiology group.  
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still very poor and the country could not afford huge investments in scientific research 
without noticeable reward. Therefore, it was the time for Chinese scientists to re-evaluate 
the importance of pure and applied sciences in order to make a long-term development 
plan. 
        I argue here that the Tsinghua IOA scientists found a way to emphasize both pure 
research and application, which allowed them to be able to adapt to local conditions and 
to communicate with their international scientific colleagues. Dai Fanglan had pointed 
out at the very beginning of Tsinghua IOA’s establishment that: 
        “[O]ur institute will devote our research to resolving practical problems 
in agricultural production. We are not focusing on profound research. This is 
why we name us as the Institute of Agriculture (农业研究所) rather than 
institute of agricultural sciences (农学研究所).”302 
And that:  
        “All applied sciences are built up on the base of pure research.”303     
        These paradoxical expressions do not imply an inconsistency among the Tsinghua 
IOA scientists. Actually, historians of science in modern China have already noticed that 
pure and applied sciences in China have not been in a tension as they had in the United 
States.304 Although debates around the relationship between pure and applied sciences 
                                                 
302 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2:1-200, p. 30. 
303 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-94, pp. 2-4. 
304 For example, in his book The Study of Change: Chemistry in China, 1840-1949 (Cambridge: 
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had lasted through the Republican period in mainland China, generally speaking, Chinese 
scholars in the 1920s and the 1930s believed that the two were inseparable and deserved 
equal attention and investment. For example, in 1936, Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培) proposed 
that: 
         “Scientific research should not set application as the only purpose. Many 
applicable scientific results were achieved as the byproduct of pure scientific 
research. … It is undeniable that achievements of pure sciences may become 
foundations of applied sciences, while concerns of applied sciences can 
provide new topics and methodologies for pure sciences. We should place 
equal emphasis on both of them and therefore receive double-wins. Ignoring 
one of the two would result in failure for both of them.”305 
        Scientists such as Ding Wenjiang and Tao Menghe also declared that the so-called 
“pure” or “applied” sciences were just simple and convenient categories to distinguish 
some new disciplines, while science itself should be a cohesive entirety rather than 
separate fragments. “It should be called the application of sciences, rather than applied 
sciences.”306 
        Therefore, although Chinese scientists motivated by their identity of being Chinese 
were inclined to conduct the scientific research most useful and practical for China’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
agricultural science in socialist China in her “Self-Reliant Science: The Impact of the Cold War 
on Science in Socialist China”, in Naomi Oreskes and John Krige, eds. Science and Technology 
in the Global Cold War, MIT Press, 2014. 
305 Cai Yuanpei, “Process Outline of the National Central Academy” (April 16th, 1936), The First 
Draft of the History of the Academia Sinica, Taipei: the Academia Sinica, 1988, pp. 23-28. (蔡元
培，“国立中央研究院进行工作大纲”（1936年 4月 16日），《中央研究院史初稿》，台
北，中央研究院，1988年，第 25-26页) 
306 Yang Tsui-Hua, p. 149. 
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prosperity and strength, they were able to stress the identity of being scientists and 
therefore were able to balance pure research and applications in their results. The reason 
for the successful balance was that, although the government and people in China—just 
as in the U.S.—were demanding that scientists produce most beneficial outcomes, 
Chinese scientists felt that it was critical to contribute to international scientific research, 
because science in China had developed with significant foreign influence. With pride in 
being Chinese scientists, they wanted to create and circulate new scientific knowledge 
around the world in order to promote China’s status in the global scientific community as 
well as to promote the development of science. Such strategies were reflected in 
Tsinghua scientists’ work in three areas: the biological control of insects led by Liu 
Chongle, water potential in plant respiration led by Tang Peisong, and fungal 
classification led by Dai Fanglan. Fungal classification in the group of plant pathology 
was a continuation of Dai Fanglan’s prewar research, and I will briefly introduce the first 
and second case to analyze how these agricultural scientists motivated by love for 
country took proper strategies to realize their desire of serving China through agricultural 
sciences. 
        Compared with Dai Fanglan and Tang Peisong, Liu Chongle, director of the 
Division of Entomology at Tsinghua IOA, seemed to be quieter and less public. 
However, his experience in Republican China might be the best example of how 
scientific knowledge circulated between China and the West.  
        Liu was born in Shanghai on September 20, 1901. His grandfather Liu Qixian (刘齐
衔, 1815-1877), the son-in-law of Lin Zexu (林则徐), had held provincial civil positions 
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including governor and judge (e.g., 陕西布政使, and 浙江按察使). Liu Chongle majored 
in chemistry and biology at Tsinghua College from 1916 to 1920. He received a B.S. 
degree from Cornell University in 1922 and entered the department of entomology at the 
agricultural school in this university. After receiving a doctoral degree, Liu Chongle 
returned to China in September 1926 and served as a professor at the Northeastern 
University in Shenyang. After the September 18 Incident,307 when most faculty and 
students of the Northeastern University were exiled to Peiping, Liu Chongle was engaged 
by the department of biology in the National Peiping Normal University (Beijing Normal 
University). By 1933, Liu Chongle had become the chair of this department. However, 
compared with universities with foreign support such as Jinda and Tsinghua, the Peiping 
Normal University (funded by the Ministry of Education in Nanjing) did not have enough 
funding to effectively support scientific survey and research. Liu Chongle had not gotten 
the chance to put what he had learned from the Cornell agricultural school to good use 
until he joined Tsinghua IOA in 1934.308 
        Biological control of insect pests had been Liu Chongle’s research focus all through 
his life. During his research trip in 1934 and 1935, Liu Chongle visited six western 
institutes for this topic—the agricultural experiment station of the Hawaiian Sugar 
Planters’ Association, Honolulu, Hawaii; the Cities Experiment Station, Riverside, 
                                                 
307 Japanese troops invaded Northeast China on September 18, 1931.  
308 It is not easy to figure out details of Liu Chongle’s life. He was persecuted to death at the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution without leaving any memoir or biography. Almost all 
archival materials of the Institute of Zoology in CAS (where Liu Chongle had been working since 
1953) were ruined during the Cultural Revolution and all personal records of the scientists were 
lost. This brief introduction is based on Tsinghua University Archives file 1-2:1-200 and The 
Brief History of the Institute of Zoology in Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing: Science Press, 
2008. 
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California; the Gipsy Moth Laboratory, Melrose Highlands, Massachusetts; European 
Corn Borer laboratory, Arlington, Massachusetts; Japanese Beetle Laboratory, 
Moorestown, New Jersey; and the parasite laboratory of the Imperial Bureau of 
Entomology, Farnham Royal, England. He was deeply impressed by the use of parasitic 
wasps in controlling orange pests in California.309  
We see Liu’s strategy to link his basic science research program to local 
applications very clearly when he and his Tsinghua colleagues fled to Yunnan Province 
to escape the Japanese Army during the war. From 1936 to 1937, Liu designed and 
headed a research program in which his assistants and students identified natural enemies 
of pests of plants important to the economy in North China, including cotton, sorghum, 
and oak. After moving to Yunnan, Liu and the Tsinghua entomologists shifted their 
emphasis to pest insects of peaches, sugarcane, and some other plants that were 
economically important to this south-western province. In the southwest, they had to start 
over to figure out the life histories of local pest insects and identify some of the natural 
predatory insects of these pests through experiments. Meanwhile, the entomology group 
cooperated with the physiology group to give weekly lectures to researchers from Lianda, 
Tsinghua, and local schools and institutes. Liu Chongle was the first presenter of this 
lecture series and his topic was on a parasitic wasp of a beetle larva. Lacking the 
personnel, Tsinghua IOA by itself was not able to popularize this scientific method. 
However, Liu and his Tsinghua colleagues gave their research results to the agricultural 
departments of the provincial government for further popularization and education. 
                                                 
309 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2-1-200, “Liu Chongle’s Research Travel Plan of 
studying agricultural entomology in America and Europe”, pp. 57-59. 
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Because of Tsinghua IOA’s collaboration with these governmental organizations, the 
idea of biological control of pests was disseminated to peasants in South China and 
became a popular method to treat pests after the 1950s. Interestingly, although the idea of 
bio-control originated in western countries, it declined in the United States and Europe 
after the wide application of chemical fertilizer and pesticides. As a result, when 
mainland China restarted diplomatic communications with the United States, scientists 
from America were deeply impressed by bio-control of insect pest in China, and this 
method was re-introduced to American people as an example of mass science from 
communist China.310  
        According to the extant documents of Liu Chongle, unlike Dai Fanglan and Tang 
Peisong, Liu did not talk too much about love for his country. He was always quiet 
towards political and social issues beyond the scope of his scientific research. Compared 
with the identity of being Chinese, the identity of being a scientist seemed to be a 
stronger motivation through Liu’s life and career. For example, Liu Chongle described 
the goals of Tsinghua IOA as: 
        “This program was established under the request of government and belongs 
to a university. … The working emphasis must be research and cultivating 
scientists. … The general steps for insect research were surveying, experimenting, 
and popularizing…”311  
                                                 
310 See Sigrid Schmalzer, “Insect Control in Socialist China and Corporate United States.: The 
Act of Comparison, The Tendency to Forget, and The Construction of Difference in 1970s U.S.-
Chinese Scientific Exchange,” Isis, 2013, 104:303-329. 
311 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-94, pp. 2-4. 
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And when talking about the biological control of pests, he believed that the duty of 
Tsinghua scientists was research rather than popularization and education: 
“Our research outcomes may be applied to the control and utilization of insects. 
However, our labors were too limited to popularize the outcomes among peasants. 
We need to cooperate with governmental departments for the popularization.”312 
Compared with Dai Fanglan’s description of the goals of the IOA, his words reveal that 
Liu was not as interested in institution building and especially publicity. He preferred to 
focus narrowly on his research and let the government popularize and apply his findings. 
        During the wartime, the National Agricultural Bureau (the Central Agricultural 
Experimental Institute) provided about half of the research funding for Liu Chongle’s 
group, which implied that the central government was expecting some practical results 
from Liu’s research. From the case of Liu’s bio-control research, we can see that this 
scientist did not especially alter his research interest to fit the requirements of the 
government. However, we should also notice that even without the motivation of 
governmental funding, Liu was choosing—maybe unconsciously—some research topic 
potentially beneficial for his country. During his 1934-1935 research trip, Liu wrote to 
president Mei Yiqi to introduce the bio-control method he saw in California, and 
expressed an enthusiasm to apply this method in rural China. While the idea of 
biological control of insect pests can only be applied based on specific local conditions, 
Liu Chongle’s research exemplified how a general scientific idea from western countries 
adapted to and developed in local environments, and how Chinese scientists transferred 
                                                 
312 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-88, pp. 38-42. 
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the developed ideas back to their western colleagues. Liu also exemplified a way of 
Chinese scientists to realize their dual-identity—they claimed to be focusing on pure 
scientific research of their interest, and claimed to be indifferent in politics and practical 
application of knowledge. However, motivated by the identity of being Chinese (maybe 
unconsciously), their research interests were entangled with the actual needs of Chinese 
society. Therefore, when conducting and creating scientific knowledge, they were also 
contributing to their country and particularly to the welfare of its people. 
        Among the three leading Tsinghua IOA scientists, Tang Peisong had especially 
emphasized pure research while he was also a major contributor to the application of 
science. His practical research included producing lubricant oil with castor-oil plants as 
raw materials; cultivating fast-growing crops and seedless fruits by applying auxin, 
colchicine, and low-temperature treatments; researching fermentation processes and 
producing acetone and calcium lactate; and surveying the nutritional details of Chinese 
diets and planning a balanced diet for Chinese soldiers. These contributions made Tang’s 
group very attractive for both young students and governmental and industrial financial 
support during the war. Tang created a very good balance between practical studies of 
applied science and the pure research of sciences with less obvious direct benefits. These 
practical studies, on one hand, realized Tang’s identity of “being for the Chinese 
people”—the desire to serve China; on the other hand, this work also enabled him to 
realize his identity of being a scientist—to conduct the basic research in which he was 
interested.  
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        Tang Peisong had developed a strong interest in exploring the fundamental nature of 
physical and chemical principles of living things as he pursued advanced research after 
his years at the University of Minnesota. During his studies at the Johns Hopkins 
University, Woods Hole, and Harvard University, he decided to choose the physiology of 
plant respiration and photosynthesis as the focus of his scientific career—and he did 
insist on this focus all through his life, even during wartime. Research conditions were 
extremely poor at Kunming during the war. Tang’s Laboratory of General Physiology 
was considered as the best-equipped laboratory in Southwest China because Lou 
Chenghou, an associate professor at this group, had brought back some specialized 
electrophysiology equipment from the United States. However, Lou’s research was 
separated from the works of other scientists. For Tang and most of his colleagues and 
students, even the incubator and the refrigerators would break down very frequently. 
However, these scientists were still able to overcome these difficulties and generate top-
ranking scientific knowledge. For instance, in March 1940, Tang Peisong and Luo Shiwei 
(罗士苇) published their research on polyploidy induced by colchicine treatment in 
Science (No. 2357).313 In December 1943, Luo Shiwei and Wang Fuxiong (王伏雄) 
published their works on conifer physiology in Science (No. 2555).314 In 1945, because of 
Joseph Needham’s introduction, three young scientists at Tang’s group, Zheng Bolin (郑
柏林), Chen Shaoling (陈绍龄), and Zheng Weiguang (郑伟光), published their research 
                                                 
313 P.S. Tang, and W.S. Loo, “Polyploidy in Soybean, Pea, Wheat and Rice, Induced by 
Colchicine Treatment,” Science, Vol. 91, No. 2357, 1 March 1940, p. 222. 
314 S.W. Loo, and F.H. Wang, “The Culture of Young Conifer Embryos in vitro,” Science, Vol. 
98, No. 2555. 17 December 1943, p. 544. 
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of puchiin in Nature (Vol. 156),315 which was the first time anyone had purified an 
antibiotic from higher plants.316 Among all the achievements of this group, I believe that 
the most interesting and remarkable one should be Tang Peisong’s 1941 article on the 
“water relations” (now called “water potential” in plant physiology) during plant 
metabolism.  
        In 1940, Tang Peisong collaborated with Wang Zhuxi (王竹溪), a physics professor 
at Lianda, working on water relations in plant cells. They submitted their discoveries to 
the Journal of Physical Chemistry in U.S. in August 1940, in a study entitled “A 
Thermodynamic Formulation of the Water Relation in an Isolated Living Cell.” This 
article was published in the third issue of Journal of Physical Chemistry in 1941. It 
proposed the thermodynamic methods to explain and calculate the water movement of 
plant cells with the concept of intra- and extra-cellular chemical potentials (although they 
did not use the term “potential” directly). Tang Peisong and Wang Zhuxi’s results were 
an important breakthrough in understanding the physical chemistry of water metabolism 
in plants at that time. This article demonstrated that scientists in wartime China were still 
active and enthusiastic in fundamental research and in participating actively in 
international scientific communication. However, their discoveries were too far ahead of 
their time and were ignored for decades.317 In the 1960s, western scientists such as R. O. 
Slatyer, S. A. Taylor, and P. J. Kramer developed a systematic way to describe water 
                                                 
315 S.L. Chen, B.L. Cheng, W.K. Cheng, and P.S. Tang, “An Antibiotic Substance in the Chinese 
Water-chestnut, Eleocharis tuberosa,” Nature, Vol. 156, 25 August 1945, p. 234. 
316 The Brief History of the Institute of Botany at CAS, p. 622. 
317 According to Google scholar (searched on August 3, 2012), Tang Peisong and Wang Zhuxi’s 
1941 article has only been cited by 14, while P. J. Kramer’s 1984 book Water Relations of Plants 
and Soils has been cited by 2514. 
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metabolism in plant cells using the concept of “water potential.” They were considered as 
pioneers in unifying studies in this field, while Tang and Wang’s 1941 article had 
actually covered all essential points in the works of Slatyer, Taylor, and Kramer. In 1984, 
Kramer expressed a deep regret for neglecting Tang and Wang’s results.318 
        After 1949, Tang Peisong continued his research in the physiology of plant 
respiration and photosynthesis. For example, when taking the position of vice director of 
the Institute of Botany at CAS, Tang led his group in elucidating multiple pathways when 
a U.S. Plant Studies Delegation visited China during August and September 1974,319 
Tang proposed to leaders at CAS that China might also send a scientist delegation to the 
U.S. He suggested that photosynthesis was a hot topic at that time, and Chinese scientists 
had strong background in this field, so this delegation might be composed scientists 
focusing on plant metabolism and photosynthesis. The CAS leaders accepted Tang’s 
proposal and organized a “Plant Photosynthesis Delegation.” This delegation consisted of 
eight plant scientists and visited the United States from November 15 to December 15, 
1974. Tang Peisong was excluded from this group because of his suspicious political 
                                                 
318 Liu Jixing, “Collaboration between Tang Peisong and Wang Zhuxi on Water Relation in Plant 
Cells,” in Tsinghua University and Science and Technology in Modern China, edited by Yang 
Jian and Dai Wusan, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2006, pp. 97-118.  Originally published 
in Physics, 2003, No. 6 & No. 7. (刘寄星，“汤佩松和王竹溪关于植物细胞水分关系的合作研
究及其启示”，《清华大学与中国近现代科学技术》，杨舰，戴吾三编著，北京：清华大
学出版社，2006，页 211-222。原载《物理》2003年第 6、7期) 
319 This delegation visited China from August 27 to September 23, 1974. Its members included 
world-renowned scientists, such as Richard L. Bernard, Norman E. Borlaug, Nyle C. Brady, 
Glenn W. Burton, John L. Creech, Jack R. Harlan, Arthur Kelman, Henry M. Munger, George F. 
Sprague, and Sterling Wortman. They visited many botany and agriculture institutes in China. 
Tang was suffering political persecution and not able to meet these American scientists, but some 
of his old colleagues (such as Yin Hongzhang) got the chance to meet and talk with the 
delegation. See Sun Qiliang, “中国与美国古植物学交流与合作的大门是如何被打开的？”, 
http://blog.sciencenet.cn/home.php?mod=space&uid=225931&do=blog&id=378602 
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background. But he was still very proud that this delegation of Chinese scientists was 
traveling to meet their western counterparts and to describe their research. The crucial 
impact of such an international delegation during the Cold War was not lost by Tang. In 
his memoirs, he bantered that this delegation functioned as “photosynthesis 
diplomacy.”320 
 
4.3 Summary 
        The War of Resistance from 1937 to 1945 forced almost all leading Chinese 
intellectuals and agricultural scientists to leave their homes and institutions in the coastal 
regions and move to the Southwest. During wartime, political forces and academic 
organizations were both reconstructed. In his 1991 book The Study of Change: Chemistry 
in China, 1840-1949, James Reardon-Anderson claimed that the war brought sharper 
conflict between scientists and the state because political leaders demanded that the 
scientists serve the immediate practical needs of industry and military, whereas the 
scientists insisted on their professional autonomy.321 After examining cases of 
agricultural scientists from the National Central University and the Institute of 
Agriculture at Tsinghua University, I think Reardon-Anderson’s assertion does not apply 
well to the agricultural scientists. It was true that the state (the Nationalist central 
government) was requesting immediate assistance from the scientists, and some scientists 
still kept their interests in pure research without instant practical benefits. However, at 
                                                 
320 Tang Peisong, p. 52. 
321 Reardon-Anderson, James, The Study of Change: Chemistry in China 1840-1949, p. 363. 
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least in the field of agricultural sciences, the war relieved, rather than sharpened, conflicts 
between scientists and the state.  
        This relief was because of the following reasons. Firstly, when the war broke out, 
tension between the “Chinese” and the “foreign” became the most principal tension in 
China, which strongly invoked Chinese intellectuals’ feeling of patriotism. For patriotic 
scientists under pressure of foreign invasion and danger of national subjugation, the 
social responsibility of a Chinese citizen took precedence over the professional interests 
of a research scientist. Agricultural scientists’ desire of serving the country through their 
academic work coincided with the state’s expectations for scientists. Secondly, the state’s 
command for agricultural scientists was largely relevant to exploring southwestern China 
to improve production and support the war. For agricultural scientists, joining 
governmental projects meant more opportunities for their scientific research, which they 
would never have gotten before the war. Therefore, agricultural scientists’ desire of 
serving the country usually did not conflict with their pursuit in science. Thirdly, 
although the Nationalist government’s domination got strengthened, it was still not strong 
enough to control regions previously ruled by other warlords. Therefore, it was possible 
for scientists disagreeing with the Nationalist state to maintain some academic autonomy 
in the political periphery, as the Tsinghua scientists did.  
        In conclusion, the eight-year war brought opportunities as well as difficulties and 
frustrations for the development of Chinese sciences. Under external pressure, 
agricultural scientists’ motivation of serving their country through science became even 
stronger than before. During the war, when tension between China and the “foreign” 
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overwhelmed the central-local tension and disagreements between sholars and 
governments, agricultural scientists were less hesitant about their careers, because the 
principal tension was more clear than before. They were able to select and implement 
strategies appropriate to their pursuit of being both patriotic Chinese people and 
productive scientists, and therefore contributed to both their country and to science. 
Comparison between scientists from NCU and Tsinghua exemplified different effective 
strategies taken under different conditions. Moreover, the migrant scientists were able to 
explore the southwest area which used to be too far away from the prewar scientific and 
academic centers. Such exploration significantly promoted the development of Chinese 
science. Achievements in this period had deep influences on Chinese agriculture, science, 
and education after the war—and even through today.  
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Figure 14 Founders of the Chinese Crop Improvement Association at Cornell University, 
February 1932 (left to right: Ma Baozhi, Cheng Shifu, Jin Shanbao, Feng Zefang, Lu 
Shougeng, Guan Jiaji) 
 
   
Figure 15 The National Agricultural Bureau’s working area: before and during the War 
(Annual Reports of the Department of Plant Pathology, the National Agricultural Bureau, 
left: 1940, right: 1942) 
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Figure 16 Movement of leading national universities with agricultural schools (Tsinghua 
IOA along with PKU, Tsinghua, and Nankai to Kunming, NCU to Chongqing, National 
Wuhan University to Leshan, the National Sun Yat-sen University to Chengjiang) 
 
  
Figure 17 Feng Zefang’s Research of Cotton in China 
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Figure 18 Kaiyuan Mumian in Yunnan, identified by Feng Zefang and his team in 1936 
 
 
Figure 19 Mumian at Kaiyuan, Yunnan, taken by Feng Zefang in 1936 
 
 
Figure 20 Research stations of Tsinghua IOA in Yunnan  
 267 
 
Epilogue	and	Conclusion	
 
        When the war ended in August 1945, it seemed that the future would be positive for 
both the Nationalist government and Chinese scientists. After winning the War of 
Resistance, the Nationalist government’s authority and prestige among Chinese people 
reached a peak. During the last year of the Sino-Japanese War, Jiang Jieshi, leader of the 
Nationalist Party, seized military power from the remaining warlords who disagreed with 
him (the price was that the command power of the Chinese army got confused, and the 
Japanese army took the chance to seize several provinces in South China). For the 
Nationalist government, the only remarkable enemy was the Chinese Communist Party 
based in the North, which governed about one-fourth of the country’s population. With 
financial, technical, scientific, and military support from America, it seemed not a big 
problem to defeat the Communist Party and unify all of China.  
        Most universities’ scholars were optimistic about the future of the country and their 
scientific endeavors in late 1945 and early 1946. Take agricultural scientists at Tsinghua, 
for example. The Tsinghua IOA returned to Peiping in August 1946. The Tsinghua 
campus had been occupied by the Japanese army for eight years. Offices and experiment 
rooms of IOA had been used as wards and horse stables. All books and equipment were 
ruined or lost. Despite tough conditions, Tsinghua scholars quickly managed to restart 
their research and education. The Institute of Agriculture was reorganized into the School 
of Agriculture in 1947, with Tang Peisong as the director. Several professors (such as Yin 
Hongzhang and Yu Dafu) left for foreign organizations or Peking University, but the 
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three leading scientists stayed in the new agricultural school. The “divisions” of plant 
pathology and entomology were reformed into the “departments” of plant pathology and 
entomology. The Laboratory of General Physiology was changed into the department of 
agricultural chemistry. Tang Peisong borrowed the institutional model of Johns Hopkins 
University and aimed to establish the agricultural school at Tsinghua as an institute 
training elite scientists. For instance, there were in total 12 professors, all of whom were 
western-trained scientists with teaching experience, in the three departments. And in 
1947 this school enrolled only 12 students. Tang Peisong wished to maintain the 
faculty/students ratio around 1:5 after five years. He got permission to use an area322 near 
the Summer Palace as a site for the agricultural school. In addition, he purchased and 
installed the most advanced apparatus for field work and laboratory research.323 
        However, the turbulent political environment broke Tang Peisong’s dream of 
building a Johns Hopkins University in China. When the civil war between the 
Nationalist government and Communist Party broke out, the positive situation for 
Chinese academia changed. The most urgent desire for patriotic intellectuals was to 
return home, promote their careers and lives, and serve China and the Chinese people 
with their science and knowledge. But the Nationalist government seemed reluctant to 
help some of the university scholars return home. It facilitated the NCU’s move back to 
Nanjing, but plotted to have Southwest Associated University stay in Yunnan and 
continue functioning as one university—that is why the Tsinghua scientists were not able 
                                                 
322 Sheng Ping Shu (昇平署) was an old but beautiful governmental office next to the east gate of 
the Summer Palace (颐和园). The Japanese occupying army had started a farm near this office 
and Tsinghua had taken both the office and the farm in 1946. 
323 Tang Peisong, Chapter 12. 
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to return to their Beiping campus until August 1946. Moreover, the Nationalist central 
government showed much greater enthusiasm in diminishing the Communists. However, 
the government’s goal was not the goal of most agricultural scientists. A civil war—
fighting against other Chinese people—seemed meaningless for most Chinese 
intellectuals who held a strong love for their country.  
        More important, the Nationalist government failed to control the economy and 
currency inflation. By September 1947, the average price index in urban China had 
increased 46 thousand times compared with that index in 1937. And it increased over one 
hundred thousand times in the following seven months. Almost all Chinese people, 
including the university scientists, went broke by April 1948.324 Once living became a 
problem, scholars could hardly devote themselves to sincerely serving China through 
knowledge. Many promising young scientists had to leave academia, because it was 
impossible for them to maintain subsistence with the salary of university scientists. For 
example, Chen Sheng, a young biochemist, started working as a research assistant at 
Tang Peisong’s plant physiology group in 1943 and exhibited excellent ability in 
scientific research and analysis. But he had a poor extended family to feed. As living 
costs kept increasing, the salary for a research assistant grew much more slowly than the 
inflation rate and was far from enough to feed them, so Chen had to search for positions 
in business with higher income, although he was very interested in physiological 
research. Tang Peisong managed to help Chen stay at Tsinghua, because he thought 
Chen’s brilliance should not be wasted. He persuaded President Mei Yiqi to send Chen 
                                                 
324 Liu Yun, 《孤帆远影：陈岱孙的 1900-1952》p. 224. 
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rice rather than money as salary (Mi Dai Jin).325 In addition, Tang directly gave Chen 
financial support with his own salary. However, as living costs kept skyrocketing, 
President Mei could not provide Mi Dai Jin for an ordinary research assistant any more, 
because even professors competed fiercely for this benefit; and Tang’s salary became 
insufficient to support his own family. As a result, Chen had to resign his research 
position, which made Tang Peisong feel deep regret.326 University scholars had belonged 
to a high-income stratum before the war, but they had to struggle for basic subsistence 
after returning to coastal areas after the war. When Tsinghua professors had to earn 
money through selling dairy products, repairing machines and appliances, and selling 
their calligraphy and carvings, it was impractical to expect them to effectively be making 
contributions toward serving China. By 1948, few university scholars still had a positive 
attitude toward the Nationalist government. A common perspective was: no matter how 
bad the new (very likely the communist) government would be, it could not be worse 
than the Nationalist one.327 
        Losing the confidence of Chinese people, and losing control over national 
economics, the Nationalist government quickly lost in the civil war as well. In the middle 
of December 1948, the PLA troops (People’s Liberation Army, the army of the CCP) 
                                                 
325 This approach was invented by the Nationalist government during the war. It functioned as a 
bonus benefit for intellectuals working at national institutes, named Mi Dai Jin (米代金, to 
replace money with rice), aiming to help officials and governmental intellectuals survive the 
inflation more easily. 
326 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-94, correspondence between Tang Peisong and Mei 
Yiqi. 
327 Qiu, Weifan, “ZhuiYi ZhenJunXue DaShi Dai Fanglan Er San Shi (Several Anecdotes of Dai 
Fanglan, the Great Mycologist),” in ZiShen YuanShi HuiYiLu (Memories of Famous 
Academicians), volume 2. 
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besieged Peiping. President Mei Yiqi fled to Nanjing. All Tsinghua professors gathered 
together to discuss the future of their university. Tang Peisong was the first one to stand 
up and appeal that “Tsinghua was built up with the blood of Chinese people. Now it is 
time to give it back to the people!”328 His appeal received a thunder of applause. Most 
Tsinghua faculty and students had no affection for the Nationalist government. They took 
a university-wide vote and decided to accept liberation of the CCP. The discussion and 
voting exemplified Tsinghua scientists’ nationalist thoughts and activities. From the 
stand-point of most Tsinghua scholars—especially some with strong patriotism—the 
Nationalist government’s unsuccessful governing made it seem almost opposed to the 
Chinese people. Therefore, even though most of these scholars did not know a lot about 
the CCP, they were willing to give up an alliance with the Nationalist government.  
        Nine months later, under an instruction from the Communist central government, the 
Tsinghua agricultural school was integrated into the new Beijing Agricultural University 
(BAU) along with the Peking University agricultural school and an agricultural division 
from the North China University. Scientists from the Tsinghua IOA reunited at the BAU, 
and the Tsinghua IOA itself had finally ended up in this new specialized agricultural 
university. 
        Experiences of the agricultural schools in Nanjing started a little better than 
Tsinghua IOA, but ended similarly. Thus, the National Central University had more 
priority in returning to its original sites and restore education and research. However, 
because of its “central” status, faculty and students at the NCU were closer to the 
                                                 
328 Tang Peisong, pp. 125-126. 
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corruption and incompetence of the Nationalist government. Disappointed by the 
Nationalist central government, in 1947 and 1948 several leading scientists at the 
agricultural school (such as Shen Qiyi and Deng Shuqun) even escaped to regions 
controlled by the Communist Party. When the PLA got close to Nanjing, the NCU faculty 
did not exhibit radical words or behaviors as the Tsinghua faculty had done, probably 
because they had been more deeply influenced by the Nationalist government for over 
two decades, or probably because the scholars who most hated the Nationalist 
government had already left. However, the majority of the NCU faculty and students 
decided to stay in Nanjing and refused to retreat to Taiwan with the Nationalist 
government. In 1952, the Communist government split and reorganized universities and 
colleges in the entire country. NCU’s agricultural school merged with the College of 
Agriculture and Forestry of the University of Nanking and formed the Nanjing 
Agricultural University. Through tremendous efforts in the following decades, the 
Nanjing Agricultural University has been considered the best higher education institute in 
South China specializing in agriculture, through today. 
        The choice between leaving for Taiwan or staying in the mainland actually may 
reflect scholars’ different strategies to fulfill their love for China and the desire of serving 
the Chinese people. For patriotic scientists like Tang Peisong and Shen Qiyi, it was the 
land and people that represented China. A “legitimate” state government losing 
confidence of the people and leaving the land could not stand for the country, even if it 
had international recognition. Therefore, they chose to stay with the object they wish to 
serve. On the other hand, scholars’ decision of leaving for Taiwan did not necessarily 
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indicate trust or affection with the Nationalist government. For instance, President Mei 
Yiqi left Tsinghua and fled to Taiwan because he believed that once the Communist Party 
took in charge, very likely the American federal government would suspend diplomatic 
relations with mainland China. Then the Boxer Scholarship could hardly continue. As the 
sole legitimate representative of Tsinghua University, Mei believed that if he was trapped 
in the mainland and lost effective connection with America, support for Tsinghua from 
the Boxer Scholarship (the China Foundation) would terminate. Therefore he decided to 
move to where he could continue cultivating capable Chinese intellectuals with the Boxer 
funding. History partly corroborated Mei’s expectations. Official connections between 
mainland China and America were suspended for almost three decades. Although none of 
the Tsinghua faculty moved to Taiwan with Mei, he was able to re-establish a National 
Tsinghua University in Taiwan with financial support from the China Foundation and it 
remains one of the top universities in Taiwan today.329 The cases I studied demonstrate 
that similar goals of serving China and Chinese people might motivate scholars taking 
opposite (but both reasonable and effective) strategies. 
        In the four chapters of this dissertation, I have studied motivations, goals, and 
strategies as keys to illuminate the American-trained scholars’ “scientific nationalism” or 
ideology of “serving China through agricultural science.” To conclude my dissertation, I 
still need to answer a big question: what was the result of these scholars’ efforts of 
serving China through science? Or, did the American-trained Chinese scholars succeed in 
realize their goals through their diverse strategies? 
                                                 
329 Even today there are still disagreements about which Tsinghua—the one in Beijing or the one 
in Taiwan—is the authentic Tsinghua. 
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         In my opinion, by the end of the war, university agriculturalists had made 
significant and valuable achievements in agricultural research and education. But their 
success in establishing agricultural extension was limited because of non-scientific 
factors. As I have explained, agricultural scientists, such as Zhao Lianfang, Shen 
Zonghan, and Feng Zefang, became aware that problems of imbalanced economical 
structures and distribution of agriculture and industry might be more important for 
improving the lives of farming people and increasing China’s wealth and strength. But it 
was beyond university scholars’ ability to reform the non-scientific factors. Some of the 
university agricultural scientists finally chose to leave universities and join governmental 
departments in order to regulate and improve non-scientific factors to facilitate extension 
of agricultural science, such as Shen Zonghan and Zhao Lianfang did. Some of them 
(such as Dai Fanglan) continued focusing on research and education, but gave the duty of 
improving agricultural extension to governmental scientists. The National Agricultural 
Research Bureau succeeded in extending advanced agricultural knowledge and 
technology in certain regions through agricultural clubs and experimental stations, but the 
Nationalist government failed to fundamentally reform the economic structure in rural 
China, and the Bureau’s efforts only covered a small part of China. According to Shen 
Zonghan’s memoir, by 1949 when he moved to Taiwan along with the Nationalist central 
government, the Bureau had established experimental stations in almost one hundred 
counties, but there were still hundreds of counties in mainland China not covered by the 
Bureau’s extension.  
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        On the other hand, it was obvious that the American-trained Chinese scholars had 
successfully improved scientific and educational institutions in China. Their work 
facilitated the generation and circulation of scientific knowledge, which elevated China’s 
status in international academic communities. In the mid-1930s, Chinese agricultural 
scientists made few presentations at international scientific conferences, and only seven 
Chinese universities were acknowledged by American academia (graduates from other 
Chinese universities had to take one or two years of additional training in American 
colleges, or they could not be admitted by American graduate school). However, by the 
end of the war, Chinese scientists at Tsinghua and the National Central University had 
published a considerable number of well-regarded articles in top ranking scientific 
journals such as Nature and the Journal of Physical Chemistry. From 1943 to 1948, many 
leading Chinese agriculturalists had attended and presented at international conferences 
in foreign countries.330 High-level international communications had become a normal 
part of the careers of scholars in leading Chinese universities.  
        As for graduate education, in his 1944 annual report, Dai Fanglan stated with 
confidence that Chinese universities like Tsinghua were competent for training masters 
students, and suggested that the Boxer scholarship should reduce its budget for 
supporting undergraduate and master students to study abroad, but increase supporting 
young faculty and researchers with working experience to take specialized training in 
                                                 
330 This type of international communication started during the war. For example, in spring 1943, 
Shen Zonghan, Zou Bingwen, and Zhao Lianfang were appointed as governmental 
representatives to attend the Post-War World Food and Agriculture Conference in Washington 
D.C. After the conference in April, Shen and Zou spent four months visiting Cornell University 
and some other agricultural colleges and institutes in the Midwest and California, investigating 
wartime American agricultural extension. See Shen Zonghan’s Memoir, volume 2, pp. 254-282. 
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foreign institutes that matched their particular research areas. Similarly to Dai’s 
perspective, in 1947, the Academia Sinica proposed a draft ten-year plan of improving 
applied science, which also pointed out that governmental scholarship for studying 
abroad would prefer supporting experienced researchers to take advanced training, and 
would diminish the number of students at the college and masters level, whose education 
could be accomplished by Chinese universities.  Meanwhile, the central government 
would increase support for improving graduate education in leading Chinese universities. 
Generally speaking, when the War of Resistance newly finished, a considerable number 
of American-trained Chinese scholars had partly realized the goal of serving China 
through agricultural sciences in education and scientific research. They were also 
confident in expanding their academic works and promoting their “serving the country 
through science” into a new stage. 
        To fully understand the development of these scholars’ “scientific nationalism,” we 
cannot ignore roles of the state, or the Nationalist central government. As I have argued 
in the introduction, when talking about KeXue BaoGuo or serving China through science, 
American-trained Chinese scholars usually considered Guo, the object of their service, as 
a country in the sense of culture and history, rather than the state government. Foremost 
in their minds was a dedication to their Chinese countrypeople. This concept was perhaps 
most powerfully stated by Tang Peisong in his eloquent statement: “Each Chinese person 
donated one tael of blood to cultivate us. I… swore to study hard in order to reciprocate 
favours bestowed by the country.” By focusing their attention on the welfare and benefits 
of the Chinese people and China as a country, they were able to ensure that they were 
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serving the country for which they felt love and belonging and dedicated loyalty, rather 
than any specific state government. Therefore, although almost all patriotic scholars 
cooperated with the Nationalist government during the war, most of them merely 
considered this as one of the many strategies they had taken to achieve their goals. The 
strategy of serving the Nationalist state was effective in serving the country under strong 
tension from war with foreigners. However, the ultimate goals for the scholars I have 
studied were still to improve the welfare of Chinese people and to strengthen China as a 
country, rather than the state as a political entity. If the Nationalist state government 
became a constraint for improving China as a country, these scholars’ profound love and 
loyalty for their country and country-people would motivate them to give up on this state. 
         In conclusion, did American-trained Chinese scholars succeed in realizing their 
goals through their diverse strategies? My answer is: if we just consider the Republican 
era, these scholars’ strategies effectively helped them improve research and education in 
the agricultural sciences in academic institutes. They not only survived and adapted to the 
chaotic environment, but also made remarkable contributions to both their country and 
the sciences by establishing and improving scientific and educational institutions in 
China. Moreover, they developed more advanced scientific knowledge in local Chinese 
environments and fed these achievements back to their foreign colleagues, and therefore 
contributed to the global circulation of scientific knowledge. But their success in 
extending scientific agricultural knowledge to working farmers was limited because of 
non-scientific factors such as problematic economical structures, imbalanced distribution 
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of agriculture and industry, and noncooperation of ignorant Chinese farming people.331 
However, if we look to the post-1949 period or even the post-reform period after 1978, a 
considerable portion of Republican-era agriculturalists’ scientific programs were 
extended after the Communist government reconstructed the country’s agriculture, 
industry, and academia (at very high price in both funding and people).  Many scientific 
and educational achievements of the American-trained scholars during the Republican era 
were extended and resulted in positive outcomes even through the change in political 
regime. I am not able to assert that these scholars were more successful in realizing their 
goals in the Communist era, because it is undeniable that new movements and situations 
after 1949 drastically disturbed and interrupted the normal careers of most American-
trained Chinese scholars (and even damaged their lives). However, I believe that the 
strategies and efforts of these scholars continued to be a positive force in serving China 
through agricultural science before and after 1949. We must consider the entire twentieth 
                                                 
331 Several cases in this dissertation (for example, Tsinghua scientists’ conflicts with peasants in 
YuanMingYuan, in section 3.3) suggest that resistance of the peasant farmers was an important 
reason why the agricultural scientists were not very successful in extension. Actually, there was 
another group of western-trained scholars in Republican China believing in that the root of 
China’s backwardness was its unenlightened ignorant people charactered by Pin Yu Ruo Si (贫愚
弱私, material poverty, intellectural ignorance, physical feebleness, and moral selfishness), and 
that the foundamental solution of improving China was to improve the peasants through mass 
education and public health. This group of Chinese intellectuals was represented by Yan Yangchu 
(晏阳初, James Yen) whom I have mentioned several times in the dissertation. Their motivation 
of improving China was similar to the motivation of agricultural scientists I am exploring, but 
their strategies of improving China through mass education were far away from (and seemed less 
successful than) those of improving China through sciences. Some efforts of the Mass Education 
were very famous, such as its programs in DingXian (定县). But the Mass Education programs 
suspended in mainland China after 1937 and did not achieve remarkable result in regions except 
Dingxian. For more information about Yan Yangchu and his colleagues’ efforts in mass 
education, see Charles W. Hayford, To the People: James Yen and Village China, Columbia 
University Press, 1990. 
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century in order to understand the complex influences on the development of Chinese 
agricultural sciences—and the strategies used by devoted and determined scientists who 
sought to serve China.  	
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List	of	Chief	Scholars	in	This	Dissertation	
 
Dai Fanglan (戴芳澜, 1893-1973) 
        Dai Fanglan was a famous mycologist and plant pathologist. He was one of the first 
academicians of the Academia Sinica and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Dai was 
founder of in China, and one of the founders of scientific institution of plant pathology in 
China. Dai traveled to American as a Boxer student in 1913. He received bachelor’s 
degree from the department of plant pathology at Cornell University in 1916, and 
master’s degree of plant pathology from Columbia University in 1918. After returning to 
China, Dai had worked at the Guangdong Provincial Agricultural College (1922-1923), 
the Southeastern University (1923-1927), the University of Nanking (1927-1934), 
Tsinghua University (1934-1949), the Beijing Agricultural College (1949-1952), and the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (1953-1973). 
 
Feng Zefang (冯泽芳, 1899-1959) 
        Feng Zefang was founder of modern cotton science in China. He took college 
education at the Southeastern University, and received doctoral degree from Cornell 
University in 1933. Since 1933 Feng had worked at the National Central University, 
Nanjing University, and the Nanjing Agricultural College.  
 
Guo Bingwen (郭秉文, 1880-1969) 
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        Guo was one of the first American-trained Chinese educationalists. He established 
the Southeastern University in Nanjing and supported Zou Bingwen to build the 
agricultural section a leading agricultural school in China. Guo took missionary education 
since childhood. He traveled to the United States with missionary funds in 1908 and 
received doctoral degree of education from Columbia University in 1914. 
 
Hu Shi (胡适, 1891-1962) 
        Hu Shi was the most well-known philosopher, writer, educationalist and diplomat in 
twentieth-century China. He had served as president of Peking University, president of 
the Academia Sinica, and China’s ambassador to the United States. Hu was among the 
first Boxer students to travel to the United States in 1911. Hu Shi studied agricultural 
science at Cornell University for one year. Then he transferred to philosophy and 
literature, and received doctoral degree of philosophy from Columbia University. He was 
well-known for advocating the use of written vernacular Chinese. He was also a key 
contributor of promoting scientific approaches and ideology.  
 
Jin Shanbao (金善宝, 1895-1997) 
       Jin Shanbao was a famous wheat scientist. His wheat variety Zhongda 2419 has been 
the most widely planted wheat in China for over four decades. Jin Shanbao received 
bachelor’s degree from the agricultural school of the Southeastern University, and studied 
plant pathology and genetics at Cornell University and the University of Minnesota 
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during 1930-1932. He had served as director of the agricultural college of the National 
Central University and worked at the Nanjing Agricultural College after 1952. 
 
Luo Jialun (罗家伦, 1897-1969) 
        Luo Jialun was a famous historian, educationalist, social activist, and nationalist 
politician in Republican China. He took college education at Peking University during 
the New Cultural Movement from 1917 to 1920, and then received governmental 
scholarship to travel to and study at six top universities in America, Britain, France, and 
Germany. Luo Jialun was known as leader of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, author 
of historical book KeXue Yu XuanXue (Science and Metaphysics), president of the 
National Tsinghua University and National Central University, and an outstanding 
diplomat at the Nationalist Government. 
 
Shen Zonghan (沈宗瀚, 1895-1980) 
        Shen Zonghan was the most famous agronomist and agricultural activist in 
Republican China. He received master’s degree from the Georgia state University and 
doctoral degree of agronomy and plant pathology from Cornell University. He had 
worked as a leading scientist at the missionary University of Nanking from 1927 to 1934 
and had taken charge of the National Agricultural Research Bureau during the War of 
Resistance from 1937 to 1946. 
 
Tang Peisong (汤佩松, 1903-2001) 
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        Tang Peisong was a plant physiologist and biochemist. He took secondary education 
at Tsinghua, college education at University of Minnesota, and doctoral education at the 
Johns Hopkins University. He and his students and colleagues at Tsinghua IOA had 
generated and circulated high quality scientific knowledge in both pure and applied 
science during the War, and he continued contributing to high-level scientific 
communication between China and America after 1949. Tang was an excellent example 
of scientist loving the country and people, but not the state.  
 
Zhao Lianfang (赵连芳, 1894-1968) 
        Zhao Lianfang was an agronomist and “father of modern Chinese rice”. He was also 
a boxer student taking undergraduate education at the Iowa state University and received 
doctoral degree of agronomy from the University of Wisconsin in 1928, focusing on 
genetics and cytology of rice. Zhao was a leading scientist and popular professor at the 
National Central University from 1928 to 1933, and a chief scientist at the National 
Agricultural Research Bureau. As a governmental scientist, he moved to Taiwan with the 
Nationalist government after 1949, but his students continued influencing younger 
Chinese agriculturalists with knowledge from Zhao Lianfang. 
 
Zou Bingwen (邹秉文, 1893-1985) 
        Zou Bingwen was founder of agricultural educational institution in China, and an 
achieving agricultural activist. He studied in the United States from 1910 to 1915 and 
majored in plant pathology at Cornell University. He was Founder and director of the 
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Agriculture Section at the Southeastern University, author of the first plant pathology 
textbook in Chinese language (1923) and the Agricultural Education in China (1923), 
Vice President of Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank (1931-1947), president of the 
Agricultural Association of China (1942-1948), and high advisor to the Ministry of 
Industry, Natural Resources Committee, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of the 
Nationalist Government.  
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